UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/16/2017

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

On September 8, 2016, action on this application was suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial No. 86663383.  The referenced pending application has abandoned and is no longer a potential bar to the registration of applicant’s mark. Further, in light of the assignment of U.S. Registration No. 2250131 to the applicant, the following refusal is OBVIATED: the refusal under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act for a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration No. 2250131.

 

However, for the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 3175600.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b). All previous evidence and arguments, where applicable, are incorporated by reference herein.

 

 

Registration Refused – Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3175600.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  A copy of the cited registration is attached to the September 7, 2016 Office action.

 

The applied-for mark is “PHANTOM” in standard characters for “Noise suppressors for guns” in International Class 13.

 

The registered mark is “PHANTOM” in standard characters for “Airguns” in International Class 13.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “PHANTOM” in standard characters and registrant’s mark is “PHANTOM” in standard characters.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1411.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Nature and Number of Similar Marks

In the applicant’s September 7, 2016 communication, it argues that the term “PHANTOM” is weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection. In support thereof, the applicant submitted a list of registrations. However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  In re Promo Ink, 78 USPQ2d 1301, 1304 (TTAB 2006); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1372-73 (TTAB 2006); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

Even if the applicant had properly submitted the third-party registrations, this evidence would not establish that “PHANTOM” is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection because these registrations appear to be for goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Thus, evidence that registrations containing the term “PHANTOM” exist for goods that are not firearm or firearm accessories are of limited probative value in determining the strength of a mark.  See Kay Chems., Inc. v. Kelite Chems. Corp., 464 F.2d 1040, 1042, 175 USPQ 99, 101 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 

 

Moreover, even if the term “PHANTOM” were considered weak for the goods at issue, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods, such as the goods at issue here.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 

 

Comparison of Goods

The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Instead, the respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006). 

 

In this instance, the applicant has identified its goods as noise suppressors for guns. The applicant does not limit the nature of the guns for which its noise suppressors are compatible. Thus, its noise suppressors are considered to be designed for all guns of the type described, which would include the registrant’s goods, air guns (“Exhibit A”).

 

Further, the applicant’s noise suppressors and the registrant’s air guns are related because the goods commonly emanate from the same commercial entity and are complementary in function. In support thereof, the examining attorney has attached Internet evidence from manufacturers and retailers of noise suppressors for guns and providers of information related thereto (“Exhibit B”). This evidence establishes that the same commercial entity, such as Umarex®, commonly produces air guns and noise suppressors therefor under the same mark and market and retail these goods through the same channels of trade, namely, retailers of airsoft firearms.

 

In addition, this evidence also demonstrates that noise suppressors for air guns are designed to reduce the noise produced by an air gun while firing. Thus, the applicant’s goods perform a complementary function to the registrant’s goods. Where evidence shows that the goods at issue have complementary uses, and thus are often used together or otherwise purchased by the same purchasers for the same or related purposes, such goods have generally been found to be sufficiently related such that confusion would be likely if they are marketed under the same or similar marks. See In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1272 (TTAB 2009) (holding medical MRI diagnostic apparatus and medical ultrasound devices to be related, based in part on the fact that such goods have complementary purposes because they may be used by the same medical personnel on the same patients to treat the same disease). 

 

Therefore, the applicant’s noise suppressors for guns and the registrant’s air guns are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009).

 

Priority of Use

In the applicant’s September 7, 2016 communication, it argues that its use of the applied-for mark precedes that of the registrant. However, applicant’s implied claim of priority of use is not relevant to this ex parte proceeding.  See In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods specified in the certificate.  During ex parte prosecution, the trademark examining attorney has no authority to review or to decide on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).

 

Evidence of Actual Confusion

In addition, the applicant argues that there has been nineteen years of peaceful co-existence of the marks at issue and the owners of the cited marks do not perceive any potential confusion. However, the test under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  It is not necessary to show actual confusion to establish a likelihood of confusion.  Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board stated as follows:

 

[A]pplicant’s assertion that it is unaware of any actual confusion occurring as a result of the contemporaneous use of the marks of applicant and registrant is of little probative value in an ex parte proceeding such as this where we have no evidence pertaining to the nature and extent of the use by applicant and registrant (and thus cannot ascertain whether there has been ample opportunity for confusion to arise, if it were going to); and the registrant has no chance to be heard from (at least in the absence of a consent agreement, which applicant has not submitted in this case).

 

In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984).

 

Further, the applicant’s statement that a signed consent to register from the owner of the cited mark is not persuasive as not consent agreement has been submitted. The applicant should note that the mere submission of a consent to register if it does not address why the parties believe there is no likelihood of confusion, nor describes the arrangements undertaken by the parties to avoid confusing the public.  See In re Mastic, 829 F.2d 1114, 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d 1292, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii).

 

Conclusion

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

 

Because the applicant’s applied-for mark and the registered mark are similar and the goods are related, registration is refused for a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).

 

Based on the foregoing, the refusal to register the applied-for mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act because a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration No. 3175600 is continued and made FINAL.

 

 

Response Guidelines

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

/Thomas Young/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 120

(571) 272-5152

thomas.young@uspto.gov

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 3/16/2017 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86817381

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 3/16/2017 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.