UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87361956
MARK: BENCHMARK
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: DeVincenti, Martin
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 7/27/2017
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
Applicant’s Correspondence
This action responds to applicant’s correspondence filed July 7, 2017. Applicant argued against the refusal under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act and submitted an amended identification of services. The amended identification is accepted and has been made of record. For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4690837. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
Likelihood of Confusion
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see TMEP §1207.01. That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).
Facts
Applicant proposes BENCHMARK for use in connection with carpentry services; painting contractor services; decorative interior house painting services; drywall and painting contractor services; house painting.
Registrant provides homebuilding services, development of real property for single-family and multi-family residential and master-planned community purposes in connection with the mark BENCHMARK COMMUNITIES.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applied-for mark is BENCHMARK and the registered mark includes and begins with the term BENCHMARK. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
While the registered mark include an additional term and the proposed mark does not, the mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as the registered mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from the registered mark.
Moreover, the additional term in the registered mark is merely descriptive or generic and has been disclaimed. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Relatedness of the Services
The respective services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that the services emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Applicant argues
Applicant renovates and or paints one home or kitchen or bathroom at a time. Small jobs compared to developing an entire residential community. I do not believe anyone would confuse these marks.
It appears that applicant is stating that consumers would not confuse the services of the parties. However, the fact that the goods or services of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods or services, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods or services. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.
Moreover, the attached Internet evidence consists of excerpts from various construction companies that provide home building and residential and commercial remodeling and renovation services. This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark and that the relevant services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007). The Internet has become integral to daily life in the United States, with Census Bureau data showing approximately three-quarters of American households used the Internet in 2013 to engage in personal communications, to obtain news, information, and entertainment, and to do banking and shopping. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1639, 1642 (TTAB 2015) (taking judicial notice of the following two official government publications: (1) Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Am. Cmty. Survey Reports ACS-28, Computer & Internet Use in the United States: 2013 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf, and (2) The Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. & Econ. & Statistics Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation: America’s Emerging Online Experience (2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring_the_digital_nation_-_americas_emerging_online_experience.pdf). Thus, the widespread use of the Internet in the United States suggests that Internet evidence may be probative of public perception in trademark examination.
Applicant argues that no likelihood of confusion exists because applicant owns a prior registration for a substantially similar or identical mark for identical or identical in part goods and/or services to those in the application and such registration has co-existed with the cited registration. Therefore, applicant concludes there is no likelihood of confusion between the applied-for mark and registrant’s mark and the trademark examining attorney should withdraw the Trademark Act Section 2(d) refusal.
However, in In re Strategic Partners, Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1397, 1399-1400 (TTAB 2012), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) only reversed a Section 2(d) refusal based on an applicant’s prior registration for the following unique set of facts: (1) the marks in applicant’s prior registration and application were virtually identical (“no meaningful difference” existed between them, such that they were “substantially similar”); (2) the goods were identical in part; and (3) the prior registration had co-existed for at least five years with the cited registration. See TMEP §1207.01. The Board acknowledged these facts constituted a “unique situation,” such that an applicant’s prior registration would generally need to fit within these precise parameters to overcome a Section 2(d) refusal. In re Strategic Partners, Inc., 102 USPQ2d at 1400; see TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, by contrast, applicant’s prior registration does not correspond to the facts set forth in In re Strategic Partners, Inc. See TMEP §1207.01. Specifically, applicant’s prior registration is not for the same mark and has not co-existed for at least five years with the cited registration. Thus applicant’s prior registration does not obviate the Section 2(d) refusal.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
This refusal is maintained and made FINAL.
Proper Response to Final Action Required to Avoid Abandonment
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
TEAS Plus Requirements Must Be Followed or Additional Fee Required
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Sara N. Benjamin/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 110
571.272.8847
sara.benjamin@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.