UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/3/2018

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

The applicant must address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive
• Additional Information Regarding Country of Origin Required
• Foreign Registration Certificate Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5156252.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Here, the applicant’s mark is LUXURY for Musical instruments, namely, percussion instruments, stringed musical instruments, woodwind musical instruments, and electronic musical instruments; cases for musical instruments, and the registrant’s mark is LAXURY and design for “Cases for musical instruments; Electric carillons; Electric and electronic musical instruments; Handbells; Music boxes; Music synthesizers; Musical boxes; Musical Christmas ornaments; Musical instrument accessories, namely, stands, cases, carrying bags and storage bags; Musical instruments; Perforated music rolls for use in player pianos; Sheet music stands; Tuners for musical instruments; Wind instruments; Electronic musical keyboards”.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, the applicant's “Musical instruments, namely, percussion instruments, stringed musical instruments, woodwind musical instruments, and electronic musical instruments; cases for musical instruments” are closely related to the registrant's “Cases for musical instruments; Electric carillons; Electric and electronic musical instruments; Handbells; Music boxes; Music synthesizers; Musical boxes; Musical Christmas ornaments; Musical instrument accessories, namely, stands, cases, carrying bags and storage bags; Musical instruments; Perforated music rolls for use in player pianos; Sheet music stands; Tuners for musical instruments; Wind instruments; Electronic musical keyboards”. 

 

The registration uses broad wording to describe “Cases for musical instruments; Electric carillons; Electric and electronic musical instruments; Handbells; Music boxes; Music synthesizers; Musical boxes; Musical Christmas ornaments; Musical instrument accessories, namely, stands, cases, carrying bags and storage bags; Musical instruments; Perforated music rolls for use in player pianos; Sheet music stands; Tuners for musical instruments; Wind instruments; Electronic musical keyboards”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “Musical instruments, namely, percussion instruments, stringed musical instruments, woodwind musical instruments, and electronic musical instruments; cases for musical instruments”.  See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).  Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Collectively, this evidence demonstrates that the parties' goods are similar in nature and regularly travel in the same trade channels under the same mark.  For these reasons, consumers are likely to mistakenly conclude that the goods emanate from the same source.  Therefore, the goods are closely related. 

 

Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are closely related, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.  Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d). 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, the applicant's standard character mark LUXURY is confusingly similar to the registrant's mark LAXURY and design.

 

The marks are highly similar in appearance as they are only one letter off, with the registrant’s mark has an “A” as the second letter and the applicant has a “U” as the second letter.  Although the marks may have slight differences, the word LAXURY stylized with an upside down V, immediately conveys the word LUXURY.  Consumer confusion has been held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall meaning.  Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1336, 164 USPQ 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding MISTER STAIN likely to be confused with MR. CLEAN on competing cleaning products); see In re M. Serman & Co., 223 USPQ 52, 53 (TTAB 1984) (holding CITY WOMAN for ladies’ blouses likely to be confused with CITY GIRL for a variety of female clothing); H. Sichel Sohne, GmbH v. John Gross & Co., 204 USPQ 257, 260-61 (TTAB 1979) (holding BLUE NUN for wines likely to be confused with BLUE CHAPEL for the same goods); Ralston Purina Co. v. Old Ranchers Canning Co., 199 USPQ 125, 128 (TTAB 1978) (holding TUNA O’ THE FARM for canned chicken likely to be confused with CHICKEN OF THE SEA for canned tuna); Downtowner Corp. v. Uptowner Inns, Inc., 178 USPQ 105, 109 (TTAB 1973) (holding UPTOWNER for motor inn and restaurant services likely to be confused with DOWNTOWNER for the same services); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Thus, the consumer confusion is likely because both marks convey the word LUXURY.

 

The registrant's mark contains the design of a stylized treble clef.  However, this addition is insufficient to obviate the similarities between the marks.  Specifically, the design is not so distinctive that consumers are likely to call for the registrant’s goods by referencing it, nor does the design otherwise alter the commercial impression that the mark conveys.  When evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods.  Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Thus, the wording LAXURY remains the dominant element of the marks.

 

Further, the applicant’s mark is in standard characters.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).  Therefore, the applicant’s mark could appear with the same stylization as the registrant’s mark.

 

For these reasons, when consumers encounter the parties' goods using marks with these similarities, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.  Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, characteristic, or quality of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

Here, the applicant has applied for the mark LUXURY in connection with “Musical instruments, namely, percussion instruments, stringed musical instruments, woodwind musical instruments, and electronic musical instruments; cases for musical instruments”.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

“Marks that are merely laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product [or service] are . . . regarded as being descriptive” because “[s]elf-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods [or services].”  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1256, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding THE ULTIMATE BIKE RACK merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s bicycle racks being of superior quality); In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d at 1373-74, 53 USPQ2d at 1058-59 (holding THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s beer and ale being of superior quality); TMEP §1209.03(k).  In fact, “puffing, if anything, is more likely to render a mark merely descriptive, not less so.”  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d at 1256, 103 USPQ2d at 1759.

 

In the present case, the word “luxury” means “something that is desirable but expensive or hard to obtain or do”.  See http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=luxury.  Third-parties commonly use the word “luxury” to describe the same or similar goods as the applicant.  For example:

 

• JustLuxe describes Echopark Guitars as “100% handcrafted luxury guitars that are vintage-toned and styled”.  See http://www.justluxe.com/lifestyle/leisure/feature-1786838.php
• Taylor & Francis Online offers an online article about why celebrity guitars are considered luxury items.  See http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19401159.2016.1252973?journalCode=rrms20
• Bad Cat Instruments offers a Ghost luxury nature 4 string electric bass guitar.  See http://www.badcatinstruments.com/electric-bass-guitars/ghost-luxury-nature-4-string-electric-bass-guitar
• Simply for Strings offers luxury bows for string instruments.  See http://www.simplyforstrings.com.au/blog/luxurybows/

 

Therefore, when viewing or hearing the applicant’s mark LUXURY in connection with the applicant’s musical instruments and cases for musical instruments, consumers are likely to immediately understand the mark as merely describing a feature, characteristic, or quality of these goods.  No mental leap or imagination is required of purchasers to conclude from LUXURY that the applicant’s goods likely will be high end and of a quality that is desirable.

 

For these reasons, when consumers encounter the applicant's goods under the mark LUXURY, they are likely to immediately understand the mark as merely describing a quality, characteristic, or feature of these goods, rather than as indicating the source of these goods.  Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).

 

RESPONSE TO REFUSALS

 

Although the applicant's mark has been refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and offering argument against the refusals and in support of registration.

 

The applied-for mark has been refused registration on the Principal Register.  Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration and/or by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a); TMEP §§801.02(b), 816.  Amending to the Supplemental Register does not preclude applicant from submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal(s).  TMEP §816.04. NOTE: Amending to the Supplemental Register does not obviate the Section 2(d) refusal for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.

 

REQUIREMENTS

 

If the applicant responds to the refusals, then the applicant also must respond to the below requirements.

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REQUIRED

 

The application specifies Trademark Act Section 44(d) as the sole filing basis and indicates that applicant intends to rely on the foreign registration that will issue from its foreign application as a basis for registration under Section 44(e).  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(d), (e); TMEP §1003.04(a).  To obtain registration under Section 44(e) based on a foreign registration that will issue from the foreign application relied on for priority, the country in which the foreign application was filed must be the applicant’s country of origin.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(c); TMEP §§1002.01, 1002.02, 1002.04.  Under Section 44(c), “country of origin” is defined as the country in which an applicant (1) is domiciled, (2) has a bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment, or (3) is a national.  15 U.S.C. §1126(c); TMEP §1002.04. 

 

In the present case, the U.S. application shows that applicant has a domicile in the United Kingdom, but the foreign application was filed in Canada. 

 

Because applicant’s domicile is in a country different from the country in which the foreign application was filed, and from which the foreign registration will issue, applicant will need to establish that this country is applicant’s country of origin as of the date of issuance of the foreign registration.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(c); TMEP §§1002.02, 1002.04.  This requirement may be satisfied by providing the following written statement for the record, once the foreign registration issues:  “Applicant has had a bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment in Canada as of the date of issuance of the foreign registration.”  TMEP §1002.04.

 

If applicant will not be able to assert that the country in which the foreign registration has issued is applicant’s country of origin, registration under Section 44(e) will be refused.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(c); TMEP §1002.01-.02.  In that case, applicant may delete the Section 44(e) basis and substitute Section 1(a) or 1(b), if applicant can satisfy all the requirements for the new basis.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)-(b), 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b); TMEP §§806.03, 1002.02.  However, applicant may still retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, if applicant’s U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date and applicant has a continuing valid basis for registration.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.03(h).  

 

FOREIGN REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE REQUIRED

 

The application specifies Trademark Act Section 44(d) as the sole filing basis and indicates that applicant intends to rely on Section 44(e) as a basis for registration; however no copy of a foreign registration was provided.  See 15 U.S.C. §1126(d), (e). 

 

An application with a Section 44(e) basis must include a true copy, photocopy, certification, or certified copy of a foreign registration from an applicant’s country of origin.  15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §§1004, 1004.01, 1016.  In addition, the applicant’s country of origin must be a party to a convention or treaty relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party, or must extend reciprocal registration rights to nationals of the United States by law.  15 U.S.C. §1126(b); TMEP §§1002.01, 1004.

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin when it becomes available.  TMEP §1003.04(a).  A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in applicant’s country of origin.  TMEP §1004.01.  If applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, the applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to applicant’s country of origin.  TMEP §1016.  In addition, applicant must also provide an English translation if the foreign registration is not written in English.  37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b).  The translation should be signed by the translator.  TMEP §1004.01(b).

 

If the foreign registration is not yet available, applicant should inform the trademark examining attorney that the foreign application is still pending and request that the U.S. application be suspended until a copy of the foreign registration is available.  TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(a).

 

If applicant cannot satisfy the requirements of the Section 44(e) basis, applicant may amend the basis to Section 1(a) or 1(b), if applicant can satisfy the requirements for the new basis.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)-(b), 1126(e); TMEP §806.03.  Please note that, if the U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date, applicant may retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, provided there is a continuing valid basis for registration.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.03(h).  

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusals and requirements in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Sarah Hopkins/

Examining Attorney

Trademark Law Office 123

571.270.0293

sarah.hopkins@uspto.gov

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 4/3/2018 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87723700

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 4/3/2018 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.