UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88032507
MARK: JOY
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Williams Furnace Co.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 5/19/2019
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This Final Action is in response to the applicant’s communication filed on April 26, 2019, in which the applicant responded and argued against the refusal under Section 2(d), amended the Identification of Goods, and added International Classes 9 and 37. However, as the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) with respect to the previously cited registrations is continued and maintained and now made FINAL with respect to International Classes 9 and 11 only.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION-PARTIAL
This refusal is continued and now made Final for International Classes 9 and 11 only.
JOY, in standard characters, for “small appliances, namely, vacuum cleaners” in Class 7 and “small appliances, namely, clothing steamers, electric clothes drying racks, portable electric warm air dryers, water filters and air purifiers” in Class 11 (U.S. Registration No. 5069416).
JOY, with design, for “small appliances, namely, vacuum cleaners” in Class 7 and “small appliances, namely, clothing steamers, electric clothes drying racks, portable electric warm air dryers, water filters and air purifiers” in Class 11 (U.S. Registration No. 5413842).
Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration(s).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
1. Similarity of the Marks
The applicant’s mark: JOY in standard characters.
The registrant’s marks: JOY, in standard characters, (U.S. Registration No. 5069416).
JOY, with design, (U.S. Registration No. 5413842).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is “JOY” and registrant’s marks are “JOY”. Thus, the word portion of the marks are identical in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id. Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
In addition, U.S. Registration No. 5413842 is a composite mark containing stylized wording and design. Specifically, the mark contains the stylized wording "joy" appearing on a shaded circle, with a curved line connecting the dot above the "j" to the "o" in "joy". When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Therefore, the inclusion of the design element in this mark does not obviate a finding of likelihood of confusion.
In applicant’s response, applicant did not address the similarity of the marks. See applicant’s response. As explained above, the Examining Attorney maintains that the dominant portion of the compared marks are identical such that the marks are confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.
Thus, the marks convey the same commercial impression and are substantially similar in this comparison. Consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the origin of the goods and the marks are similar. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
2. Relatedness of the Goods
The applicant’s relevant amended goods are:
Class 9: “thermostats”.
Class 11: “heating and cooling equipment for climatization of buildings, namely, furnaces, fan coils in the nature of parts for heating or cooling installations, wall air conditioning units, and hydronic coolers”.
The registrant’s relevant goods are:
Class 11: “Small appliances, namely, clothing steamers, electric clothes drying racks, portable electric warm air dryers, water filters and air purifiers”.
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).
The previously attached as well as newly attached Internet evidence, establishes that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark. This evidence shows that the applicant’s “thermostats”, “heating and cooling equipment”, and “furnaces” are commercially related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers with registrant’s “water filters” and “air purifiers”. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the products and/or services originate from a common source.
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely, “thermostats”, “furnaces”, and “water filters and air purifiers” are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
In applicant’s response, applicant asserts that the amended goods are dissimilar since applicant’s goods are for “heating and cooling equipment for climatization of buildings” whereas registrant’s goods are for “small appliances” and thus there is no overlap since none of “[r]egistrant’s goods have anything to do with regulating temperature or climatization of buildings”. See applicant’s response at 2-3. Applicant maintains that the goods travel in distinct trade channels since applicant’s goods are “targeted to distributors and general contractors”, whereas registrant’s goods are for “consumers of small household items”. Id. at 3. Further, applicant argues that its products are distributed “through distinct and much more sophisticated channels of trade” and that “[p]urchasers of Applicant’s goods and services are sophisticated professionals who know and understand what they are buying and from whom” such that “the parties are not in the same business and do not sell the same or related goods”. Id. at 4-5.
The Examining Attorney continues to respectfully disagree. As further explained above, similarity and relatedness is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use by applicant and registrant. The attached evidence clearly shows the relatedness of the goods. Moreover, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163). Therefore, applicant’s arguments are unpersuasive.
In addition, applicant’s internet materials have not been properly made of record and are objected to. Although applicant has discussed the contents of webpages as evidence against the refusal, applicant provided only screen shots of portions of the web pages, which is not sufficient to introduce the underlying webpages into the record. In re Olin, 124 USPQ2d 1327, 1331 n.15 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Powermat Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 (TTAB 2013); In re HSB Solomon Assocs., LLC, 102 USPQ2d 1269, 1274 (TTAB 2012)); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b).
To properly introduce Internet evidence into the record, an applicant must provide (1) an image file or printout of the downloaded webpage, (2) the date the evidence was downloaded or accessed, and (3) the complete URL address of the webpage. See In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018); see TMEP §710.01(b). Accordingly, applicant’s arguments referencing the internet evidence that has not met these requirements will not be considered.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods for International Classes 9 and 11 are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g. , In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd. , 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp. , 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Thus, registration remains refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act for Classes 9 and 11.
PARTIAL ABANDONMENT- ADVISORY
See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a)-(a)(1); TMEP §718.02(a).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
Carolyn Wlodarczyk
/Carolyn Wlodarczyk/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 109
571-272-9273
carolyn.wlodarczyk@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.