To: | Foxcaps of Florida, Inc. (steve@vondranlegal.com) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 87221879 - RAGE - N/A |
Sent: | 3/4/2017 2:53:43 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM117@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87221879
MARK: RAGE
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: THE LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN C. VONDRAN, P. |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Foxcaps of Florida, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/4/2017
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This Office action is in response to applicant’s February 13, 2017 communication.
In the previous Office action dated January 23, 2017, registration was refused under Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Reg. No. 4881936.
Requirements were also issued regarding (1) identification of goods, and (2) disclaimer.
Based upon applicant’s response, the foregoing requirements are satisfied.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL applicant must address:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant’s mark is “RAGE” for “clothing and apparel for paintball enthusiasts, namely, hats, beanies, paintball jersey and pants, T-shirts, shirts, tank tops, shorts, sweaters, jackets and sweatshirts” in International Class 25.
Registrant’s mark is “RAGE” for “Apparel for dancers, namely, tee shirts, sweatshirts, pants, leggings, shorts and jackets; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps,
athletic uniforms; Athletic shirts; Baseball caps and hats; Button down shirts; Golf shirts; Hats; Hooded sweat shirts; Jackets; Party hats; Polo shirts; Rugby shirts; Shirts; Sports caps and hats;
T-shirts; Tank tops; Tops; Wearable garments and clothing, namely, shirts” in International Class 25.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see TMEP §1207.01. That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
A) Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark “RAGE” is highly similar in appearance, sound, connotation, and overall commercial impression to registrant’s “RAGE” mark. Both marks begin with and consist entirely of the identical term “RAGE” and consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 102 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).
In this case, consumers will likely focus on “RAGE” in applicant’s mark and may confuse the mark with registrant’s “RAGE” mark, especially since the goods of the respective parties are highly related, as shown below.
B) Relatedness of the Goods
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods (i.e., “hats”, “jackets”, “shirts”, “tops” and “t-shirts”) and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification (i.e., “clothing and apparel for paintball enthusiasts, namely, hats, … paintball jersey, … t-shirts, shirts, tank tops, … sweaters, jackets and sweatshirts”).
Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Therefore, applicant’s mark is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) for likelihood of confusion.
RESPONSE TO APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS
Applicant first argues that “there is no likelihood of consumer confusion” because it has limited its identification of goods to “paintball enthusiasts.” Applicant contends the respective goods travel in different channels of trade, asserting that “many dancers are women, whereas many paintball enthusiasts are males.” First, this statement sexist in nature; there are both female and male dancers, and also both female and male paintball enthusiasts. Moreover, the gender of consumers is irrelevant for the Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion analysis. Secondly, only one particular entry in registrant’s identification of goods is narrowed specifically to dancers (i.e., “Apparel for dancers, namely, tee shirts, sweatshirts, pants, leggings, shorts and jackets”). The remaining items listed in applicant’s goods contain no limitations as to the particular types of consumers. Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s various goods—e.g., Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Athletic shirts; Baseball caps and hats; Button down shirts; Golf shirts; Hats; Hooded sweat shirts; Jackets; Party hats; Polo shirts; Rugby shirts; Shirts; Sports caps and hats; T-shirts; Tank tops; Tops; Wearable garments and clothing, namely, shirts—are presumed to travel in all channels of trade. Since applicant includes no restrictions in its identifications, it is presumed that these goods are sold to all consumers, including paintball enthusiasts. Therefore, applicant’s amendment to its identification of goods does not obviate the Section 2(d) refusal.
Applicant further contends that “the channel of trades here are distinct” because “[a]pplicant intends and will limit its sales to online sales through its company owned websites.” Nevertheless, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Applicant’s identification of goods does not include any limitation as to online sales. Moreover, even if applicant decides to limit the identification of goods, registrant’s goods contain no limitation as to the channel of trades, and therefore it is presumed that registrant’s goods are sold in all channels, including online.
For the foregoing reasons, the trademark examining attorney finds the applicant’s arguments unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
Consumers familiar with the registrant’s mark “RAGE” used in connection with a variety of clothing items, upon encountering applicant’s “RAGE” used in connection with variety of clothing items, would be likely to mistakenly believe that the goods emanate from a common source.
The greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). Here, applicant and registrant’s marks are legally identical, and the goods at issue are highly related.
In view of the foregoing, the refusal to register the mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final.
RESPONSE OPTIONS
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Eric Sable/
Law Office 117
571-272-4653
Eric.Sable@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.