Reconsideration Letter

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

AFTER FINAL ACTION

DENIED

 

 

Issue date:  July 07, 2021

 

 

Applicant’s request for reconsideration is denied.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3).  The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant’s request and determined the request did not:  (1) raise a new issue, (2) resolve all the outstanding issue(s), (3) provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issue(s), or (4) present analysis and arguments that were persuasive or shed new light on the outstanding issue(s).  TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a). 

 

The applied-for mark “CONVEY-ALL” (standard characters) for “Grain and seed bin weighing systems comprised of mechanized livestock feeders, bag-handling machines, automatic bin refillers in the nature of augers, scales, and metal supply bins; Conveyors being machines specialized for unloading and processing materials from rail cars; Bulk material handling equipment, namely, portable and stationary sand and gravel screening machines, troughing conveyors being machines, Bulk sand and material handling equipment, namely, conveyors being machines used for the cleaning, transport, delivery and storage of sand and frac sand” is refused registration because of a likelihood of confusion with the following registered marks:

 

-          Reg. No. 2029965 – “CONVEYS-ALL” (typed drawing) for “parts handling conveyors”

 

-          Reg. No. 2033627 – “CONVEYS-ALL” (drawing) for “parts handling conveyors.”

 

As explained in the previous Office actions, the marks are similar. An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar.  Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).

 

The applied-for mark is entirely incorporated within the registered marks. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

The evidence of record establishes that the goods are related. The evidence of record from UMDAutomatedSystems.com, BioMassEngineeringEquipment.com, FlexIcon.com, KaseConveyors.com, Sudenga.com, Tristeelmfg.com, AdamsFertEquip, JorgensenConveyors.com, DornerConveyors.com, TCEConveyors.com, and EMICorp.com establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures conveyors, conveyor systems, bulk handling systems, weigh batch systems, and/or augers and markets the goods under the same mark and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Applicant argues that there is no likelihood of confusion because there are “significant differences” in the recited goods, the relevant consumers are sophisticated, there is no evidence of actual confusion, applicant owns a prior registration for the same mark for a component of the goods of the subject application, and the cited marks are not famous.

 

First, the fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01. Moreover, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  Therefore, evidence from the registrant’s website is not relevant to these proceedings. Registrant’s goods are not limited to “bottling and packaging facilities” and applicant’s goods are not limited “to the agricultural and oil and gas industries.”

 

Second, assuming arguendo the relevant consumers are sophisticated, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

 

Third, “‘a showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).  “Uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual confusion . . . are of little evidentiary value,” especially in ex parte examination.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 

Fourth, applicant’s prior registration is not for the goods.  Applicant argues that no likelihood of confusion exists because (1) applicant owns a prior registration for a substantially similar or identical mark for identical or identical in part goods and/or services to those in the application, and (2) such registration has co-existed with the cited registration.  Applicant concludes there is no likelihood of confusion between the applied-for mark and registrant’s mark; therefore, the trademark examining attorney should withdraw the Trademark Act Section 2(d) refusal.   However, in In re Strategic Partners, Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1397, 1399-1400 (TTAB 2012), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board only reversed a Section 2(d) refusal based on an applicant’s prior registration for the following unique set of facts:  (1) the marks in applicant’s prior registration and application were virtually identical (“no meaningful difference” existed between them, such that they were “substantially similar”); (2) the goods were identical in part; and (3) the prior registration had co-existed for at least five years with the cited registration (both being more than five years old and thus immune from attack on likelihood of confusion grounds).  See TMEP §1207.01.  The Board acknowledged these facts constituted a “unique situation,” such that an applicant’s prior registration would generally need to fit within these precise parameters to overcome a Section 2(d) refusal.  In re Strategic Partners, Inc., 102 USPQ2d at 1400; see In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1793-94 (TTAB 2017); TMEP §1207.01. In this case, by contrast, applicant’s prior registration does not correspond to the facts set forth in In re Strategic Partners, Inc.  See TMEP §1207.01.  Specifically, applicant’s prior registration is not for the goods.  Thus applicant’s prior registration does not obviate the Section 2(d) refusal.

 

Finally, the purported lack of fame of the cited mark, as argued by applicant, is not significant to the issue of likelihood of confusion in ex parte examination.  See In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1204 (TTAB 2009) (citing In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ix).  Because the types of evidence bearing on the fame of a registered mark include the volume of sales, advertising expenditures, and length of use of the mark, and such evidence normally is not publicly available, trademark examining attorneys are not expected to submit evidence regarding the fame of a cited registered mark in ex parte proceedings.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(ix); see In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1086 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1027 n.11).  When no evidence of fame has been provided, this du Pont factor is usually treated as neutral.  See In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d at 1086.  Thus, in this case, this factor is considered neutral for purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. 

 

Accordingly, the following refusal made final in the Office action dated December 7, 2020 is maintained and continued: 

 

            •  Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal

 

See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a). 

 

If applicant has already filed an appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Board will be notified to resume the appeal.  See TMEP §715.04(a).

 

If applicant has not filed an appeal and time remains in the six-month response period, applicant has the remainder of that time to (1) file another request for reconsideration that complies with and/or overcomes any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s), and/or (2) file a notice of appeal to the Board.  TMEP §715.03(a)(ii)(B).  Filing a request for reconsideration does not stay or extend the time for filing an appeal.  37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); see TMEP §715.03(c). 

 

 

/Jacquelyn A. Jones/

Jacquelyn A. Jones

Examining Attorney

Law Office 120

571-272-4432

jacquelyn.jones@uspto.gov

 

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 07, 2021 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88040758

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Jacquelyn A. Jones/

Jacquelyn A. Jones

Examining Attorney

Law Office 120

571-272-4432

jacquelyn.jones@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 07, 2021, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”