To: | Esquel Enterprises Limited (blc@pattishall.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88058219 - MIRAGE - N/A |
Sent: | September 07, 2020 07:26:34 PM |
Sent As: | ecom126@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88058219
Mark: MIRAGE
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Correspondence Address: PATTISHALL, MCAULIFFE, NEWBURY, HILLIARD 200 S. WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 2900
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Applicant: Esquel Enterprises Limited
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 07, 2020
On May 28, 2019, action on this application was suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87848603, 86804064, 86804066, 85932775, and 85932773. The following prior-pending applications have abandoned and are no longer a potential bar to the registration of applicant’s mark: Application Serial Nos. 87848603, 86804064, and 86804066. However, the following prior-pending applications have since registered: Application Serial Nos. 85932775 and 85932773. Therefore, registration is refused as follows.
In addition, the following refusal(s) have been withdrawn: Trademark Act Section 2(d) as to registration 4319568 and 1348006 as a result of the registrations cancelling. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
THIS PARTIAL REFUSAL APPLIES TO CLASS 25 ONLY
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 4678514, 3794106, 6044778, and 6026290. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Applicant’s mark MIRAGE is for “Clothing for men, women and children, namely, coats, jackets, pants, skirts, dresses, suits, shirts, t-shirts, sweaters, underwear, socks, stockings, gloves, ties as clothing, scarves, hats, pajamas, slippers, vests, uniforms, belts, caps being headwear; headwear, namely, hats and caps; athletic clothing, namely, warm-up jackets and warm-up pants; Formalwear, namely, tuxedos and tuxedo shirts; casual clothing, namely, sweatpants” in Class 25.
Registrant 4678514’s mark MIRAGE is for “shoes” in Class 25.
Registrant 3794106’s mark MIRAGE CAMO is for “Uniforms and related apparel, namely, shirts, pants, hats, gloves, socks, packs, sacks, for use by military personnel, Special Forces, and swat teams” in Class 25.
Registrant 6044778’s mark MIRAGE COLLECTION is for “On-line retail store services featuring clothing and jewelry; retail store services featuring clothing and jewelry” in Class 35.
Registrant 6026290’s mark MIRAGE is for “custom tailored women's clothing, namely, shirts, dresses, skirts, blouses” in Class 25.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the applied-for mark is MIRAGE and the cited registered marks are MIRAGE, MIRAGE CAMO, and MIRAGE COLLECTION.
In regards to registration nos. 4678514 and 6026290, applicant’s mark is MIRAGE and registrants’ mark is MIRAGE. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
In addition, in regards to registration nos. 3794106 and 6044778, registrants disclaimed the descriptive wording “CAMO” and “COLLECTION”. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Thus, rendering the wording “MIRAGE” as the dominant portion of the marks.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Goods/Services
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the application use(s) broad wording to describe s footwear, uniforms, and clothing for men, women and children, namely, coats, jackets, pants, skirts, dresses, suits, shirts, t-shirts, sweaters, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrants’ “shoes”, “uniforms and related apparel”, and “custom tailored women's clothing”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
In regards to registration 6044778, the use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii). See the attached evidence from HM.com, and Gap.com.
In sum, the evidence demonstrates that consumers are likely to encounter the parties’ goods/services in the same commercial contexts. Given the similarity of the marks overall and the related nature of the goods/services, consumers encountering the marks are likely to mistake the underlying sources of the goods/services.
Thus, the applied-for mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks cited herein.
REQUEST TO DIVIDE ADVISORY
In response to a refusal or requirement that pertains only to certain classes, goods, and/or services, an applicant may file a request to divide the application (form # 3) into two or more separate applications so that any acceptable classes, goods, and/or services may be transferred to the divided out application(s) and proceed toward registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.87; TMEP §1110 et seq. Any outstanding deadline in effect at the time the application is divided will generally apply to each new divided out application. See 37 C.F.R. §2.87(e); TMEP §1110.05 (see list of exceptions).
There is a fee for each new application created. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(19)(ii), 2.87(b); TMEP §1110.04. And if dividing out some, but not all, of the goods or services within a class, an additional application filing fee will be required for each new separate application created by the division. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iii), 2.87(b); TMEP §1110.02.
CONCLUSION
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within the six-month period for response, International Class 25 will be deleted from the application. The application will then proceed with International Classes 23 and 24 only. See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a)-(a)(1); TMEP §718.02(a).
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Michelle Ribaudo/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 126
(571) 270-3962
michelle.ribaudo@uspto.gov
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