UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87703915
MARK: WILD
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 9/19/2018
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on August 28, 2018.
In a previous Office action dated March 1, 2018, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:
Applicant was also advised of a Prior-Filed Application that has since abandoned and is therefore no longer a potential grounds for refusal.
In addition, the trademark examining attorney required the applicant to satisfy the following requirement:
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied:
See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
In regards to the Section 2(d) refusal, applicant has submitted evidence and arguments against the refusal. After careful consideration of applicant’s evidence and arguments, the examining attorney finds that applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated weakness or dilution of the relevant terminology and therefore finds the arguments unpersuasive for the reasons below.
Therefore, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant seeks to register WILD for “Video game software; computer game software; virtual reality game software; game software” in Class 9 and “Providing temporary use of non-downloadable game software; virtual reality game services provided on-line from a computer network” in Class 41.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant has applied for the design mark WILD and the cited registrations are the standard character marks WILD GAMES. Applicant merely deletes the generic wording GAMES from registrant’s two marks, and adds a distinctive design element. The shared dominant matter WILD is identical in all three marks and this results in marks with a similar appearance, sound and connotation. These elements altogether lead to a very similar commercial impression.
In its August 28, 2018 response, applicant makes arguments that the marks are “meaningfully distinct”, but these arguments are unpersuasive. The literal element of applicant’s mark is identical to registrant’s marks, except that the generic wording GAMES is deleted. Because GAMES is generic for the goods and services of the registrant and also the goods and services of applicant, the commercial impression of WILD and WILD GAMES is essentially identical for these virtually identical goods and services. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Applicant provides no evidence that GAMES is anything but generic, and it cannot put forth any such argument, as both applicant and registrant explicitly use this term in identifying both their goods and services. Therefore WILD is the dominant element in registrant’s marks, and this dominant element is identical in both registrants and applicant’s marks.
The only other alleged meaningful distinction is the design element and stylization of applicant’s mark, which applicant attempts to contrast with registrant in the table provided, highlighting the fanciful stylization and design element of applicant’s mark. However applicant’s table inaccurately imputes a stylization to registrant’s marks, implying that registrant’s marks are stylized in block lettering and Times New Roman font, when, in fact, both are standard character marks that can be stylized in any manner. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with marks in typed or standard characters, as are registrant’s two marks, because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Therefore the distinctions in design and stylization are not relevant to determining the similarity of the marks.
Finally, applicant’s mark does include a distinctive design that is considered in the analysis. However, the presence of this abstract design is not sufficient to avoid the likelihood of confusion, because applicant’s design does not change the commercial impression or detract from the fact that WILD is the dominant element of applicant’s mark. When evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services. Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Here the wording “WILD”, as opposed to an abstract design that has no verbal equivalent, is the dominant element of applicant’s mark that will be used when referring to the goods and services.
In its August 28, 2018 response, applicant also makes two additional arguments against the refusal, namely, 1) that the cited registrations exist in a crowded field, and 2) that the cited registrations are not famous.
However, the weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services. See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Here applicant provides a list of marks (WILD PETS, WILD GUNS, WILD BLOOD, WILDSTAR, WILD FACTOR, WILD EARTH, WILD WORKS, WILD ACTION, WILD PIXIES, WILD WARRIOR, WILD 9) that contain additional distinctive matter that separate each mark from registrant’s mark and that fundamentally change the commercial impression of each mark such that it is different from the term WILD alone. The list shows that the term WILD is only diluted when used with additional distinctive wording that alters the overall commercial impression. In the instant case, as discussed above, applicant’s mark contains no additional wording to change the commercial impression of its mark from WILD alone. There are no additional words and the design element is abstract and does nothing to change the commercial impression of the word WILD. Registrant’s marks are the only registered marks in this field of goods and services where the term WILD alone is accompanied by merely generic matter and is therefore the sole dominant element of the mark. Thus applicant does not present evidence of sufficiently similar marks, such that applicant’s mark can co-exist.
Finally, in regards to applicant’s argument regarding the fame of the registrant’s marks, the citation is not made based on excessive latitude of protection based on the fame of the registrant’s marks and is therefore not relevant to the inquiry. The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Because the marks are similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, the marks are confusingly similar.
RELATEDNESS OF THE GOODS AND SERVICES
The applicant identifies the following goods and services:
Class 9 Video game software; computer game software; virtual reality game software; game software
Class 41 Providing temporary use of non-downloadable game software; virtual reality game services provided on-line from a computer network
Registration No. 3752345 identifies the following goods:
Class 9 Computer game software
Registration No. 3752346 identifies the following services:
Class 41 Entertainment services, namely, providing on-line computer games
In its August 28, 2018 response, applicant provided no arguments in relation to the relatedness of the good and services, and therefore it is presumed that applicant concedes that the goods and services are related. However, the examining attorney has attached additional evidence showing that the goods and services are indeed related:
Big Fish
Downloadable Plant Tycoon: http://www.bigfishgames.com/games/2135/plant-tycoon/?pc
Online Games: http://www.bigfishgames.com/online-games/index.html
Disney
Apps: http://lol.disney.com/games/mobile-apps
Arcade Games: http://lol.disney.com/games/arcade-games
Disneyland Adventures Game: http://lol.disney.com/games/kinect-disneyland-adventures-video-game
Fisher-Price
Apps: http://play.fisher-price.com/en_US/GamesandActivities/AppsPage/index.html
Online Games: http://play.fisher-price.com/en_us/gamesandactivities/onlinegames/index.html
JumpStart
Mobile Games: http://www.jumpstart.com/mobileapps/
Online Games: http://www.jumpstart.com/parents/games/online-games
Miniclip
Downloadable Games: http://www.miniclip.com/games/page/en/downloadable-games/#t-m-s-H
Online Games: http://www.miniclip.com/games/genre-6/top-10/en/#t-m-c-H
Pogo
Download Games Center: http://downloadgames.pogo.com/?refid=10
Games: http://www.pogo.com/all-games?sl=2&filters=allgames
Pokémon
Minigames: http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-online-games/
TCG Online: http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-tcg/play-online/
Video Games: http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-video-games/pokemon-lets-go-pikachu-and-pokemon-lets-go-eevee/
Shockwave
Download Games: http://www.shockwave.com/download.jsp
Online Games: http://www.shockwave.com/
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods and services are related, there is a likelihood of confusion to relevant consumers, and therefore the refusal of registration is made FINAL.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/benjaminrosen/
Benjamin Rosen
Examining Attorney
Law Office 120
(571) 272-8425
benjamin.rosen@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.