Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  June 16, 2020

 

 

 

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THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on June 3, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action dated December 3, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, the applicant was required to amend the identification of goods.

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the following refusal and requirement:  Section 2(d) refusal and requirement to amend the identification of goods.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

·       Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion (MADE FINAL)

·       Amendment of Identification of Goods Required (MADE FINAL)

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

(MADE FINAL)

 

Registration of the applied-for mark was previously refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5444187 (HURRICANE SPIN BROOM).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  The registration was previously attached.  For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

The Applicant’s mark is HURRICANE for "Steam cleaning machines in the nature of steam mops; battery-powered spraying device, namely, sprayer for dispensing hard surface cleaning solution for use with wet mops for cleaning floors; squeegees for commercial use, namely, squeegee blades specially adapted for use with floor cleaning machines", "Disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds; fluffed, feather-like disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds", and "Mop refills in the nature of mop heads, dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, floor mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, microfiber mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, roller mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, dry or dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops featuring scrub brushes and their refills in the nature of mop heads, spray mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, strip mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, twist mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, flat mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, wet mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, deck mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, yarn mopheads, floor wax applicators and refills therefor in the nature of pads for floor wax application mountable on mop handles; brooms, corn brooms, hard brooms, plastic brooms, push brooms, whisk brooms, sweep brooms, brushes, namely, bath and shower brushes, brushes for cleaning bottles for household use, brushes for parquet floors, brushes for cleaning tile floors, brushes for cleaning vegetables for household use, cleaning brushes for household use, dishwashing brushes, dusting brushes, floor brushes, grill brushes for barbecue grills, lint brushes, pot cleaning brushes, roofing brushes in the nature of tar brushes for household use, scraping brushes, scrubbing brushes, toilet brushes, bowl brushes, tub scrub brushes, nail and hand cleaning brushes, wire brushes not being machine parts; dusters, feather dusters, microfiber cleaning dusters; cleaning sponges, microfiber cleaning sponges, scouring sponges, scrub sponges, sponges for household purposes, and refills for cleaning sponges in the nature of sponges and cleaning clothes, dish-cleaning sponges with soap-filled dispensers and refills therefor in the nature of sponges; cleaning cloths, cloth for wiping or dusting, dusting cloths, microfiber cleaning cloths, scrubbing pads made of metal and plastic filaments for cleaning, cleaning pads, grill cleaning pads; buckets, plastic buckets, buckets for commercial and household use, squeegee buckets; pails, plastic pails; mop wringers; dust pans, dust bins; dusting gloves; lint rollers and refills for lint rollers; metal wool for cleaning; scoops for household purposes; soap dispensers and soap holders; squeegees for floor use for household use, window cleaners in the nature of squeegees for commercial use, squeegees for floor use; toilet brush holders; plungers for clearing blocked drains, plungers with caddies; Cleaning tools, namely, buckets, brooms, push brooms, dust pans, debris collectors, namely, mop buckets and trash cans; squeegees, cleaning sponges, dusters, dust cloths, soap dispensing brushes, namely, scrub brushes, dust brushes and utility cleaning brushes for household use, and gloves for household use; work gloves; Light duty utility gloves; cloth for washing floors; furniture and appliance dusters; crumb-sweepers; cleaning solution refill cartridges for mops with electric cleaning solution sprayers used to clean floors for household use".

 

The Registrant’s mark is HURRICANE SPIN BROOM for "non-electric carpet and floor sweeper".

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant's mark is HURRICANE.

 

Registrant's mark is HURRICANE SPIN BROOM.

 

Here, Applicant's mark and Registrant's mark both feature the wording "HURRICANE".  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

As the first word in each mark, "HURRICANE" is also the dominant portion of each mark.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 102 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

Moreover, incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

In addition, the additional wording in the registered mark will not avoid a likelihood of confusion because the wording is merely descriptive of, if not generic for, the goods and was disclaimed.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Therefore, the common wording "HURRICANE" remains the dominant feature of the registered mark. 

 

Furthermore, generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009).

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe carpet and floor sweepers, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including the applicant's narrower crumb sweepers and sweep brooms.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

The previously attached Internet evidence shows multiple entities producing a variety of household cleaning products, including a variety of types of mops and sweepers, wipes, brushes, brooms, sponges, and refills for such goods (See previously attached evidence from Clorox®, Procter & Gamble®, and SC Johnson®).  The trademark examining attorney has also attached additional evidence showing numerous entities that produce a variety of household cleaning products, including non-electric sweepers, brooms, mops, wipes, cleaning cloths, brushes, sponges, and/or refills for such goods (See attached evidence from Alpine®, Carlisle®, Casabella®, Fuller®, Kärcher®, Rubbermaid®, Sanitaire, and Scotch-Brite®).  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely, a variety of cleaning tools, including, carpet and floor sweepers, brushes, brooms, mops, and cloths, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Applicant indicates that it has a legal relationship with the registrant in the cited registration (that it is the exclusive licensee of the registrant).  However, a legal relationship between the parties is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion unless the parties constitute a “single source.”  That is, the legal relationship between the parties must exhibit a “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods in connection with which the trademarks are used, and a “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d 1359, 1361 (TTAB 1987); see also TMEP §1201.07.  In addition, a licensor-licensee relationship generally signals that there is no unity of control.  Therefore, the applicant's argument is unpersuasive. 

 

Unity of control is presumed in instances where, absent contradictory evidence, one party owns (1) all of another entity, or (2) substantially all of another entity and asserts control over the activities of that other entity.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  Such ownership is established, for example, when one party owns all or substantially all of the stock of another or when one party is a wholly owned subsidiary of another.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d at 1361; TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  It is additionally presumed when, absent contradictory evidence, applicant is shown in USPTO records as a joint owner of the cited registration, or the owner of the registration is listed as a joint owner of the application, and applicant submits a written statement asserting control over the use of the mark by virtue of joint ownership.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii). 

 

However, in most other situations, additional evidence is required to show unity of control.  For example, if the parties are sister corporations or if the parties share certain stockholders, directors or officers in common, additional evidence must be provided to show how the parties constitute a single source.  See In re Pharmacia, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1883, 1884 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1201.07(b)(iii). 

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a written statement explaining the nature of the legal relationship between the parties.  In addition, if neither party owns all or substantially all of the other party, and USPTO records do not show their joint ownership of the application or cited registration, applicant must provide a detailed written explanation and documentary evidence showing the parties’ “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods in connection with which the trademarks are used, and the parties’ “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(iii).  This statement and, if necessary, explanation must be verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii)-(iii); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).  However, if one party owns all of the other entity, and there is no contradictory evidence of record, the written statement need not be verified.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(i).

 

If the relationship between the parties is that of licensor and licensee, unity of control will ordinarily not be present.  The licensing relationship suggests ownership in one party and control by that one party over only the use of a specific mark or marks, but not over the operations or activities of the licensee generally.  Thus, there is no unity of control and no basis for concluding that the two parties form a single source.  Precisely because unity of control is absent, a licensing agreement is necessary.  The licensing agreement enables the licensor/owner to control specific activities to protect its interests as the sole source or sponsor of the goods provided under the mark.  Therefore, in these situations, it is most unlikely that an applicant could establish unity of control to overcome a §2(d) refusal.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(iv). 

 

In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' goods will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Refusal of Registration pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d) is hereby made FINAL.

 

 

AMENDMENT OF IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIRED

(MADE FINAL)

 

The identification of goods was previously found unacceptable because it contains a significant amount of indefinite wording and must be clarified.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.  It is noted that Applicant amended its identification of goods to address this requirement.  However, some indefinite wording still remains.  For the reasons set forth herein, this requirement is MADE FINAL. 

 

Specifically, Applicant should specify the household use of its "squeegees for floor use" as the wording is too broad and must be clarified.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.  The wording can encompass hand tools in International Class 008 and squeegees for household use in International Class 021. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

 

International Class 007:  "Steam cleaning machines in the nature of steam mops; battery-powered spraying device, namely, sprayer for dispensing hard surface cleaning solution for use with wet mops for cleaning floors; squeegees for commercial use, namely, squeegee blades specially adapted for use with floor cleaning machines" [no change required]

 

International Class 016:  "Disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds; fluffed, feather-like disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds" [no change required]

 

International Class 021:  "Mop refills in the nature of mop heads, dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, floor mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, microfiber mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, roller mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, dry or dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops featuring scrub brushes and their refills in the nature of mop heads, spray mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, strip mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, twist mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, flat mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, wet mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, deck mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, yarn mopheads, floor wax applicators and refills therefor in the nature of pads for floor wax application mountable on mop handles; brooms, corn brooms, hard brooms, plastic brooms, push brooms, whisk brooms, sweep brooms, brushes, namely, bath and shower brushes, brushes for cleaning bottles for household use, brushes for parquet floors, brushes for cleaning tile floors, brushes for cleaning vegetables for household use, cleaning brushes for household use, dishwashing brushes, dusting brushes, floor brushes, grill brushes for barbecue grills, lint brushes, pot cleaning brushes, roofing brushes in the nature of tar brushes for household use, scraping brushes, scrubbing brushes, toilet brushes, bowl brushes, tub scrub brushes, nail and hand cleaning brushes, wire brushes not being machine parts; dusters, feather dusters, microfiber cleaning dusters; cleaning sponges, microfiber cleaning sponges, scouring sponges, scrub sponges, sponges for household purposes, and refills for cleaning sponges in the nature of sponges and cleaning clothes, dish-cleaning sponges with soap-filled dispensers and refills therefor in the nature of sponges; cleaning cloths, cloth for wiping or dusting, dusting cloths, microfiber cleaning cloths, scrubbing pads made of metal and plastic filaments for cleaning, cleaning pads, grill cleaning pads; buckets, plastic buckets, buckets for commercial and household use, squeegee buckets; pails, plastic pails; mop wringers; dust pans, dust bins; dusting gloves; lint rollers and refills for lint rollers; metal wool for cleaning; scoops for household purposes; soap dispensers and soap holders; squeegees for floor use for household use, window cleaners in the nature of squeegees for commercial use, squeegees for floor use for household purposes; toilet brush holders; plungers for clearing blocked drains, plungers with caddies; Cleaning tools, namely, buckets, brooms, push brooms, dust pans, debris collectors, namely, mop buckets and trash cans; squeegees, cleaning sponges, dusters, dust cloths, soap dispensing brushes, namely, scrub brushes, dust brushes and utility cleaning brushes for household use, and gloves for household use; work gloves; Light duty utility gloves; cloth for washing floors; furniture and appliance dusters; crumb-sweepers; cleaning solution refill cartridges for mops with electric cleaning solution sprayers used to clean floors for household use"

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods, but not to broaden or expand the goods beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

For the reasons set forth above, this requirement is hereby made FINAL.

 

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on June 16, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87356506

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from June 16, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”