UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 9/21/2018

 

 

 

 

 

This letter responds to Applicant’s communication filed August 2, 2018. 

 

The foreign registration has been entered and raises the issue below.

 

In addition, after careful consideration, the refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is continued and maintained.

 

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS IN U.S. APPLICATION EXCEEDS SCOPE OF IDENTIFICATION IN FOREIGN REGISTRATION

 

Particular wording in the U.S. application’s identification of goods and/or services has been found to exceed the scope of goods and/or services in the foreign registration upon which the U.S. application relies for a Section 44(e) filing basis.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.  For a U.S. application based on Section 44(e), an applicant is required to list only goods and/or services that are within the scope of the goods and/or services in the foreign registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1012, 1402.01(b).  Therefore, this wording is not considered part of the identification of goods and/or services in the U.S. application for the Section 44(e) filing basis, and only the remaining wording in the identification is operative for purposes of future amendment for that basis.  See TMEP §1402.01(b); cf. TMEP §1402.07(d).

 

In this case, the U.S. application identifies the particular goods as, metal bolts, rivets, screws and nuts.

 

However, the foreign registration identifies the following goods:  metal screws, bolts and rivets.

 

There are no metal nuts listed in the foreign registration.  As such, these goods in the U.S. application exceed the scope of goods in the foreign registration.  Thus, these goods in the U.S. application are not acceptable for the Section 44(e) filing basis and cannot be amended to correspond with the goods and/or services in the foreign registration.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)            Amending the identification of goods and/or services in the U.S. application for the Section 44(e) filing basis to correspond with the goods and/or services identified in the foreign registration, if possible, to ensure that all goods and/or services beyond the scope of the foreign registration are deleted from the U.S. application; or

 

(2)            Deleting the Trademark Act Section 44 basis for the goods and/or services beyond the scope of the foreign registration and relying solely on the Section 1 basis for those goods and/or services.   

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)-(b), 1126; 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6), 2.34(b), 2.35(b); Marmark Ltd. v. Nutrexpa S.A., 12 USPQ2d 1843, 1845 (TTAB 1989); TMEP §§806.02, 806.04, 1402.01(b).

 

Additionally, applicant may respond by arguing that these goods and/or services are within the scope of the foreign registration and should remain in the U.S. application.

 

 

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – CONTINUED & MAINTAINED

 

The refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), with regard to the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 3232886 is continued and maintained because it when used in connection with the identified goods, it is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  During ex parte examination, the USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Applicant applied to register the mark CONFORM (standard characters) for metal bolts, nuts and screws.  The registered mark is CONFORM (standard characters) for metal wire and cable.

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is CONFORM and registrant’s mark is CONFORM.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

SIMILARITY BETWEEN GOODS

 

The compared goods identified in the application and registration need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  The issue is not whether the goods services will be confused with each other, but rather whether the public will be confused as to the source or origin of the goods.  It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

The compared goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, the goods identified in the registration are closely related to the goods identified in the application.  The attached evidence from Crown Screw & Bolt, Forney Industries, Suncor Stainless, Texas Specialty Fasteners, and Zareba, and previously attached evidence from Acorn, Blue Hawk, Everbilt, Hillman, and National, clearly shows that it is quite common for manufacturers of metal wire and cables, such as those provided by Registrant, to also manufacture metal hardware and fittings, such as those provide by Applicant.  In addition, the attached excerpted webpages from Forney Industries, Zareba, Rural King, Coburn’s, Tractor Supply Co., Aero Assemblies, C&M Wire Rope & Supply, Cableworks Inc., Edwards Wire Rope, Fehr, and Western States Hardware, and previously attached webpages from Lowes featuring metal hardware from Blue Hawk, and Home Depot featuring metal hardware from Everbilt, shows that metal hardware, such as those in the application and registration, are available in the same retail channels of commerce to the same end consumers.  See also attached excerpted webpages from Hillman’s Ook and Ikea showing both metal wire and fasteners sold and used together; previously attached excerpted third party registrations showing Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods offered under the same mark.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Consequently, the goods are closely related and similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Applicant argues that his mark should be approved for registration because he and Registrant have a consent agreement.  The examining attorney disagrees.

 

The Consent Agreement (CA) is insufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion.  More specifically, the CA submitted by Applicant states that the parties’ believe that there is no likelihood of confusion because:

• The channels of commerce differ

• The goods are different

• The average consumer is knowledgeable and sophisticated, and

• There is no known instances of actual confusion

• The Parties agree to undertaken action to avoid confusion

 

At the outset, the Parties’ apparently acknowledge that their marks are identical and capable of presentation in the same stylization in that the consent agreement refers to the same term CONFORM for both the pending application and registration.  Both are standard character marks capable of presentation in the exact same stylization.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). 

 

Identified Goods & Channels of Trade

The identified goods are closely related.  It is well known that the goods offered under a given mark do not need to be identical to conclude that they are related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Instead, the goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, the identification of goods in the application and registration, are very closely related.  As the evidence clearly demonstrates, metal extrusions, wire and cable are frequently manufactured by the same entity that manufacture metal screws, nuts and bolts, and offered in the same channels of commerce as metal screws, nuts and bolts.  That the CA concludes there is no likelihood of conclusion based on Applicant’s goods and Registrant’s goods being different and that is restricts each Party from offering the other’s goods does not rebut this reality, and is not persuasive.

 

Consumer Sophistication

Even if consumers of the compared goods could be considered sophisticated and discriminating, it is settled that “even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion, especially in cases such as the present one involving identical marks and related goods.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1413 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1279, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The identity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods “outweigh any presumed sophisticated purchasing decision.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1413 (citing HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823 (TTAB 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

 

Here, the goods in the application and registration are very closely related.  The conclusion in the CA that the average consumer is knowledgeable and sophisticated is not persuasive based upon case law on the subject.  This is especially true when the marks are identical and the goods are closely related.  Id.

 

Actual Confusion / Action to Avoid Confusion

The conclusion in the CA that there is no confusion and will be no confusion based upon the parties’ actions if any occurs is not persuasive.  Knowledge about instances of actual confusion is after-the-fact and undermines the purpose and use of trademarks.  After-the-fact knowledge and correction thereof does not address instances of initial actual confusion nor instances of a likelihood of confusion.  See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571, 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).

 

Finally, a case from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit presented a similar issue.  In that case, In re Mastic Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the Court stated:

 

The dispute in this appeal centers on the recurring question of the evidentiary weight which should be afforded a consent to registration of a mark given by the owner of a registration for a mark which has been cited as a bar to registration under section 2(d).  The seminal case discussing the effect of a consent, on which both sides rely to support their respective positions, is In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co ., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).

 

The DuPont case held that all evidence of record relating to the issue of likelihood of confusion must be considered in reaching a conclusion on that issue, and it provided guidance by listing some thirteen factors which may enter into that determination. Id. at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567.  A consent to registration is one of those factors.  476 F.2d at 1363, 177 USPQ at 569.

 

….  the DuPont case does not make it a “given” that experienced businessmen, in all cases, make an agreement countenancing each other’s concurrent use of the same or similar marks only in recognition of no likelihood of confusion of the public.  One must look at all of the surrounding circumstances, as in DuPont, to determine if the consent reflects the reality of no likelihood of confusion in the marketplace, or if the parties struck a bargain that may be beneficial to their own interests, regardless of confusion of the public.  For example, the parties may prefer the simplicity of a consent to the encumbrances of a valid trademark license.  However, if the goods of the parties are likely to be attributed to the same source because of the use of the same or a similar mark, a license (not merely a consent) is necessary to cure the conflict. See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18:25, at 866 (2d ed. 1984).

 

As DuPont holds, a consent is simply evidence which enters into the likelihood of confusion determination and may or may not tip the scales in favor of registrability, depending upon the entirety of the evidence. 476 F.2d at 1362-63, 177 USPQ at 567-69; see 1 J. Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice §3.04[3], at 3-64 (1987).

 

4 USPQ2d 1292, 1294. 

 

As indicated in In re Mastic Inc., the question is whether the consent agreement reflects the reality of no likelihood of confusion in the marketplace, or if the parties struck a bargain that may be beneficial to their own interests, regardless of confusion of the public.  The latter seems to be applicable in this case.

 

The conclusions and undertakings of the parties do not reflect the reality that confusion is likely for use of identical marks on closely related goods.  See In re Permagrain Prods., Inc., 223 USPQ 147 (TTAB 1984) (finding a consent agreement submitted by applicant did not alter the conclusion that confusion was likely, because the agreement was “naked” in that it merely indicated that each party would recognize, and refrain from interfering with, the other’s use of their respective marks and that the applicant would not advertise or promote its mark without its company name, but the agreement did not restrict the markets or potential customers for their goods in such a way as to avoid confusion). 

 

Although Applicant may only use his mark on metal screws, bolts and rivets, it is disingenuous to conclude that these goods do not frequently emanate from a common source, namely, those that provide metal wire and cable.  The market reality, as shown by the attached and previously attached evidence, is that the same entity manufacturers both Applicant’s metal screws, nuts and rivets and Registrant’s metal extrusions, wire and cable, that the same end consumers may encounter both Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods in the marketplace, and nothing in the CA contradicts this, nor precludes the contemporaneous use of identical marks on these closely related goods.  The CA must be viewed in light of all the facts and evidence of record, including a possible desire between the parties to avoid litigation and further expense to benefit their own interests, regardless of confusion to the public.

 

In conclusion, Applicant’s mark, CONFORM, is identical to Registrant’s CONFORM mark.  The term “Conform” is distinctive for closely related goods that exist in the same or similar channels of trade.  Therefore, confusion as to source of origin or sponsorship is extremely likely if the applicant’s proposed mark be allowed to register.  Thus, the examining attorney continues and makes FINAL the refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), for the above identified reasons.

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).

 

If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

 

 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/VJ/

Gene V.J. Maciol, II

Attorney-advisor

Law Office 103

gene.maciol@uspto.gov

571-273-9280 fx

571-272-9280 ph

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 9/21/2018 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87678204

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 9/21/2018 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.