UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88065282
MARK: FORD
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Ford, Elisa
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 2/1/2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on January 10, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated November 27, 2018, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, refusal for being primarily merely a surname. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement: amend the identification of services.
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: definite amended identification provided. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusals below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark remains refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3644915, 5596013, and 5596012. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registrations.
The applicant’s mark is FORD for:
Class 41: Entertainment services, namely, live musical, dance and dramatic performances; Entertainment services, namely, providing a website featuring non-downloadable prerecorded videos in the field of acting, drama, comedy, spirituality, self help, motivational storytelling, television and films; Entertainment services, namely, providing a website featuring non-downloadable pre-recorded audio and video recordings featuring online performances in the field of acting, drama, comedy, spirituality, self help, motivational storytelling, television and films; Entertainment services, namely, production of audio and video recordings; Event production services, namely, party planning and special event planning for social entertainment purposes
The first registrant’s mark is FORD for:
Class 41: Entertainment and educational services, namely, presenting and producing sporting events, sporting exhibitions, car shows, concerts, arranging meetings, sporting programs, seminars and conventions, and providing facilities for such events
The second registrant’s first mark is DR FORD MUSIC for:
Class 41: Entertainment services, namely, music production, music mixing, music mastering and music remixing
The second registrant’s second mark is DR FORD PRODUCTIONS for:
Class 41: Entertainment services, namely, music production, music mixing, music mastering and music remixing
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are similar in appearance, sound, and overall commercial impression.
Applicant’s mark which consists of only the word “FORD,” shares the same wording with all registrants’ marks. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Applicant argues that due to the manner in which the applied-for mark, “FORD,” is used, namely, to identify a “public entertainer brand name.” This argument is unpersuasive. The commercial impression of the applied-for mark and the registrations are highly similar as all are used to identify entertainment purposes. Consumer confusion has been held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall meaning. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1336, 164 USPQ 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding MISTER STAIN likely to be confused with MR. CLEAN on competing cleaning products); see In re M. Serman & Co., 223 USPQ 52, 53 (TTAB 1984) (holding CITY WOMAN for ladies’ blouses likely to be confused with CITY GIRL for a variety of female clothing); H. Sichel Sohne, GmbH v. John Gross & Co., 204 USPQ 257, 260-61 (TTAB 1979) (holding BLUE NUN for wines likely to be confused with BLUE CHAPEL for the same goods); Ralston Purina Co. v. Old Ranchers Canning Co., 199 USPQ 125, 128 (TTAB 1978) (holding TUNA O’ THE FARM for canned chicken likely to be confused with CHICKEN OF THE SEA for canned tuna); Downtowner Corp. v. Uptowner Inns, Inc., 178 USPQ 105, 109 (TTAB 1973) (holding UPTOWNER for motor inn and restaurant services likely to be confused with DOWNTOWNER for the same services); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant further argues that applicant has been using the applied-for mark “since a youth as a child performer.” This argument is unpersuasive. The length of time prior to which the applicant has been using the mark is not relevant for a likelihood of confusion determination. Applicant’s claim of priority of use is not relevant to this ex parte proceeding. See In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods and/or services specified in the certificate. During ex parte prosecution, the trademark examining attorney has no authority to review or to decide on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration. TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
Thus, the marks are highly similar.
Comparison of the Services
In this case, applicant is providing various entertainment services while the respective registrants are also providing entertainment services. The evidence will show that those who provides the specific entertainment services of the applicant also provide the services of each registrant and market these services under the same mark. In addition to the evidence attached in the November 27, 2018 Office action, please see the attached evidence from the following additional third party websites all accessed February 1, 2019.
Broadcast Management Group
Supreme Tracks
SkyeLabMusic
Applicant argues that because the services are different there can be no likelihood of confusion. This argument is unpersuasive. The fact that the services of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular services, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those services. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant argues that the services are unrelated due to the amendment of the identification of services. This argument is unpersuasive. The evidence above shows that those who provide entertainment services provide a wide variety of entertainment services including those of the applicant and registrants, and market these services under the same mark.
Further, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009).
Thus, the services are highly related.
Conclusion
Given that the applied-for mark is highly similar to the registered marks and that the services of applicant are highly related to the services in the registrations, applicant is rightly refused registration under Section 2(d). This refusal is now made FINAL.
It is important to note that the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Please see the following additional refusal.
ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS CLAIMED DENIED
Applicant’s Trademark Act Section 2(f) claim based on five years’ use is insufficient to show acquired distinctiveness because applicant’s dates of use of the mark indicate that applicant has not actually used the mark in commerce for the requisite time period. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f). For this claim to be accepted, applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate must have been for at least five years before the date on which the claim is made. 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05. And such use must have been in a type of commerce that may be regulated by the U.S. Congress. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(f), 1127.
In the present case, applicant asserted a claim of acquired distinctiveness on January 10, 2019. Five years prior to this date would be approximately January 10, 2014. However, the date of first use in commerce specified in the application is June 18, 2017, which is less than five years prior to the date the distinctiveness claim was made.
As an alternative to claiming acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), applicant may request to amend the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. See 15 U.S.C. §1091(a); 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a); TMEP §§801.02(b), 816. To amend to the Supplemental Register, the mark must be in lawful use in commerce; however, no specific length of use is required. See 15 U.S.C. §1091(a); 37 C.F.R. §2.47(a); TMEP §815.02.
SECTION 2(e)4 REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME
An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’” Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.
The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:
(1) Whether the surname is rare;
(2) Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;
(3) Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;
(4) Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and
(5) Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.
In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination. In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01. For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry. In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.
Please see the previously attached evidence from LEXISNEXIS®, establishing the surname significance of “Ford.” This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 287938 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers.
(1) Five Years’ Use: Applicant may submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The mark has become distinctive of the services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).
(2) Other Evidence: Applicant may submit other evidence of acquired distinctiveness, with the following statement, if accurate: “The evidence shows that the mark has become distinctive of the services.” 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(3); TMEP §1212.06. Such additional evidence may include “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).” In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above, applicant may respond by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. See 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
ASSISTANCE
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Alexandra Suarez/
Trademark Examining Attorney
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Law Office 120
p) 571-272-4845
e) alexandra.suarez@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
