UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

 

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• REFUSAL TO REGISTER - LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
• STATEMENT REQUIRED - SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDING IN THE MARK
• SIGNED DECLARATION REQUIRED
• DISCLAIMER REQUIRED
• AMENDED IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES REQUIRED
• MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

 

REFUSAL TO REGISTER – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4035084.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

• Applicant’s mark is RED WATER CASINO for “gaming services in the nature of casino gaming; restaurant services; hotel services.”

 

• The registrant’s mark is RED WATER CAFE (with a disclaimer of “CAFE”) for “Restaurants.”

 

Similarity of the Marks

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d at 1960 (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

 

In the present case, the attached dictionary evidence from http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/casino shows that the word “CASINO” in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s services; therefore, this word is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “RED WATER” the more dominant element of the mark.

 

Likewise, the identical non-disclaimed wording “RED WATER” is the dominant element in the registrant’s mark.  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Moreover, “RED WATER” is the first wording in both marks.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 102 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).  Considered in their entireties, applicant’s RED WATER CASINO mark and the registrant’s RED WATER CAFE mark are confusingly similar in appearance, sound, and commercial impression. 

 

Relatedness of the Services

The services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, applicant’s “restaurant services” and the registrant’s “restaurants” are legally identical and have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, the restaurant services of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Additionally, applicant’s casino gaming services and hotel services are related to the registrant’s “restaurants” because restaurant services are commonly provided by casinos, hotels and casino resorts.  The attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database, consisting of a representative sample of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and the registrant in this case, shows that the services listed therein, namely casino gaming services, restaurant services and hotel services, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Given the identical dominant wording in the marks for identical and related services, there is a likelihood of confusion regarding the source of the services.  Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

STATEMENT REQUIRED – SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDING IN THE MARK

Applicant must explain whether “RED WATER” has any meaning or significance in the industry in which the services are provided, or if such wording is a “term of art” within applicant’s industry.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814. 

 

Applicant must also explain whether this wording identifies a geographic place.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.

 

Failure to respond to a request for information is an additional ground for refusing registration.  See In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1917, 1919 (TTAB 2008); In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §814.

 

UNSIGNED APPLICATION – SIGNED DECLARATION REQUIRED

The application was unsigned, resulting in the application not being properly verified.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(n), 2.33(a), (b)(2), 2.34(a)(2), (a)(3)(i), (a)(4)(ii), 2.193(e)(1).  Applicant must properly sign and therefore verify the application in an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(n), 2.33(a), (b)(2), 2.34(a)(2), (a)(3)(i), (a)(4)(ii), 2.193(e)(1); TMEP §804.02.

 

To respond to this requirement online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response Office action form, answer “yes” to the TEAS response form wizard question #10, and follow the instructions within the form for signing.  The TEAS online form will require two signatures:  one in the “Declaration Signature” section and one in the “Response Signature” section.  For more information about a signed declaration and required verified statement and how to provide them using TEAS, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademark/laws-regulations/verified-statement.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

Applicant must disclaim the word “CASINO” in the mark because it merely describes a feature of applicant’s services, and thus is an unregistrable component of the mark.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(1), 1056(a); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

“CASINO” means “a public room or building where gambling games are played” (see attached dictionary evidence from http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/casino).  This wording appears in applicant’s identification of Class 41 services, and is encompassed by applicant’s Class 43 services because the hotel and restaurant services may be provided in casino resorts; therefore, the wording merely describes a feature of the services.

 

An applicant may not claim exclusive rights to terms that others may need to use to describe their goods and/or services in the marketplace.  See Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1560, 21 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Aug. Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823, 825 (TTAB 1983).  A disclaimer of unregistrable matter does not affect the appearance of the mark; that is, a disclaimer does not physically remove the disclaimed matter from the mark.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 978, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); TMEP §1213. 

 

If applicant does not provide the required disclaimer, the USPTO may refuse to register the entire mark.  See In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1040-41, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1088-89 (Fed. Cir. 2005); TMEP §1213.01(b).

 

Applicant should submit a disclaimer in the following standardized format:

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “CASINO” apart from the mark as shown.

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this disclaimer requirement online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/disclaimer.jsp.

 

AMENDED IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES REQUIRED

THIS PARTIAL REQUIREMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THE SERVICES SPECIFIED THEREIN

 

The wording “restaurant services; hotel services” in the identification of Class 41 services must be clarified because it identifies services in another international class.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.  Applicant’s “gaming services in the nature of casino gaming” are acceptable in Class 41; however, applicant’s restaurant and hotel services are Class 43 services.

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate: 

 

INTERNATIONAL CLASS 41:  gaming services in the nature of casino gaming

 

INTERNATIONAL CLASS 43:  restaurant services; hotel services 

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

The application identifies services in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):

 

(1)       List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.

 

(2)       Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/tm_fee_info.jsp).  The application identifies services that are classified in at least two classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only one class.  Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

For an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/multiclass.jsp.

 

The fee for adding classes to a regular TEAS application is $400 per class when the fee is paid using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(1)(ii); TMEP

§§810, 1403.02(c).

 

TRADEMARK FEES:  Effective January 14, 2017, the USPTO increased fees for all trademark applications and related documents filed on paper.  See 81 Fed. Reg. 72694 (Oct. 21, 2016) (codified at 37 C.F.R. parts 2 and 7).  Additionally, the USPTO increased the filing fee for each class of goods or services in a regular Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) application and the per class processing fee for a TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application that does not meet the relevant filing requirements.  Id.  Trademark applications and related documents filed on or after January 14, 2017 must comply with the new fees.  See more information for an overview of the changes.  See the fee chart that lists all trademark fee changes.

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal and/or requirements in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

/Kathy de Jonge/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

(571) 272-9152

kathleen.dejonge@USPTO.gov (informal use only)

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.