STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

Section 2(d) Refusal– Likelihood of Confusion

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4699625, 2071127, 1105842, 4103317, and 4903065. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services. In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 (TTAB 2015) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see TMEP §1207.01. That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

Comparison of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Truimph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d at 1960 ( (citing Spoons Rests., Inc., v. Morrison, Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013));TMEP §1207.01(b).

In the present case, the applicant’s mark, PERK, is similar or identical to the registrants’ marks, PERK-CRETE, PERK, PERC, PERC, and SEPTIC PERC (U.S. Reg. Nos. 4699625, 2071127, 1105842, 4103317, and 4903065, respectively), and will lead to consumer confusion. Specifically, the dominant feature of all the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

While the marks PERK-CRETE and SEPTIC PERC include additional wording that the applicant has deleted from its mark, the mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as the registered mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from the registered mark.

Comparison of the Goods and/or Services

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the goods and/or services and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in registrants’ more narrow identification.

Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

Applicant must respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

Identification of Goods and/or Services Amendment Partial Requirement

THIS REQUIREMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THE SPECIFIED GOODS

The USPTO has the discretion to determine the degree of particularity needed to clearly identify goods and/or services covered by a mark. In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1365, 83 USPQ2d 1541, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the USPTO requires the description of goods and/or services in a U.S. application to be specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise. TMEP §1402.01; see In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d at 1597-98; Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ 321, 322 (Comm’r Pats. 1954).

Here, the wording specified below in the identification of goods and/or services must be clarified because it is too broad and could include goods and/or services in other international classes. See TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.

For the applicant’s convenience, the Examining Attorney has highlighted suggested amendments and problem areas in bold type below. The applicant may adopt following wording, if accurate, because it is sufficiently definite and properly classified:

“Chemicals used in industry; Chemicals, including those used for construction, namely, {specify by common commercial name, e.g., “chemical preparations for use in industry”}; Chemical preparations for industrial purposes; crack and joint fillers, namely, {specify by common commercial name, e.g., “wood flour for use as a filler in the manufacture of plastics”},” in International Class 1;

“Paints, varnishes; Primers, sealers, namely, {specify, e.g., “paint sealers”} and coatings, namely, {specify, e.g., “coating comprised of cement”}; Concrete sealers in the form of coatings; Polyaspartic sealers and coatings, namely, {specify, e.g., “anti-corrosive coatings”}; Primers, including epoxy-based primers and sealers for concrete surfaces; Polyaspartic and epoxy based floor coatings, namely, {specify, e.g., “direct dyes”},” in International Class 2;

“Non-metallic building materials, namely, {specify, e.g., “fly ash”}; non-metallic flooring¸ namely, {specify, e.g., “vinyl flooring”}; crack and joint fillers for concrete, namely, {specify, e.g., “cement fillers for use in roofing”}; Epoxy-based filler for concrete surfaces, namely, {specify, e.g., “epoxy grout”}; Polyaspartic floors, namely, {specify, e.g., “laminate flooring”},” in International Class 19.

See TMEP §1402.01.

Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b). The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification. TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b). Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted. TMEP §1402.07(e).

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.

Partial Abandonment Advisory

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within the six-month period for response, the indefinite goods will be deleted and the application will then proceed with the remaining goods only. See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a)-(a)(1); TMEP §718.02(a).

Assistance

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

/James W. Stein/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

Phone: 571.272.3056

james.stein@uspto.gov

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.