Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 30, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal Likelihood of Confusion

• Disclaimer Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL- LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION:

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 4335701 and Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration. Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [ du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS:

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” In re U.S. Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1795 (TTAB 2017) (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam , 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “LA” with the design of a star and registrant’s mark is “L.A STAR”. The marks are the legal equivalents of each other. Although applicant’s mark features a design of a star in the letter “A” and the registrant’s mark features the word “STAR”, the first word portions of the marks are identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; therefore, the addition of a design element does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).

 

These marks are legally identical in sound and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are legally identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.

 

Under the doctrine of legal equivalents, a design mark may be found confusingly similar to a word mark consisting of the design’s literal equivalent because they create a similar mental impression. TMEP §1207.01(c)(i); see, e.g., In re Rolf Nilsson AB, 230 USPQ 141, 142-43 (TTAB 1986) (holding a mark comprising the silhouette of a lion’s head and the letter “L” confusingly similar to the word mark LION); PumaSportschuhfabriken Rudolf Dassler KG v. Garan, Inc., 224 USPQ 1064, 1066-67 (TTAB 1984) (holding a mark comprising designs of a mountain lion confusingly similar to the word mark PUMA).

 

Moreover, there is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

RELATEDNESS OF GOODS:

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc. , 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton , 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler , 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The applicant’s goods are “Belts; Bottoms as clothing; Footwear; Headwear; Tops as clothing” in class 025.

 

The registrant’s goods are also clothing “Capri pants; Cargo pants; Crop pants; Denims; Lounge pants; Pants; Stretch pants” in class 025.

 

The attached Internet evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark:

 

• JCREW, who provides both bottoms as clothing and belts, footwear, headwear, and tops.
• NIKE, who provides both bottoms as clothing and belts, footwear, headwear, and tops.
• OLD NAVY, who provides both bottoms as clothing and belts, footwear, headwear, and tops.

 

Thus, applicant and registrant’s goods are considered the same and related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g. , In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd. , 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp. , 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In summary, the registered marks and the applied-for mark create the same commercial impression and the evidence shows that the goods are likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by the same consumers. Thus, consumers are likely to make the mistaken conclusion that the goods originate from the same source.

 

Therefore, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d). Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration

 

DISCLAIMER OF DESCRIPTIVE WORDING REQUIRED:

 

Applicant must disclaim “LA” because it is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods, and thus is an unregistrable component of the mark. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(2), 1056(a); In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A. , 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik”, 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1309 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §§1210.01(a), 1210.06(a), 1213.03(a).

 

The attached evidence from Acronymfinder.com and Ahdictionary.com show that LA stands for “Los Angeles.” The attached evidence from Wikipedia.com shows that Los Angeles is the most populous city in the state of California and thus, is a generally known geographic place or location. See TMEP §§1210.02 et seq.

 

The goods for which applicant seeks registration originate in this geographic place or location as shown by applicant’s address. See TMEP §1210.03. Purchasers are likely to believe the goods originate in this geographic place or location because applicant is from Los Angeles. See TMEP §§1210.04 et seq.

 

When there is no genuine issue that the geographical significance of a term is its primary significance, and the geographical place is neither obscure nor remote, a public association of the goods with the place is presumed if an applicant’s goods originate in the place named in the mark. TMEP §1210.04; see, e.g., In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Inc. , 10 USPQ2d 1704, 1706 (TTAB 1988) (holding CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN primarily geographically descriptive of restaurant services rendered in California); In re Handler Fenton Ws., Inc. , 214 USPQ 848, 849-50 (TTAB 1982) (holding DENVER WESTERNS primarily geographically descriptive of western-style shirts originating in Denver).

 

An applicant may not claim exclusive rights to terms that others may need to use to describe their goods, including the geographic origin thereof, in the marketplace. See Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc. , 950 F.2d 1555, 1560, 21 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Aug. Storck KG , 218 USPQ 823, 825 (TTAB 1983). A disclaimer of unregistrable matter does not affect the appearance of the mark; that is, a disclaimer does not physically remove the disclaimed matter from the mark. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc. , 340 F.2d 978, 978, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); TMEP §1213.

 

If applicant does not provide the required disclaimer, the USPTO may refuse to register the entire mark. See In re Stereotaxis Inc. , 429 F.3d 1039, 1040-41, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1088-89 (Fed. Cir. 2005 ); TMEP §1213.01(b).

 

Applicant may submit the following standardized format for a disclaimer:

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “LA” apart from the mark as shown.

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this disclaimer requirement online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/disclaimer.jsp

 

Legal Counsel Advisory:

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process.  The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process.  USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

CONTACT INFORMATION: If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

/Alexandra K. Chaffin/

Alexandra K. Chaffin

Law Office 126

(571).270.3077

Alexandra.Chaffin@USPTO.GOV

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 30, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88107304

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Chaffin, Alexandra

/Alexandra K. Chaffin/

Alexandra K. Chaffin

Law Office 126

(571).270.3077

Alexandra.Chaffin@USPTO.GOV

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 30, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”