UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/6/2017

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 1, 2016.

 

In a previous Office action dated October 1, 2016, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark; and Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) because the applied-for mark is merely descriptive.  In addition, applicant was required to amend the identification of goods.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the requirement to amend the identification of goods has been satisfied.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusals in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion 
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration Nos. 4008259.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The marks at issue are:

 

• Application – “KNOOK”; and

 

• Registration – “NUK”.

 

The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Moreover, because the marks are phonetic equivalents, they are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Therefore, the marks are similar for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis. 

 

Applicant argues that the marks are not similar because they look different.  In response to this argument it is noted that consumer confusion has been held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall meaning.  Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1336, 164 USPQ 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding MISTER STAIN likely to be confused with MR. CLEAN on competing cleaning products); see In re M. Serman & Co., 223 USPQ 52, 53 (TTAB 1984) (holding CITY WOMAN for ladies’ blouses likely to be confused with CITY GIRL for a variety of female clothing); H. Sichel Sohne, GmbH v. John Gross & Co., 204 USPQ 257, 260-61 (TTAB 1979) (holding BLUE NUN for wines likely to be confused with BLUE CHAPEL for the same goods); Ralston Purina Co. v. Old Ranchers Canning Co., 199 USPQ 125, 128 (TTAB 1978) (holding TUNA O’ THE FARM for canned chicken likely to be confused with CHICKEN OF THE SEA for canned tuna); Downtowner Corp. v. Uptowner Inns, Inc., 178 USPQ 105, 109 (TTAB 1973) (holding UPTOWNER for motor inn and restaurant services likely to be confused with DOWNTOWNER for the same services); TMEP §1207.01(b). 

 

In the instant case, the attached evidence from SpellChecker.net and Meriam-Webster.com shows that the words in the marks at issue are both the phonetic equivalent and/or common misspellings of the word “nook.”  Based on this evidence, the fact that the marks look different does not obviate the likelihood of confusion because the marks convey the same idea, namely, a nook.

 

Applicant also asserts that the marks are not similar because consumers will view the applied-for mark as a “somewhat familiar term” and the registered mark as “a coined term with no meaning.”  This argument, however, is unpersuasive because the evidence demonstrates that consumers are likely to perceive both marks as an intentional misspellings of the word “nook.”

 

For the above-stated reasons, applicant’s arguments that the marks are not similar are unpersuasive.

 

Comparison of Goods

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

The goods at issue are:

 

• Application – Under cabinet electric lighting fixtures; cabinet and kitchen lighting fixtures; and

 

• Registration – Flashlights, lamps to be inserted in electrical outlets for use as nightlights; humidifiers.

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

 

The trademark examining attorney attached evidence to the Office action dated October 1, 2016 from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case (incorporated to this action by reference thereto).  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely electric lighting fixtures, flashlights, and cabinet and kitchen lights, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

The attached Internet evidence consists of screenshots from LampsPlus.com, PicClick.com, HomeDepot.com, Amazon.com, and LigtingEver.com.  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures and/or provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Based on the above-referenced evidence, the goods of the parties’ are related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Applicant contends that the goods are not related because the goods are not competitive.  In response to this argument, it is noted that the goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  In the instant case, the evidence demonstrates the relatedness of the parties’ goods, and thus, applicant’s argument that the goods are not related because they are not competitive is unpersuasive.

 

Applicant further argues that the goods are not related because the goods serve different purposes, the goods are not sold in the same sections of stores, the goods are not used together, and because applicant is unaware of any well-known lighting producers that offer both types of products under the same mark.  These arguments are unpersuasive because the above-referenced evidence clearly demonstrates the relatedness of the parties’ goods.

 

In total: the parties’ marks create similar commercial impressions because they are phonetic equivalents that are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression because the marks convey the same idea; the parties’ goods and are available in the same trade channels because neither party has restricted its channels of trade; and the evidence show that the parties’ goods are commercially related.  Thus, consumers encountering the marks are likely to confuse them and mistake the underlying sources of the goods. 

 

For the above stated reasons, applicant’s arguments that confusion is not likely are unpersuasive, and the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made final.

 

Applicant must also respond to the following refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) is now made FINAL for the reasons set forth below.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes the use of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). 

 

“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

The applied-for mark is “KNOOK” used to identify: under cabinet electric lighting fixtures; cabinet and kitchen lighting fixtures.

 

A novel spelling or an intentional misspelling that is the phonetic equivalent of a merely descriptive word or term is also merely descriptive if purchasers would perceive the different spelling as the equivalent of the descriptive word or term.  See In re Quik-Print Copy Shop, Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 526 & n.9, 205 USPQ 505, 507 & n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding “QUIK-PRINT,” phonetic spelling of “quick-print,” merely descriptive of printing and photocopying services); In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009) (holding “URBANHOUZING,” phonetic spelling of “urban” and “housing,” merely descriptive of real estate services); In re The State Chem. Mfg. Co., 225 USPQ 687, 689-90 (TTAB 1985) (holding “FOM,” phonetic spelling of “foam,” merely descriptive of foam rug shampoo); TMEP §1209.03(j).

 

In the instant case, the applied-for mark is the phonetic equivalent of the word “nook.”  Additionally, the evidence attached to the Office action dated October 1, 2016 from AHDictionary.com (incorporated to this action by reference thereto) defines “nook” as “a small corner, alcove, or recess, especially one in a large room.”  Moreover, the additional evidence attached to the Office action dated October 1, 2016 from PhantomLighting.com, LampsPlus.com, PennWestHomes.com, VimVigorDesign.com, and LightsUnlimitedInc.com shows that the word “nook” is commonly used in connection with similar goods to describe lights that are used in small areas.  Based on the evidence, the applied-for mark merely describes the use of the applicant’s goods, namely, under cabinet electric lighting fixtures and cabinet and kitchen lighting fixtures used in small corners, alcoves, or recesses.  Thus, registration must be refused under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant argues that the applied-for mark is suggestive rather than merely descriptive because the mark is not the proper spelling of the descriptive word “nook” and begins with the letter “K”.  These arguments, however, are unpersuasive because it contradicts the above-stated principle that a novel spelling or an intentional misspelling that is the phonetic equivalent of a merely descriptive word or term is also merely descriptive whereas the attached evidence from SpellChecker.net demonstrates that purchasers will perceive the different spelling of the word “nook” in the applied-for mark as the equivalent of the word “nook.”

 

Applicant contends that the mark is not merely descriptive because consumers will encounter the mark displayed on the product in a manner that would stand out from the other text on the packaging.  This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the mere descriptiveness is not negated by the potential manner in which the applicant intends to present the applied-for mark.  Moreover, the applied for mark is in standard characters, and it is noted that a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style.  Thus, the purported presentation of the applied-for mark on applicant’s product packaging does not negate the mere descriptiveness of the mark because the mark in the application is a standard character mark, and thus, is not restricted to the manner of display that is indicated in the applicant’s response.

 

Applicant further asserts that the mark is not merely descriptive because the word “nook” is not typically used by consumers to describe cabinets, small corners, alcoves, or kitchen recesses.  In response to this argument, it is noted that a word is not merely descriptive only if it is “typically” used by consumers to describe parts of their homes.  Rather, in contrast, the above-referenced evidence and the additional attached evidence from LightingDirect.com, R-Anell.com, BestPriceProbe.com, and HomeDepot.com demonstrates that the word “nook” is commonly used in the marketplace to describe the same or similar goods.  Thus, applicant’s argument that it is atypical for consumers to use the word “nook” to describe parts of their homes is unpersuasive.

 

Applicant argues that the evidence provided by the trademark examining attorney is “unpersuasive.”  Although applicant does not clearly state why it feels the evidence is unpersuasive, but rather merely points to the parts of the evidence that demonstrate the descriptive use of the word “nook,” the trademark examining attorney notes that the Section 2(e)(1) refusal is not based on whether the applicant is persuaded that its mark is merely descriptive.  Rather, the refusal is made because the applied-for mark comprises a term that others may need to use to describe their goods in the marketplace.  See Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1560, 21 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Aug. Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823, 825 (TTAB 1983).  Moreover, ample evidence has been provided in both the prior Office action and attached to this Office action to demonstrate that the word “nook” is commonly used in the marketplace to describe the same or similar goods.  Thus, applicant’s argument that the applied-for mark is not merely descriptive because the evidence does is unpersuasive to the applicant is not persuasive.

 

Lastly, applicant argues that because another application filed by the applicant for a similar mark used to identify similar goods was not refused under Section 2(e)(1), the instant application likewise should not be refused registration under this Section.  In response to this argument, it is noted that the applicant correctly remarks that prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi); see In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1165 n.3 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).  Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1536 (TTAB 2009).  In the instant case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the applied-for mark must be refused under Section 2(e)(1), and thus, the merits of this case demonstrate that the refusal is proper.

 

For the above stated reasons, applicant’s arguments that the applied-for mark is not merely descriptive are unpersuasive, and the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) is now made final.

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the effective filing date of the application will be the date on which applicant met the minimum filing requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for the amendment to allege use.  37 C.F.R. §2.75(b); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)        a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully resolves the outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)        an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

 

/Josh Toy/

JOSHUA S. TOY

Law Office 120

Phone: 571-272-4856

joshua.toy@uspto.gov

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 4/6/2017 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87114764

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 4/6/2017 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.