UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/23/2018

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
• MARK ON THE DRAWING AND SPECIMEN DIFFER
• DRAWING NOT ACCEPTABLE

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5109303 (I REP LA), 5285039 (I REP 473), and 4607538 (IREP767).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

The applied for mark is IREP for “Bottoms as clothing; Footwear; Headwear; Socks; Tops as clothing; Underwear” in Class 25.

 

The registered mark I REP LA, registered for “Clothing, namely, caps, bandanas, sweat bands, fedoras, hats, shirts, t-shirts, polo shirts, short-sleeved t-shirts, long-sleeved t-shirts, short-sleeved shirts, sport shirts, sports shirts with short sleeves, tank tops, sweat shirts, hoodies, jerseys, pullovers, men's and women's jackets, coats, belts for clothing, pants, sweat pants, shorts, underwear, swimwear, socks, shoes, tennis shoes, flip flops, footwear for men and women, beach footwear” in Class 25.

 

The registered mark I REP 473 is registered for “Clothing, namely, shirts, jackets, sweatshirts, headwear” in Class 25.

 

The registered mark IREP467 is registered for “Hats; Shirts; T-shirts” in Class 25.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

First, the compared marks share an identical phrase except for a slight difference in appearance between applicant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, IREP; and registrants’ marks, which appear as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, I REP.  As such, the marks are nearly identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). 

 

Next, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).  In the present case, the nearly identical wording I REP/IREP is first in each of the compared marks.  Thus, IREP or I REP will be the part of each mark consumers are likely to focus on.

 

Furthermore, the additional numbers or wording in the registered marks will not obviate the similarity between the marks.  Although there is no mechanical test to determine the dominant element of a mark, consumers would be more likely to perceive a distinctive term, even if suggestive, rather than a generic or descriptive term as the source-identifying feature of the mark.  Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1059-60 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009)).  In each of the registered marks in question, a city (LA) or an area code (473 & 767) follow the wording “I REP.”  Consumers are not likely to view the area code or city name as source indicating, and thus I REP is the dominant portion of the marks.  Accordingly, the dominant portion of the registered marks is nearly identical to the entirety of the applied for mark. IREP.

 

Lastly, consumers encountering the compared marks are likely to view “IREP” as a house mark. Adding a house mark to an otherwise confusingly similar mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1366-67 (TTAB 2007) (finding CLUB PALMS MVP and MVP confusingly similar); In re Christian Dior, S.A., 225 USPQ 533, 534 (TTAB 1985) (finding LE CACHET DE DIOR and CACHET confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  It is likely that goods and/or services sold under these marks would be attributed to the same source.  See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007).  Accordingly, in the present case, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Thus, the compared marks are confusingly similar.

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrants’ goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registrations at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods and/or services in the application and registration(s) are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

 

Furthermore, neither the application nor the registrations contain any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are related.  

 

Therefore, there is a likelihood of confusion between the applied for mark and the registered marks.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

MARK ON THE DRAWING AND SPECIMEN DIFFER

 

Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the mark in the drawing in use in commerce in International Class 25, which is required in the statement of use.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i).  The mark appearing on the specimen and in the drawing must match; that is, the mark in the drawing “must be a substantially exact representation of the mark” on the specimen.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)-(b); TMEP §807.12(a).

 

In this case, the specimen displays the mark as “IREPBRAND” and various stylizations on the t-shirts included in the specimen.  However, the drawing displays the mark as IREP within a triangle with an upside down triangle as the dot in the “i”.  The mark on the specimen does not match the mark in the drawing because none of the iterations in the specimen include the design element submit in the drawing.  Applicant has thus failed to provide the required evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  See TMEP §807.12(a). Additionally, the drawing, as submit, is contained within a darkly shaded black box.  Please see the requirement below for more information about the drawing.

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) for each applicable international class that (a) shows the mark in the drawing in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services in the application or amendment to allege use, and (b) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use.

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).  Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).

 

(2)       Submit a request to amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

The USPTO will not accept an amended drawing submitted in response to this refusal because the changes would materially alter the drawing of the mark in the original application or as previously acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); TMEP §807.14.  Specifically, removing the design element and amending to standard characters would expand the coverage of the mark because it provides the registrant rights in the text itself in any possible depictions regardless of font style, size, or color.

 

For more information about drawings and instructions on how to satisfy these response options online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.

 

DRAWING NOT ACCEPTABLE

 

The drawing is not acceptable because the digitized image of the mark is unclear and does not show all aspects of the mark in sufficient detail.  See TMEP §807.04(a).  Specifically, the drawing as provided, appears within a darkly shaded black box and it is difficult to see the mark itself.  A clear drawing of the mark is an application requirement.  37 C.F.R. §2.52. 

 

Therefore, applicant must submit a new drawing showing a clear depiction of the mark.  All lines must be clean, sharp and solid, and not fine or crowded.  37 C.F.R. §§2.53(c), 2.54(e); TMEP §§807.05(c), 807.06(a).  Additionally, the USPTO will not accept a new drawing in which there are amendments or changes that would materially alter the applied-for mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.72; see TMEP §§807.13 et seq., 807.14 et seq.

 

For more information about drawings and instructions on how to submit a drawing, see the Drawing webpage.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Mark Peisecki/

Mark Peisecki

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 105

(571) 270-5399

mark.peisecki@uspto.gov

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 11/23/2018 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88060662

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 11/23/2018, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Mark Peisecki/

Mark Peisecki

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 105

(571) 270-5399

mark.peisecki@uspto.gov

 

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.