Suspension Letter

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

SUSPENSION NOTICE: NO RESPONSE NEEDED

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 5/31/2019

 

 

The trademark examining attorney is suspending action on the application for the reason(s) stated below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq. 

 

FOREIGN REGISTRATION:  Applicant is required to provide a true copy, a photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy of a foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin that will be in force at the time the United States registration issues.  15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii)-(iii); In re Societe D’Exploitation de la Marque Le Fouquet’s, 67 USPQ2d 1784, 1788-89 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §§1003.04(a)-(b), 1004.01, 1004.01(a).  Action on this application is suspended until the USPTO receives a copy of such foreign registration or proof of its renewal.  TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(a)-(b), 1004.01(a).  If the foreign registration or renewal document is not in English, applicant must provide an English translation.  37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii)-(iii); TMEP §1004.01(b).  Further, applicant should notify the trademark examining attorney in the event that the foreign application abandons or the foreign registration is not renewed.  See TMEP §§1003.08, 1004.01(a).  In such case, applicant may amend the application to rely on another basis, if appropriate, and will retain the priority filing date, if applicable.  TMEP §§1003.08, 1004.01(a).

 

REFUSAL(S)/REQUIREMENT(S) CONTINUED AND MAINTAINED:  The following refusal(s)/requirement(s) is/are continued and maintained:

 

1. Trademark Act Section 2(d)—Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
2. Translation Statement Required

 

The Examining Attorney notes that applicant, in its April 26, 2019 correspondence, has provided a definite and acceptable identification of goods, and that requirement has now been satisfied.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 3236603, 1274496, 4562054, and 5494152.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously provided registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark COSTA is for “Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni” in Class 30.

 

Registrant 3236603’s mark COSTA is for “Pasta” in Class 30.

 

Registrant 1274496’s mark COSTA is for “Macaroni Products” in Class 30.

 

Registrant 4562054’s mark DALLA COSTA is for “Alimentary pasta, dehydrated pasta, flavoured pasta, organic pasta, rice pasta, corn pasta, gluten-free pasta not for medical purposes” in Class 30.

 

Registrant 5494152’s mark COSTA CAMPANIA is for “Sauces” in Class 30.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applied-for mark and registrant 3236603 and 1274496’s marks are

In the present case, applicant’s mark is COSTA and registrant 3236603 and 1274496’s mark is COSTA.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

In addition, the applied-for mark and the remaining two registrations feature similar wording, namely, COSTA. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Therefore, as previously established, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Applicant contends that the marks avoid a likelihood of confusion because the wording “COSTA” is merely descriptive or diluted. Applicant has submitted printed or electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording COSTA to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  These registrations appear to be for goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”  See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording COSTA is weak or diluted. 

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

As previously set forth, the registrations use broad wording to describe “pasta”, “alimentary pasta, dehydrated pasta, flavoured pasta, organic pasta, rice pasta, corn pasta, gluten-free pasta not for medical purposes”, and “sauces”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely, ravioli, lasagna, flour based gnocchi, cannelloni”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are related.

 

Applicant argues that the goods are significantly different because applicant is offering all vegan products. However, the registrations’ identification do not limit the goods, therefore, registrants could also be providing “vegan pasta sauce; vegan pasta, namely, ravioli, lasagna, flour based gnocchi, cannelloni”. Thus, applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.

 

In sum, the evidence demonstrates that consumers are likely to encounter the parties’ goods in the same commercial contexts. Given the similarity of the marks overall and the related nature of the goods, consumers encountering the marks are likely to mistake the underlying sources of the goods.

 

Thus, the applied-for mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks cited herein.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

TRANSLATION STATEMENT REQUIRED

 

Applicant must submit an English translation of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(9), 2.61(b); TMEP §809.

 

The following translation statement is suggested:

 

The English translation of the word “COSTA” in the mark is “COAST”.

 

TMEP §809.03. See the previously provided translation evidence.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The USPTO will periodically conduct a status check of the application to determine whether suspension remains appropriate, and the trademark examining attorney will issue as needed an inquiry letter to applicant regarding the status of the matter on which suspension is based.  TMEP §§716.04, 716.05.  Applicant will be notified when suspension is no longer appropriate.  See TMEP §716.04.

 

No response to this notice is necessary; however, if applicant wants to respond, applicant should use the “Response to Suspension Inquiry or Letter of Suspension” form online at http://teasroa.gov.uspto.report/rsi/rsi.

 

 

 

/Michelle Ribaudo/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 126

(571) 270-3962

michelle.ribaudo@uspto.gov

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 5/31/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO.88020393

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.