Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 2194 (Rev 03/2012) |
OMB No. 0651-0054 (Exp 12/31/2020) |
Input Field |
Entered |
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SERIAL NUMBER | 88020393 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED | LAW OFFICE 126 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PETITION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PETITION STATEMENT | Applicant has firsthand knowledge that the failure to respond to the Office Action by the specified deadline was unintentional, and requests the USPTO to revive the abandoned application. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MARK SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MARK FILE NAME | http://uspto.report/TM/88020393/mark.png | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
LITERAL ELEMENT | COSTA | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STANDARD CHARACTERS | NO | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE | NO | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COLOR(S) CLAIMED (If applicable) |
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARK (and Color Location, if applicable) |
The mark consists of The word "COSTA" is stylized format wherein the "S" resembles a pasta noodle. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ARGUMENT(S) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION
I. Response to Primary Basis for Refusal of Registration Under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Û¬§1052(d)
In the Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application No. 88020393 COSTA Design (the “Applicant’s Mark) the examining attorney refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the grounds that it creates a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration Nos. 3236603 for COSTA (the “First Cited Registration), 1274496 for COSTA (the “Second Cited Registration), 4562054 for DALLA COSTA (the “Third Cited Registration”, and 5494152 for COSTA CAMPANIA (the “Fourth Cited Registration), collectively (the “Cited Registrations”). Applicant does not agree with this conclusion, and in further support of its original application (“Application”), hereby submits this Response and requests that the examining attorney reconsider his prior determination concluding that the Application should be refused.
The Applicant’s Mark is for COSTA (Design) under International Class 030: “Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni”.
The Cited Registrations are all for various regular pasta related goods.
II. The Applicant’s Mark Passes The DuPont Multi-Factor Test And Proves There Is No Confusion, Mistake, or Deception With The Registered Marks
In testing for likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), the Du Pont factors need to be considered, including factors such as the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; the purchasers of the goods i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing; and the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. In 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
A. The Applicant’s Mark Is Different From The Registrant’s Mark In Appearance, Sound, Connotation, and Commercial Impression
In regards to the First and Second Cited Registrations, the Examining Attorney sets out that “In the present case, in regards to registrants 3236603 and 1274496, applicant’s mark is COSTA and registrants’ mark are COSTA. The word portion of the marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner. Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.”
She further sets out that “Further, in regards to registrant 1274496, when evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services. Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.
Additionally, the Examining Attorney sets out that the Third and Fourth Cited Registrations “are confusingly similar to the applied-for mark because the applied-for mark is featured entirely in the registrants’ marks. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.”
However, when considering the Cited Registrations, the examining attorney fails to take into account the significant differences that exist between Cited Registrations and the Applicant’s Mark, including the appearance of the marks and the sounds of the marks. In Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, the Supreme Court laid down the Anti-Dissection Rule and held that composite conflicting marks are to be compared by looking at them as a whole rather than breaking the marks up into their component parts for comparison. The rationale of this rule is that the commercial impression of a composite trademark on an ordinary prospective buyer or customer is created by the mark as a whole, not by its component parts.
Based upon the fact that the Cited Registrations and the Applicant’s Mark contain some similar wording, the Examining Attorney concludes that the
marks are identical in appearance, connotation and commercial impression. Furthermore, the Examining Attorney states that “Incorporating the entirety of one mark within
another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). In the present case, the
marks are identical in part”[emphasis added].
B. Neither The Applicant’s Mark, Nor the Registrants’ Marks Cater To Impulse Purchasers
The Examining Attorney has set out that “ the compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source. The registrations use broad wording to describe its “pasta”, “alimentary pasta, dehydrated pasta, flavoured pasta, organic pasta, rice pasta, corn pasta, gluten-free pasta not for medical purposes”, and “sauces”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni. Further, the application uses broad wording to describe its “vegan pasta”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “macaroni products”. Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.
However, the Examining Attorney has not taken into account the significant differences that exist between the goods of the Applicant and those of the Cited Registrations. The Applicant would like to point out that it’s goods, although set out in the same class as the Cited Registrations, the Examining Attorney must take into consideration that the Applicant’s goods are Vegan in nature.
Individuals who lead a vegan lifestyle take great care in ensuring that any of the food goods that are consumed are free of any kind of animal or animal biproduct. As such, they will do their research with respect to brands that they choose to consume and read ingredient lists with a fine-tooth comb. A Vegan lifestyle also often means that vegan brands are well known and sought by such individuals. Veganism is not just about choosing products that are animal free, it is about leading a cruelty free life and about choosing very specific brands that support such a lifestyle. Vegans will spend a considerable time and research into brands that support their lifestyle. They do not choose products in haste. They will demonstrate a high level of care when choosing products. As noted in Electronic Design & Sales Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 21 USPQ2d 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992), “sophisticated consumers may be expected to exercise greater care;” and “[t]here is always less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful consideration.” Astra Pharmaceuticals Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 220 USPQ 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1993).
The USPTO should look to “something more” than the mere fact that the Subject Mark and the Registered Mark contain some of the same
words and are in some way connected to potentially providing goods and/or services in connection with boats. See Jacobs v. International Multifoods Corp., 668 F.2d 1234, 1236
(CCPA 1982).
C. Registrants Do Not Have the Exclusive Right to the word “COSTA”.
Aside from the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Registrations, a search of the USPTO Register reveals over 30 Registered or Allowed Trademarks in which the word “COSTA” appear in connection Class 030 goods including, but not limited to:
These registrations show that the “COSTA” cannot be said to be distinctive of Class 030 goods and that the public will look to other elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. American Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269-70 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Plus Products v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 220 USPQ 541, 544 (TTAB 1983).
Copy of state of the register report is attached for ease of Examining Attorney’s reference.
D. The Applicant’s Mark is Phonetically and Visually Different
Even where two marks are phonetically similar, it has been held that no likelihood of confusion exists if other differentiating factors can be established. See National Distillers & Chemical Corporation v. William Grant and Sons, Inc., 505 F.2d 719. As outlined by the Supreme Court in DuPont, a determination on likelihood of confusion must be made by comparing the marks in their entireties and considering them in connection with the particular goods or services for which they are used. The phonetic and visual differences between Applicant’s mark and the Registrant’s mark present explicit differences refuting a claim of likelihood of confusion. The distinct design element which forms part of the Cited Registrations create different looks, sound and impression on the listener than the Applicant’s mark.
Conclusion
In view of the arguments above, Applicant respectfully requests that Examiner withdraw all objections listed in the office action and allow the Applicant's trademark application to proceed for publication in the Official Gazette.
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EVIDENCE SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_184162133112-20190426182813058784_._State_of_Register_-_COSTA.pdf | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CONVERTED PDF FILE(S) (23 pages) |
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DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE | EXHIBITS REFERENCED IN RESPONSE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (current) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 030 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DESCRIPTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely, ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING BASIS | Section 44(d) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN APPLICATION NUMBER | 1900809 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN APPLICATION COUNTRY | Canada | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN FILING DATE | 05/24/2018 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (proposed) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 030 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Vegan pasta sauce; |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely, ravioli, lasagna, flour based gnocchi, cannelloni | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING BASIS | Section 44(d) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN APPLICATION NUMBER | 1900809 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN APPLICATION COUNTRY | Canada | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FOREIGN FILING DATE | 05/24/2018 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
INTENT TO PERFECT 44(d) |
At this time, the applicant intends to rely on Section 44(e) as a basis for registration and requests that the application be suspended to await the submission of the foreign registration. If ultimately the applicant does not rely on §44(e) as a basis for registration, a valid claim of priority may be retained. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENT | The foreign application(s) No(s).1900809 being used as the basis for a priority claim under Section 44(d) of the Trademark Act has/have not yet matured into a registration in the applicant's country of origin. We hereby request that the application be suspended. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PAYMENT SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TOTAL AMOUNT | 100 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TOTAL FEES DUE | 100 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATURE SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PETITION SIGNATURE | /JB/ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Jamie Bashtanyk | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Trademark Agent of Record | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DATE SIGNED | 04/26/2019 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
RESPONSE SIGNATURE | /JB/ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Jamie Bashtanyk | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Trademark Agent of Record | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER | 5142443900 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DATE SIGNED | 04/26/2019 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY | YES | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING INFORMATION SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SUBMIT DATE | Fri Apr 26 18:36:58 EDT 2019 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TEAS STAMP | USPTO/POA-XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX -20190426183658094265-880 20393-620969b41f1da5ec6a1 f8c05e87dde7d8b4d0baf6f33 c1f7f8d6a3efca474374a6-CC -5064-2019042618281305878 4 |
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 2194 (Rev 03/2012) |
OMB No. 0651-0054 (Exp 12/31/2020) |
APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION
I. Response to Primary Basis for Refusal of Registration Under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Û¬§1052(d)
In the Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application No. 88020393 COSTA Design (the “Applicant’s Mark) the examining attorney refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the grounds that it creates a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration Nos. 3236603 for COSTA (the “First Cited Registration), 1274496 for COSTA (the “Second Cited Registration), 4562054 for DALLA COSTA (the “Third Cited Registration”, and 5494152 for COSTA CAMPANIA (the “Fourth Cited Registration), collectively (the “Cited Registrations”). Applicant does not agree with this conclusion, and in further support of its original application (“Application”), hereby submits this Response and requests that the examining attorney reconsider his prior determination concluding that the Application should be refused.
The Applicant’s Mark is for COSTA (Design) under International Class 030: “Vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni”.
The Cited Registrations are all for various regular pasta related goods.
II. The Applicant’s Mark Passes The DuPont Multi-Factor Test And Proves There Is No Confusion, Mistake, or Deception With The Registered Marks
In testing for likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), the Du Pont factors need to be considered, including factors such as the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; the purchasers of the goods i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing; and the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods. In 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
A. The Applicant’s Mark Is Different From The Registrant’s Mark In Appearance, Sound, Connotation, and Commercial Impression
In regards to the First and Second Cited Registrations, the Examining Attorney sets out that “In the present case, in regards to registrants 3236603 and 1274496, applicant’s mark is COSTA and registrants’ mark are COSTA. The word portion of the marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner. Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.”
She further sets out that “Further, in regards to registrant 1274496, when evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services. Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.
Additionally, the Examining Attorney sets out that the Third and Fourth Cited Registrations “are confusingly similar to the applied-for mark because the applied-for mark is featured entirely in the registrants’ marks. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.”
However, when considering the Cited Registrations, the examining attorney fails to take into account the significant differences that exist between Cited Registrations and the Applicant’s Mark, including the appearance of the marks and the sounds of the marks. In Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, the Supreme Court laid down the Anti-Dissection Rule and held that composite conflicting marks are to be compared by looking at them as a whole rather than breaking the marks up into their component parts for comparison. The rationale of this rule is that the commercial impression of a composite trademark on an ordinary prospective buyer or customer is created by the mark as a whole, not by its component parts.
Based upon the fact that the Cited Registrations and the Applicant’s Mark contain some similar wording, the Examining Attorney concludes that the
marks are identical in appearance, connotation and commercial impression. Furthermore, the Examining Attorney states that “Incorporating the entirety of one mark within
another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). In the present case, the
marks are identical in part”[emphasis added].
However, it has been held that additions to marks may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if the matter common to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as a
distinguishing source because it is merely descriptive or diluted. For instance, in Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261
(Fed. Cir. 2011), the court affirmed the TTAB’S holding that contemporaneous use of applicant’s CAPITAL CITY BANK marks for banking and financial services, and opposer’s CITIBANK marks for
banking and financial services, is not likely cause confusion, based, in part, on findings that the phrase “City Bank” is frequently used in the banking industry and that ”CAPITAL” is the dominant
element of applicant’s marks, which gives the marks a look and sound distinct from opposer’s marks.
The Examining Attorney has set out that “ the compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source. The registrations use broad wording to describe its “pasta”, “alimentary pasta, dehydrated pasta, flavoured pasta, organic pasta, rice pasta, corn pasta, gluten-free pasta not for medical purposes”, and “sauces”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “vegan pasta sauce; Vegan pasta, namely ravioli, lasagna, gnocchi, cannelloni. Further, the application uses broad wording to describe its “vegan pasta”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “macaroni products”. Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.
However, the Examining Attorney has not taken into account the significant differences that exist between the goods of the Applicant and those of the Cited Registrations. The Applicant would like to point out that it’s goods, although set out in the same class as the Cited Registrations, the Examining Attorney must take into consideration that the Applicant’s goods are Vegan in nature.
Individuals who lead a vegan lifestyle take great care in ensuring that any of the food goods that are consumed are free of any kind of animal or animal biproduct. As such, they will do their research with respect to brands that they choose to consume and read ingredient lists with a fine-tooth comb. A Vegan lifestyle also often means that vegan brands are well known and sought by such individuals. Veganism is not just about choosing products that are animal free, it is about leading a cruelty free life and about choosing very specific brands that support such a lifestyle. Vegans will spend a considerable time and research into brands that support their lifestyle. They do not choose products in haste. They will demonstrate a high level of care when choosing products. As noted in Electronic Design & Sales Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 21 USPQ2d 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992), “sophisticated consumers may be expected to exercise greater care;” and “[t]here is always less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful consideration.” Astra Pharmaceuticals Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 220 USPQ 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1993).
The USPTO should look to “something more” than the mere fact that the Subject Mark and the Registered Mark contain some of the same
words and are in some way connected to potentially providing goods and/or services in connection with boats. See Jacobs v. International Multifoods Corp., 668 F.2d 1234, 1236
(CCPA 1982).
C. Registrants Do Not Have the Exclusive Right to the word “COSTA”.
Aside from the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Registrations, a search of the USPTO Register reveals over 30 Registered or Allowed Trademarks in which the word “COSTA” appear in connection Class 030 goods including, but not limited to:
Mark/Name |
Registration No. |
Brief Goods/Services |
Owner Information |
COSTA
|
5326531
|
(Int'l Class: 30)
|
Costa Limited (United Kingdom Limited Company (Ltd.))
|
COSTA and Design
|
4642872
|
(Int'l Class: 29)
|
Costa Concentrados Levantinos, S.A. (Spain Sociedad Anónima)
|
COSTA
|
1918205
|
(Int'l Class: 30)
|
Empresas Carozzi S.A. (Chile Corp.)
|
COSTA D'ORO (Stylized)
|
1800938
|
(Int'l Class: 29)
|
Costa D'oro S.P.A. (Italy Corp.)
|
COSTAMAR
|
1894209
|
(Int'l Class: 29)
|
Costamar Corp. (Puerto Rico Corp.)
|
GOMES DA COSTA and Design
|
4513479
|
(Int'l Class: 29)
|
Gdc Alimentos S/A (Brazil Corp.)
|
These registrations show that the “COSTA” cannot be said to be distinctive of Class 030 goods and that the public will look to other elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. American Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269-70 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Plus Products v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 220 USPQ 541, 544 (TTAB 1983).
Copy of state of the register report is attached for ease of Examining Attorney’s reference.
D. The Applicant’s Mark is Phonetically and Visually Different
Even where two marks are phonetically similar, it has been held that no likelihood of confusion exists if other differentiating factors can be established. See National Distillers & Chemical Corporation v. William Grant and Sons, Inc., 505 F.2d 719. As outlined by the Supreme Court in DuPont, a determination on likelihood of confusion must be made by comparing the marks in their entireties and considering them in connection with the particular goods or services for which they are used. The phonetic and visual differences between Applicant’s mark and the Registrant’s mark present explicit differences refuting a claim of likelihood of confusion. The distinct design element which forms part of the Cited Registrations create different looks, sound and impression on the listener than the Applicant’s mark.
Conclusion
In view of the arguments above, Applicant respectfully requests that Examiner withdraw all objections listed in the office action and allow the Applicant's trademark application to proceed for publication in the Official Gazette.