Response to Office Action

POLICE

Base Product Company, LLC

Response to Office Action

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number.
PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020)

Response to Office Action


The table below presents the data as entered.

Input Field
Entered
SERIAL NUMBER 88013741
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED LAW OFFICE 114
MARK SECTION
MARK http://uspto.report/TM/88013741/mark.png
LITERAL ELEMENT POLICE
STANDARD CHARACTERS YES
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE YES
MARK STATEMENT The mark consists of standard characters, without claim to any particular font style, size or color.
ARGUMENT(S)
APPLICANT BASE PRODUCT COMPANY LLC?s RESPONSE TO JANUARY 8, 2019 OFFICE ACTION ABOUT APPLICANT?S TRADEMARK APPLICATION APPLICANT SERIAL NO. 88013741 MARK: POLICE CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL: david@lilenfeld.com; kg@lilenfeld.com; robin@lilenfeld.com RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION Applicant Base Product Company, LLC (?Applicant?), submits this response to the January 8, 2019 Office Action issued by the Examining Attorney refusing registration for POLICE, Serial No. 85720339 (?Applicant?s Mark?). The examining attorney has refused registration of POLICE on the Principal Register, on the grounds that Applicant?s Mark merely describes the Applicant?s goods. For the reasons set forth below, Applicant respectfully disagrees. ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY A mark or term is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act only if it immediately describes an attribute, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods or services. (In re: Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 996, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The attribute must be described with "some particularity," otherwise it is not ?descriptive.? (RJR Foods, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 174 U.S.P.Q. 244 (T.T.A.B. 1972)). Alternatively, when one must use imagination, mature thought, or follow a multistage reasoning process to determine what characteristics a term identifies, it is suggestive and registrable. (Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, for a refusal to register based on descriptiveness, the Examining Attorney bears the burden of demonstrating the descriptiveness of a mark for which registration is sought. (Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2019)). Applying these standards, applicant respectfully submits that the Mark POLICE is not merely descriptive for stun guns. Section 2(e)(1) Applicant?s Mark is not merely descriptive. Rather it is at least suggestive, because the Mark does not describe any attribute, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of Applicant?s goods with ?some particularity.? Indeed, the Mark does not describe the goods at all. Instead, the Mark requires consumers to use additional thought, perception, or imagination to comprehend the significance of the Mark in relation to Applicant?s goods. (See Pom Wonderful, 775 F.3d at 1126 (finding that the word ?POM? is suggestive for pomegranate flavored drinks because ?the word ?POM? which is not ascribed independent pomegranate-related meaning by conventions dictionaries ? requires customers to use some additional imagination to decipher the nature of Pom Wonderful?s goods.?)). A consumer would not immediately perceive that the Mark refers to stun guns. First and foremost, it is not apparent from the Mark what Applicant?s goods are: the Mark does not use the terms ?stun? or ?gun?. Additionally, the term POLICE has a large number of possible meanings. As with ?POM,? consumers would not immediately be able to perceive that the Mark refers to stun guns. In fact, conventional dictionaries do not define the term police with reference to stun guns. The Merriam Webster definition of ?police? (attached as Exhibit A), does not include the term ?stun guns?. Nor does the American Heritage Dictionary. (Attached as Exhibit B). As such, the term POLICE does not immediately call to mind ?stun guns.? Indeed, because the term POLICE has several meanings, it falls short of describing Applicant?s services in any degree of particularity. See In re TMS Corp. of the Americas, 200 USPQ 57 (TTAB 1978) (finding THE MONEY SERVICE suggestive of financial services providing transfer of funds); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Monolith Enterprises, 212 USPQ 949, 952 (TTAB 1981) (finding THE AMERICAN CAF? not merely descriptive of a caf? offering restaurant services because the concept of ?American food? is too vague and nebulous). In In re TMS Corp. of the Americas, the court found that After considering carefully applicant's mark ?THE MONEY SERVICE? in relation to the services set forth in its application papers, namely, financial services wherein funds are transferred to and from a savings account from locations remote from the associated financial institution, it is our opinion that because the mark ?THE MONEY SERVICE? is composed of commonly used words of the English language, it suggests a number of things, but yet falls short of describing applicant's services in any one degree of particularity. To effect a readily understood connection between applicant's mark and its services requires the actual or prospective customer to use thought, imagination and perhaps an exercise in extrapolation. (200 USPQ at 59). In Holiday Inns, the court found that ?while it may be highly suggestive, ?THE AMERICAN CAFE? falls short of being merely descriptive? in connection with restaurant services. (212 USPQ at 952). ?In order to be termed descriptive, the name must immediately tell a potential customer what to expect in the sum total of these concepts, that is the typical ?American? Cafe. Given the wide variety of ethnic groups that have contributed to our national heritage, and whose dishes, d?cor, attitudes, customs and costumes have been blended and refined into what is considered typically American, it appears that the use of that term is nebulous at best.? (Id. (emphasis added)) Additionally, the word ?police? is not highly descriptive of stun guns. The Examiner has concluded that POLICE ?is highly descriptive of stun guns which are categorized as police-grade ? or stun guns for use by police?. However, not all stun guns are categorized as police-grade or for use by police. Exhibit C (attached) describes the Avenger Defense Portable Stun Gun as ?Extremely Powerful Rechargeable Stun Gun for Self-Defense and Protection ? Built-In Flashlight and Carrying Case ? Intimidating and Comfortable Design ? Loud Noise?. Exhibit D (attached) describes the RBS Emporium Stun Gun w/Flashlight as ?Panic alarm, Rechargeable Internal Battery with LED Power Indicator, Safety Pin, Wrist Strap, Heavy Duty Carry Case. Includes Quick Set-up and How to Guides?. Exhibit E ? J (attached) additionally all provide descriptions of stun guns that do not contain the word ?police?. Because of the numerous meanings and interpretations of the mark POLICE, consumers encountering Applicant?s Mark would need to use a multi-step reasoning process to understand Applicant?s Mark and its connection to Applicant?s goods. See Nautilus Group Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004). ?There is a certain amorphous quality about the words, and no specific information about any quality or characteristic of the goods is conveyed with a degree of particularity.? In re Cuban Cigar Brands, N.V., Serial Nos. 7855795 and 78554967 (October 19, 2007) [not precedential]. Thus, consumers would need to use additional thought, imagination, or perception to perceive any significance of the word POLICE as it relates to Applicant?s goods. TMEP ? 1209.01(a). Essentially, a consumer seeing or hearing POLICE would have to make a mental leap to perceive the Mark as relating to stun guns. A consumer could see or hear the Mark to interpret it as an officer, department, handcuffs, 911 call, taser, shooting, academy, station, jail, prison, body armor, gun, holster, nightstick, portable breath analyzer, patrol car, security, baton, and a myriad of other things. The general public understands the primary significance of Applicant?s Mark as identifying the source of Applicant?s goods thereby giving it acquired distinctiveness. Although Applicant recognizes that each case must stand on its own merits, the TTAB and the courts have found a number of marks to be suggestive rather than descriptive in factual situations that are more extreme than this case. 2 McCarthy, at ?11:72. For example, some of the marks that have been deemed at least suggestive include: ? DIAL-A-MATTRESS for mattress sales, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, 33 U.S.P.Q2d 1961 (E.D.N.Y 1994); ? SPRAY 'N VAC for a no scrub rug cleaner, Glamorene Products Corp. v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 145 (S.D.N.Y 1975); ? LOC-TOP for container closures ?in the nature of bottle caps having a cap portion adapted to be secured to a container and a spout mounted on the cap portion so as to be capable of being rotated between open and closed positions,? In re Polytop Corporation, 167 U.S.P.Q. 383 (T.T.A.B. 1970); ? CHEW' N CLEAN for dentifrices, In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 160 U.S.P.Q 733 (C.C.P.A. 1969); ? SUGAR & SPICE for bakery goods, In re Colonial Stores Incorporated, 157 U.S.P.Q. 382 (C.C.P.A. 1968); and ? HANDI WIPES for dusting cloths, In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 149 U.S.P.Q 793 (T.T.A.B. 1966). As with the cases, the Mark POLICE fails to immediately call to mind stun guns. Instead, additional thought, imagination or perception is required. Thus, the term is suggestive and registerable. Section 2(f) Acquired Distinctiveness The Examining Attorney found that Applicant?s evidence of acquired distinctiveness was insufficient ?because the applied-for mark is highly descriptive of applicant?s goods and/or services.? As described above, however, the mark is not highly descriptive but rather suggestive of the goods. Applicant has submitted evidence of acquired distinctiveness in the alternative but submits that because the mark is suggestive, the Examining Attorney has no need to reach this issue. In the Office Action, the Examining Attorney stated that ?[w]ith regard to the 5,500 ?likes? applicant received on Facebook?, ?it is not possible to determine the degree to which applicant?s Facebook ?likes? are significant.? Applicant has attached a competitor?s (Cutting Edge Product?s Inc.) Facebook page (Exhibit K). A comparison of Applicant?s Facebook (Exhibit L) page with its competitor?s Facebook page shows that Application has acquired distinctiveness. Application has nearly 5,500 ?likes? compared to its competitor?s mere 481 likes. That is 5 times the amount of ?likes.? Thus, this is a significant showing. CONCLUSION Because of the numerous possible interpretations of Applicant?s Mark require consumers to use additional thought, imagination, or perception, as well as the numerus cited registrations and pending applications, the mere descriptiveness refusal should be withdrawn, and Applicant?s mark should proceed to publication. Applicant need only establish a prima facie case to warrant publication of Applicant?s Mark for opposition, and the Applicant respectfully submits that it has met this burden. (Yamaha, 840 F. 2d at 1576). Therefore, Applicant?s Mark is suggestive. Alternatively, the Mark has acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1052(f). Applicant respectfully submits that the Mark is entitled to registration on the Principal Registrar. Should the Examining Attorney have any questions, she is encouraged to contact the undersigned at (404) 201-2520. Sincerely, /David M. Lilenfeld/
EVIDENCE SECTION
        EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S)
       ORIGINAL PDF FILE evi_665610238-20190708173201700202_._Combined_-_Exhibits.pdf
       CONVERTED PDF FILE(S)
       (15 pages)
\\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0002.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0003.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0004.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0005.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0006.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0007.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0008.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0009.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0010.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0011.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0012.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0013.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0014.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0015.JPG
        \\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\880\137\88013741\xml7\ROA0016.JPG
DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE Exhibit A - Meriam-Webster definition for Police; Exhibit B - The American Heritage definition for Police; Exhibit C-J - Amazon screenshots; Exhibit K-L - Facebook Screenshots
CORRESPONDENCE SECTION
ORIGINAL ADDRESS DAVID M. LILENFELD
LILENFELD PC
3379 PEACHTREE ROAD NE, SUITE 980
ATLANTA
Georgia
US
30326
NEW CORRESPONDENCE SECTION
NAME DAVID M. LILENFELD
FIRM NAME LILENFELD PC
STREET 3379 PEACHTREE ROAD NE, SUITE 980
CITY ATLANTA
STATE Georgia
ZIP/POSTAL CODE 30326
COUNTRY United States
PHONE 404-201-2520
EMAIL david@lilenfeld.com;kg@lilenfeld.com; angela@lilenfeld.com; robin@lilenfeld.com
AUTHORIZED EMAIL COMMUNICATION Yes
SIGNATURE SECTION
RESPONSE SIGNATURE /David M. Lilenfeld/
SIGNATORY'S NAME David M. Lilenfeld
SIGNATORY'S POSITION Attorney of record, Georgia bar member
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER 4042012520
DATE SIGNED 07/08/2019
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY YES
FILING INFORMATION SECTION
SUBMIT DATE Mon Jul 08 17:41:03 EDT 2019
TEAS STAMP USPTO/ROA-XX.XX.XX.XXX-20
190708174103302284-880137
41-62072baff753f1cffd01ff
d56691aea248f3266f6ca3441
e72f3044b62852705b-N/A-N/
A-20190708173201700202



Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number.
PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020)

Response to Office Action


To the Commissioner for Trademarks:

Application serial no. 88013741 POLICE(Standard Characters, see http://uspto.report/TM/88013741/mark.png) has been amended as follows:

ARGUMENT(S)
In response to the substantive refusal(s), please note the following:

APPLICANT BASE PRODUCT COMPANY LLC?s RESPONSE TO JANUARY 8, 2019 OFFICE ACTION ABOUT APPLICANT?S TRADEMARK APPLICATION APPLICANT SERIAL NO. 88013741 MARK: POLICE CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL: david@lilenfeld.com; kg@lilenfeld.com; robin@lilenfeld.com RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION Applicant Base Product Company, LLC (?Applicant?), submits this response to the January 8, 2019 Office Action issued by the Examining Attorney refusing registration for POLICE, Serial No. 85720339 (?Applicant?s Mark?). The examining attorney has refused registration of POLICE on the Principal Register, on the grounds that Applicant?s Mark merely describes the Applicant?s goods. For the reasons set forth below, Applicant respectfully disagrees. ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY A mark or term is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act only if it immediately describes an attribute, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods or services. (In re: Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 996, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The attribute must be described with "some particularity," otherwise it is not ?descriptive.? (RJR Foods, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 174 U.S.P.Q. 244 (T.T.A.B. 1972)). Alternatively, when one must use imagination, mature thought, or follow a multistage reasoning process to determine what characteristics a term identifies, it is suggestive and registrable. (Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, for a refusal to register based on descriptiveness, the Examining Attorney bears the burden of demonstrating the descriptiveness of a mark for which registration is sought. (Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2019)). Applying these standards, applicant respectfully submits that the Mark POLICE is not merely descriptive for stun guns. Section 2(e)(1) Applicant?s Mark is not merely descriptive. Rather it is at least suggestive, because the Mark does not describe any attribute, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of Applicant?s goods with ?some particularity.? Indeed, the Mark does not describe the goods at all. Instead, the Mark requires consumers to use additional thought, perception, or imagination to comprehend the significance of the Mark in relation to Applicant?s goods. (See Pom Wonderful, 775 F.3d at 1126 (finding that the word ?POM? is suggestive for pomegranate flavored drinks because ?the word ?POM? which is not ascribed independent pomegranate-related meaning by conventions dictionaries ? requires customers to use some additional imagination to decipher the nature of Pom Wonderful?s goods.?)). A consumer would not immediately perceive that the Mark refers to stun guns. First and foremost, it is not apparent from the Mark what Applicant?s goods are: the Mark does not use the terms ?stun? or ?gun?. Additionally, the term POLICE has a large number of possible meanings. As with ?POM,? consumers would not immediately be able to perceive that the Mark refers to stun guns. In fact, conventional dictionaries do not define the term police with reference to stun guns. The Merriam Webster definition of ?police? (attached as Exhibit A), does not include the term ?stun guns?. Nor does the American Heritage Dictionary. (Attached as Exhibit B). As such, the term POLICE does not immediately call to mind ?stun guns.? Indeed, because the term POLICE has several meanings, it falls short of describing Applicant?s services in any degree of particularity. See In re TMS Corp. of the Americas, 200 USPQ 57 (TTAB 1978) (finding THE MONEY SERVICE suggestive of financial services providing transfer of funds); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Monolith Enterprises, 212 USPQ 949, 952 (TTAB 1981) (finding THE AMERICAN CAF? not merely descriptive of a caf? offering restaurant services because the concept of ?American food? is too vague and nebulous). In In re TMS Corp. of the Americas, the court found that After considering carefully applicant's mark ?THE MONEY SERVICE? in relation to the services set forth in its application papers, namely, financial services wherein funds are transferred to and from a savings account from locations remote from the associated financial institution, it is our opinion that because the mark ?THE MONEY SERVICE? is composed of commonly used words of the English language, it suggests a number of things, but yet falls short of describing applicant's services in any one degree of particularity. To effect a readily understood connection between applicant's mark and its services requires the actual or prospective customer to use thought, imagination and perhaps an exercise in extrapolation. (200 USPQ at 59). In Holiday Inns, the court found that ?while it may be highly suggestive, ?THE AMERICAN CAFE? falls short of being merely descriptive? in connection with restaurant services. (212 USPQ at 952). ?In order to be termed descriptive, the name must immediately tell a potential customer what to expect in the sum total of these concepts, that is the typical ?American? Cafe. Given the wide variety of ethnic groups that have contributed to our national heritage, and whose dishes, d?cor, attitudes, customs and costumes have been blended and refined into what is considered typically American, it appears that the use of that term is nebulous at best.? (Id. (emphasis added)) Additionally, the word ?police? is not highly descriptive of stun guns. The Examiner has concluded that POLICE ?is highly descriptive of stun guns which are categorized as police-grade ? or stun guns for use by police?. However, not all stun guns are categorized as police-grade or for use by police. Exhibit C (attached) describes the Avenger Defense Portable Stun Gun as ?Extremely Powerful Rechargeable Stun Gun for Self-Defense and Protection ? Built-In Flashlight and Carrying Case ? Intimidating and Comfortable Design ? Loud Noise?. Exhibit D (attached) describes the RBS Emporium Stun Gun w/Flashlight as ?Panic alarm, Rechargeable Internal Battery with LED Power Indicator, Safety Pin, Wrist Strap, Heavy Duty Carry Case. Includes Quick Set-up and How to Guides?. Exhibit E ? J (attached) additionally all provide descriptions of stun guns that do not contain the word ?police?. Because of the numerous meanings and interpretations of the mark POLICE, consumers encountering Applicant?s Mark would need to use a multi-step reasoning process to understand Applicant?s Mark and its connection to Applicant?s goods. See Nautilus Group Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004). ?There is a certain amorphous quality about the words, and no specific information about any quality or characteristic of the goods is conveyed with a degree of particularity.? In re Cuban Cigar Brands, N.V., Serial Nos. 7855795 and 78554967 (October 19, 2007) [not precedential]. Thus, consumers would need to use additional thought, imagination, or perception to perceive any significance of the word POLICE as it relates to Applicant?s goods. TMEP ? 1209.01(a). Essentially, a consumer seeing or hearing POLICE would have to make a mental leap to perceive the Mark as relating to stun guns. A consumer could see or hear the Mark to interpret it as an officer, department, handcuffs, 911 call, taser, shooting, academy, station, jail, prison, body armor, gun, holster, nightstick, portable breath analyzer, patrol car, security, baton, and a myriad of other things. The general public understands the primary significance of Applicant?s Mark as identifying the source of Applicant?s goods thereby giving it acquired distinctiveness. Although Applicant recognizes that each case must stand on its own merits, the TTAB and the courts have found a number of marks to be suggestive rather than descriptive in factual situations that are more extreme than this case. 2 McCarthy, at ?11:72. For example, some of the marks that have been deemed at least suggestive include: ? DIAL-A-MATTRESS for mattress sales, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, 33 U.S.P.Q2d 1961 (E.D.N.Y 1994); ? SPRAY 'N VAC for a no scrub rug cleaner, Glamorene Products Corp. v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 145 (S.D.N.Y 1975); ? LOC-TOP for container closures ?in the nature of bottle caps having a cap portion adapted to be secured to a container and a spout mounted on the cap portion so as to be capable of being rotated between open and closed positions,? In re Polytop Corporation, 167 U.S.P.Q. 383 (T.T.A.B. 1970); ? CHEW' N CLEAN for dentifrices, In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 160 U.S.P.Q 733 (C.C.P.A. 1969); ? SUGAR & SPICE for bakery goods, In re Colonial Stores Incorporated, 157 U.S.P.Q. 382 (C.C.P.A. 1968); and ? HANDI WIPES for dusting cloths, In re Colgate-Palmolive Co., 149 U.S.P.Q 793 (T.T.A.B. 1966). As with the cases, the Mark POLICE fails to immediately call to mind stun guns. Instead, additional thought, imagination or perception is required. Thus, the term is suggestive and registerable. Section 2(f) Acquired Distinctiveness The Examining Attorney found that Applicant?s evidence of acquired distinctiveness was insufficient ?because the applied-for mark is highly descriptive of applicant?s goods and/or services.? As described above, however, the mark is not highly descriptive but rather suggestive of the goods. Applicant has submitted evidence of acquired distinctiveness in the alternative but submits that because the mark is suggestive, the Examining Attorney has no need to reach this issue. In the Office Action, the Examining Attorney stated that ?[w]ith regard to the 5,500 ?likes? applicant received on Facebook?, ?it is not possible to determine the degree to which applicant?s Facebook ?likes? are significant.? Applicant has attached a competitor?s (Cutting Edge Product?s Inc.) Facebook page (Exhibit K). A comparison of Applicant?s Facebook (Exhibit L) page with its competitor?s Facebook page shows that Application has acquired distinctiveness. Application has nearly 5,500 ?likes? compared to its competitor?s mere 481 likes. That is 5 times the amount of ?likes.? Thus, this is a significant showing. CONCLUSION Because of the numerous possible interpretations of Applicant?s Mark require consumers to use additional thought, imagination, or perception, as well as the numerus cited registrations and pending applications, the mere descriptiveness refusal should be withdrawn, and Applicant?s mark should proceed to publication. Applicant need only establish a prima facie case to warrant publication of Applicant?s Mark for opposition, and the Applicant respectfully submits that it has met this burden. (Yamaha, 840 F. 2d at 1576). Therefore, Applicant?s Mark is suggestive. Alternatively, the Mark has acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1052(f). Applicant respectfully submits that the Mark is entitled to registration on the Principal Registrar. Should the Examining Attorney have any questions, she is encouraged to contact the undersigned at (404) 201-2520. Sincerely, /David M. Lilenfeld/

EVIDENCE
Evidence in the nature of Exhibit A - Meriam-Webster definition for Police; Exhibit B - The American Heritage definition for Police; Exhibit C-J - Amazon screenshots; Exhibit K-L - Facebook Screenshots has been attached.
Original PDF file:
evi_665610238-20190708173201700202_._Combined_-_Exhibits.pdf
Converted PDF file(s) ( 15 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Evidence-3
Evidence-4
Evidence-5
Evidence-6
Evidence-7
Evidence-8
Evidence-9
Evidence-10
Evidence-11
Evidence-12
Evidence-13
Evidence-14
Evidence-15

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS CHANGE
Applicant proposes to amend the following:
Current:
DAVID M. LILENFELD
LILENFELD PC
3379 PEACHTREE ROAD NE, SUITE 980
ATLANTA
Georgia
US
30326

Proposed:
DAVID M. LILENFELD of LILENFELD PC, having an address of
3379 PEACHTREE ROAD NE, SUITE 980 ATLANTA, Georgia 30326
United States
david@lilenfeld.com;kg@lilenfeld.com; angela@lilenfeld.com; robin@lilenfeld.com
404-201-2520



SIGNATURE(S)
Response Signature
Signature: /David M. Lilenfeld/     Date: 07/08/2019
Signatory's Name: David M. Lilenfeld
Signatory's Position: Attorney of record, Georgia bar member

Signatory's Phone Number: 4042012520

The signatory has confirmed that he/she is an attorney who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state, which includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions; and he/she is currently the owner's/holder's attorney or an associate thereof; and to the best of his/her knowledge, if prior to his/her appointment another U.S. attorney or a Canadian attorney/agent not currently associated with his/her company/firm previously represented the owner/holder in this matter: (1) the owner/holder has filed or is concurrently filing a signed revocation of or substitute power of attorney with the USPTO; (2) the USPTO has granted the request of the prior representative to withdraw; (3) the owner/holder has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her in this matter; or (4) the owner's/holder's appointed U.S. attorney or Canadian attorney/agent has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her as an associate attorney in this matter.

Mailing Address:    DAVID M. LILENFELD
   LILENFELD PC
   3379 PEACHTREE ROAD NE, SUITE 980
   ATLANTA, Georgia 30326
        
Serial Number: 88013741
Internet Transmission Date: Mon Jul 08 17:41:03 EDT 2019
TEAS Stamp: USPTO/ROA-XX.XX.XX.XXX-20190708174103302
284-88013741-62072baff753f1cffd01ffd5669
1aea248f3266f6ca3441e72f3044b62852705b-N
/A-N/A-20190708173201700202


Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]

Response to Office Action [image/jpeg]


uspto.report is an independent third-party trademark research tool that is not affiliated, endorsed, or sponsored by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) or any other governmental organization. The information provided by uspto.report is based on publicly available data at the time of writing and is intended for informational purposes only.

While we strive to provide accurate and up-to-date information, we do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information displayed on this site. The use of this site is at your own risk. Any reliance you place on such information is therefore strictly at your own risk.

All official trademark data, including owner information, should be verified by visiting the official USPTO website at www.uspto.gov. This site is not intended to replace professional legal advice and should not be used as a substitute for consulting with a legal professional who is knowledgeable about trademark law.

© 2024 USPTO.report | Privacy Policy | Resources | RSS Feed of Trademarks | Trademark Filings Twitter Feed