Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

Issue date:  July 15, 2019

INTRODUCTION

This Office action is in response to Applicant’s communication filed on May 28, 2019.

In a previous Office action dated November 27, 2018, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion – Refusal
• Identification of the Goods – Clarification Required
• Claim of Ownership of Pending Application not Printed – Advisory

Based on Applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied:

• Identification of the Goods – Clarification Required
• Claim of Ownership of Pending Application not Printed – Advisory

See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

SUMMARY OF THE ISSUE MADE FINAL THAT APPLICANT MUST ADDRESS:

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion – Refusal

SECTION 2(d) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – REFUSAL

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

Applicant seeks registration of the mark PRESENCE. Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4630927 and 4630928, both owned by Registrant.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

Applicant seeks registration of the mark PRESENCE for “Digital materials, namely, CDs, DVDs, downloadable audio files, downloadable video files, and downloadable multi-media files containing text, audio, and video, all featuring Catholic education content” in International Class 009.

The registered mark in U.S. Registration No. 4630927 is PRESENCE QUOTIENT, in relevant part, for “Pre-recorded CDs and DVDs of training programs and seminars promoting Christian and family values” in International Class 009.

The registered mark in U.S. Registration No. 4630928 is PRESENCE QUOTIENT (plus design), in relevant part, for “Pre-recorded CDs and DVDs of training programs and seminars promoting Christian and family values” in International Class 009.

Similarity of the Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

In the present case, Applicant’s PRESENCE mark is confusingly similar to Registrant’s PRESENCE QUOTIENT marks in terms of appearance, sound, and commercial impression.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here, Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks share the identical term PRESENCE; thus, they appear and sound identical in part.

Further, Applicant’s PRESENCE mark is confusingly similar to Registrant’s PRESENCE QUOTIENT marks because the applied-for mark is entirely incorporated by the registered marks. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

In response, Applicant unpersuasively argues against the similarity of the marks.

First, Applicant’s argument that Applicant’s PRESENCE mark is dissimilar to Registrant’s PRESENCE QUOTIENT marks because the registered marks contain the additional term QUOTIENT is unpersuasive. Although Applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered marks, Applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of Registrant’s marks.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered marks because it contains some of the wording in the registered marks and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from these marks.

Second, Applicant’s argument that Applicant’s PRESENCE mark is dissimilar to Registrant’s PRESENCE QUOTIENT marks because the additional term QUOTIENT in the registered marks is dominant is equally unpersuasive Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Accordingly, because consumers are more inclined to focus on the first portion of the registered marks, the dominant portion of the registered marks that must be given greater weight in this analysis is the PRESENCE portion – which is identical to the applied-for PRESENCE mark.

Third, Applicant has submitted electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the word PRESENCE to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection. These registrations, however, appear to be for goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. For instance, U.S. Registration No. 5240818 is for totally unrelated goods, such as for software for watching concerts, festivals, and sports, U.S. Registration No. 3140345 is for consumer audio and electronic products, and U.S. Registration No. 1868070 is for musical sound recordings. In fact, not a single third-party registration that Applicant relies on is for related goods, namely, for materials in the field of Christianity or Catholicism. Evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”  See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by Applicant are insufficient to establish that the word PRESENCE is weak or diluted. Likewise, Applicant’s argument that the diluted nature of the marks is shown by the co-existence of the two cited registrations is not only unpersuasive but also incorrect, as the two cited registrations are owned by the same party, and are the only two registrations containing the word PRESENCE for materials in the field of religion.

Lastly, Applicant’s argument that a showing of actual confusion has not been established is irrelevant. “‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). Based on the analysis and the evidence of record, at the very least, a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods of the parties has been established in this case.

In summary, Applicant has failed to establish that the marks are dissimilar enough such that confusion is unlikely.  

Relatedness of the Goods

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 

Here, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

Further, the registrations use broad wording to describe “[p]re-recorded CDs and DVDs of training programs and seminars promoting Christian … values,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including Applicant’s more narrow “[d]igital materials, namely, CDs, DVDs … all featuring Catholic education content.”  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). This argument is supported by the attached evidence that demonstrates that Catholicism is a denomination encompassed by the core Abrahamic religion of Christianity, as Christianity includes all denominations that follow the teachings of Jesus Christ, including Catholicism, Protestantism, the Eastern Orthodox Church, Lutheranism, and Methodism, to name a few. See:

-       http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Catholicism (defining Catholicism as “the faith, practice, or system of Catholic Christianity”)

-       http://www.lexico.com/en/definition/catholicism (“Adherence to the forms of Christian doctrine and practice which are generally regarded as Catholic rather than Protestant or Eastern Orthodox.”)

-       http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_denomination (“The Catholic Church which claims 1.2 billion members – slightly over half of all Christians worldwide – does not view itself as a denomination, but as the original pre-denominational church,[1] a view rejected by other Christians. Protestant denominations account for approximately 37 percent of Christians worldwide.[2] Together, Catholicism and Protestantism (including Anglicanism, and other denominations sharing historical ties) comprise Western Christianity.”)

-       http://www.scripturecatholic.com/the-difference-between-catholic-and-christian/ (“Not all Christians are Catholics, but all Catholics are Christians. There is over 60% of the Christian population that is following the Catholic faith.”)

Likewise, the attached evidence demonstrates that many Christian organizations provide various forms of educational and training materials related to Christianity in general and its particular denominations, including Catholicism. See:

-       All About God: http://www.allaboutgod.com/aboutus.htm

-       The Gospel Coalition: http://www.thegospelcoalition.org/

-       Religion Resources Online: http://www.religionresourcesonline.org/

Thus, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

Lastly, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the Registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the Registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

In response, Applicant unpersuasively argues against the relatedness of the goods.

First, Applicant’s argument that the classification of the goods of the parties in this case is different is incorrect because the religious materials of both Applicant and Registrant are classified in International Class 009. Applicant should note, however, that even if the classification of the goods was different, the fact that the Office classifies goods in different classes does not establish that the goods are unrelated under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01(d)(v). The determination concerning the proper classification of goods is a purely administrative determination unrelated to the determination of likelihood of confusion.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 USPQ2d 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Thus, Applicant’s reliance on case law where the difference in the classification of the goods, such as textiles versus cooking wine, was found to be relevant because the relatedness of the goods was not supported by evidence, which is not the case here, is irrelevant to the present discussion.

Second, Applicant’s argument that the goods of the parties are unrelated because they travel in different channels of trade is not compelling. As stated above, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. In this case, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers and are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. Accordingly, Applicant’s argument that Catholic materials would not be marketed to Christians is unpersuasive because, as evidenced by the discussion above and by the attached evidence, Catholicism is a denomination encompassed by the core Abrahamic religion of Christianity, as Christianity includes all denominations that follow the teachings of Jesus Christ, including Catholicism. Thus, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are related.

In summary, Applicant has failed to establish that the goods of the parties are so unrelated that consumers are not likely to believe that they emanate from the same source.

Conclusion

Because Applicant's and Registrant's marks are similar and because the goods are related, Applicant's mark must be refused registration pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

Although Applicant's mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

ASSISTANCE

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about Applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide Applicant with additional explanation about the refusal and requirements in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).

/Xheneta Ademi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272-7151

xheneta.ademi@uspto.gov

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 15, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88065130

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

(1)  Read the official letter.

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

/Xheneta Ademi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272-7151

xheneta.ademi@uspto.gov

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 15, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”