Response to Office Action

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)

OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 07/31/2017)

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Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)

OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 07/31/2017)

Response to Office Action

To the Commissioner for Trademarks:

Application serial no. 86774231 DOGSTAR(Standard Characters, see http://tmng-al.gov.uspto.report/resting2/api/img/86774231/large) has been amended as follows:

ARGUMENT(S)
In response to the substantive refusal(s), please note the following:

Applicant acknowledges the Office Action dated November 5, 2015 in the present application.  In response, applicant has the following comments.

 I.         No Likelihood of Confusion Under Section 2(d)

 

The Examining Attorney has refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), because Applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the identified services, allegedly resembles U.S. Registration No. 4592893 for the mark DOG STAR BARKERY for edible organic pet treats for pets, as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.  For the reasons stated below, Applicant respectfully traverses the refusal to register the mark DOGSTAR.

 There are distinct differences between the marks such as to preclude a likelihood of confusion.  It is noted that “confusion is related not to the nature of the mark but to its affect when applied to the goods of the Applicant.  [Therefore] the only relevant application is made in the marketplace.”  In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

A.         Differences in the Marks

The basic principle in determining likelihood of confusion between marks is that marks must be compared in their entireties.  Consequently, likelihood of confusion can not be predicated on only part of a mark.  Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pats., 252 U.S. 536, 545-46 (1920) (“The commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail.  For this reason, it should be considered in its entirety and to strike out any considerable part of it, certainly any conspicuous part of it, would be to greatly affect its value.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).  Thus, when comparing Applicant’s unitary mark DOGSTAR to the cited mark DOG STAR BARKERY, the Examining Attorney must look to the marks as a whole to yield the impression created by the marks, and not only the common words DOG STAR.

The present mark, DOGSTAR, can be distinguished from the cited mark DOG STAR BARKERY, in its entirety, and avoid any likelihood of confusion as to source by the average consumer.  In the present case, Applicant’s mark is a unitary mark with two components and two syllables.  On the other hand, the cited mark DOG STAR BARKERY is a three-term, five-syllable composite mark.  The marks, therefore, are very different in terms of their overall sound and appearance.  

 

Applicant’s mark, DOGSTAR, also has a very different meaning and commercial impression from the cited mark DOG STAR BARKERY in the minds of consumers.  In the present case, Applicant’s use of the term DOGSTAR is a reference to Sirius, the brightest star in the Earth’s night sky.  Serius is also known as the “DOGSTAR” reflecting its prominence in its constellation, Canis Major (Greater Dog).  Applicant includes herewith a printout from Wikipedia to support this fact.  Applicant also promotes the term DOGSTAR on its website where it describes its kitches as “a bright star in the global pet food industry”.  A printout from Applicant’s website showing the use of the mark with this meaning is also included herewith.    By contrast, the cited Registrant’s mark DOG STAR BARKERY used in connection with dot treats implies that “your dog is always a star” and deserves special treats.  A printout from Registrant’s website displaying this phrase is also included herewith.  Therefore, Applicant’s mark and the cited mark have very different meanings and commercial impressions in the minds of the average consumer.

The Examining Attorney has emphasized the common words “DOG” and “STAR” to form the likelihood of confusion refusal.  In this case, the word “DOG” is highly suggestive and weak when used in connection with pet products.  As a result, the word “STAR” then becomes the more dominant term.  The Examining Attorney has also discounted the term “BARKERY” in the cited Registrant’s mark by assuming the consumers will convert the term BARKERY to the descriptive term BAKERY, concluding that a descriptive term is less significant.  This is an improper dissection of the cited Registrant’s mark, especially when the term BARKERY is not disclaimed and has not been determined to be descriptive.

 

B.         Descriptive and Disclaimed Matter

Even if a consumer were to take a “mental leap” and convert the BARKERY portion of the cited Registrant’s mark to the descriptive term BAKERY, it is well settled that “[t]he filing of a disclaimer with the Patent and Trademark Office does not remove the disclaimed matter from the purview of determination of likelihood of confusion.” In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F. 2d 1204, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also, In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 U.S.P.Q. 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disclaimer has no legal effect on the issue of likelihood of confusion). This is so because confusion is evaluated from the perspective of the purchasing public, which is not aware that certain words or phrases have been disclaimed. Id. at 751. In this case, when encountering the parties’ marks in the marketplace, consumers will encounter the marks in their entireties as DOGSTAR on the one hand and DOG STAR BARKERY on the other, when considering the purchase of pet products. 

 

The Board’s analysis in Sports Authority Michigan Inc. v. PC Authority Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1782 (T.T.A.B. 2002), appeal dismissed, (Fed. Cir. Sep. 09, 2002) (opposition dismissed as to both applications) is instructive.  Because the registrations and applications at issue all included disclaimers, Opposer focused on the presence of the term “Authority” in each mark, and argued that it was the dominant term in each mark. The Board posited however that “[i]t need not automatically follow, however, that, merely because the marks have the same dominant element, they are pronounced the same, look the same or present the same overall commercial impression.” Sports Authority at 1792. In that case, the Board ultimately concluded that “though the marks share a significant element, they look different, sound different and create different specific commercial impressions.” Id.

 

Clearly, additions to marks may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if the marks in their entireties convey significantly different commercial impressions; or the matter common to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely diluted.  See, e.g.,  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of applicant’s CAPITAL CITY BANK marks for banking and financial services, and opposer’s CITIBANK marks for banking and financial services, is not likely cause confusion, based, in part, on findings that the phrase “City Bank” is frequently used in the banking industry and that “CAPITAL” is the dominant element of applicant’s marks, which gives the marks a geographic connotation as well as a look and sound distinct from opposer’s marks); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1245, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of THE RITZ KIDS for clothing items (including gloves) and RITZ for various kitchen textiles (including barbeque mitts) is likely to cause confusion, because, inter alia, THE RITZ KIDS creates a different commercial impression).

 

When viewed in their entireties, it is clear that the respective marks sound more dissimilar than similar to consumers.  The dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression strongly supports a finding of no likelihood of confusion.

 

C.         Coexistence of Prior Cited Registration and Additional Third Party

            Registrations

It is respectfully requested that the Examining Attorney consider the number and nature of similar marks for pet products.  See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); T.M.E.P. 1207.01. “[E]vidence of third party usage of similar marks on similar goods and services is admissible and relevant to show that the mark is relatively weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection.”  Standard Brands, Inc. v. R.J.R. Foods, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 383 (T.T.A.B. 1976)  See also General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442 (8^th Cir. 1997). 

Attached Schedule A contains third party registrations and allowed applications that are similar to the cited prior registration for pet products in that they all contain the words “DOG” and “STAR”.   For example, the mark FIVE STAR DOG RESORT is registered for pet training and kennel services; the mark STARDOG is registered for pet foods; the mark DOG STAR is registered for a variety of pet products; the mark D DOGSTAR PRODUCTIONS is registered for recordings featuring dog training techniques; the mark DOG STAR DAILY is registered for blogs related to dogs; the mark DOG STAR RANCH is registered for boarding and day care services for pets; and the mark STARDOG is allowed for medical animal feed.  Clearly, if these marks shown in Schedule A can coexist in the marketplace and travel through the same channels of trade for various types of pet products, including pet food, without any confusion being found, Applicant’s mark DOGSTAR should also be allowed to coexist.  The existence of the marks in Schedule A serve to narrow the scope of protection and to limit the effect on other marks, such as Applicant’s mark, by the third party registrations.  The registrations in Schedule A are for goods that are highly related and identical to those identified in the cited prior registration. 

Attached Schedule B contains third party registrations that are similar to the cited prior registration for pet products in that they all contain the word “STAR”.  Clearly, the existence of these registrations supports the fact that the term STAR is weak and only entitled to a narrow scope of protection for pet products.

The existence of these additional registrations also support the fact that the term STAR is weak and only entitled to a narrow scope of protection.  By allowing the additional registrations in Schedules A and B to coexist on the Register, the Trademark Office has indicated that it considers the word “STAR” to be weak and diluted.  Plus Prods. v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 541, 543-44 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (multiple registrations for composite marks that included the word “PLUS” are evidence that the Trademark Office and consumers would view “PLUS” as not entitled to broad protection.)  Since no confusion was found between these additional registrations and the cited prior registration, there should be no confusion found between the cited prior registration and Applicant’s mark DOGSTAR.  Applicant believes that the coexistence of the additional registrations for very similar marks for highly related and identical goods indicates that its application is also registrable.

The sampling of registrations submitted herewith also serves as evidence to support the fact that the average consumer is repeatedly confronted with a variety of pet products which bear the same or similar mark and is already aware that the goods provided under those marks do not emanate from the same source.  After considering the coexistence of the cited registration along with the marks listed in Schedules A and B, and in view of the fact that they are owned by separate entities, it is clear that no one particular company has such exclusive use of the word “STAR” so as to preclude another from obtaining a registration; thus, the cited mark should be subjected to a narrow reading.  See Puma-Sportschuhfabriken Rudolf-Dassler kk.g.v. Superga S.P.a., 210 U.S.P.Q. 31 (T.T.A.B. 1980).

It is respectfully requested that the Examining Attorney recognize and consider that it would be unfair to Applicant and the other registrants, to afford broad protection to the cited prior registration.  Since the Patent and Trademark Office has already inherently recognized this narrow scope of protection by allowing multiple registrations for very similar marks for related and identical goods, it should be consistent in its practice and reconsider the rejection in the present application on this basis.  There can be no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark DOGSTAR, the cited prior registration for the mark DOG STAR BARKERY, and the additional third party registrations all containing the words “DOG STAR” and “STAR”; all for the same or closely related goods.  Clearly, the word “STAR” is weak in the pet products industry.  All of these marks coexist without any confusion because of the overall dissimilarities in the sound, meaning and commercial impression between the marks.

While Applicant understands that prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering different marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the Office, Applicant believes that the numerous registrations in this case should hold great weight. 

 

Courts have interpreted third party registrations consistently with the foregoing.  In re Dayco-Products-Eaglemotive, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1910 (T.T.A.B. 1988).  In Dayco, the court held that applicant’s IMPERIAL for automotive products would not likely cause confusion with the cited trademark IMPERIAL for automobiles and structural parts thereof because IMPERIAL had been adopted by others in the vehicular field and as such, the scope of protection afforded such a mark is considerably narrower than that afforded a more arbitrary designation.  Id. at 1910.

In another case the court held that applicant’s KEY for banking services would not cause confusion with KEYCHECK, KEY-CARD BANK, KEYBANKER and CB KEY for banking services because extensive third party adoption had diluted the trademark significance of the word KEY such that marks incorporating the term are entitled to a limited scope of protection.  In re Hamilton Bank, 222 U.S.P.Q. 174 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 

D.         Shared Terms

“[E]vidence of widespread third-party use in a particular field of marks containing a certain shared term is competent to suggest that the purchasers have been conditioned to look to other elements of the marks as a means of distinguishing the source of goods or services in the field.” In re Broadway Chicken, Inc., 38 USPQ2d 1559, 1565 (TTAB 1996).  Accordingly, terms in use by many sellers are not entitled to the same scope of protection as strong marks.  Like the terms “acme” and “national,” as demonstrated by Schedules A and B submitted herewith, the words “DOG and STAR” and the word “STAR” for pet products is in common use by many sellers and thus deserves a lesser scope of protection.   See Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Riverstates Oil Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. 79 (T.T.A.B. 1962); See also, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11:86. 

Clearly, consumers in the marketplace for pet products have not been confused by the existing plurality of marks containing the word STAR.   After considering all of the marks listed in Schedules A and B containing the words “DOG STAR” and “STAR”, it is clear that no one particular company has such exclusive use of the words “DOG STAR” or “STAR” so as to preclude another from obtaining a registration.  Thus, the cited prior registration must be narrowly construed in view of the crowded nature of this field. 

E.         Consumers Will Look To Elements Of The Marks

In view of the marks listed in Schedules A and B, the cited mark must be narrowly construed in view of the crowded nature of this field.  In such a crowd, customers will not likely be confused between any two of the crowd since they have learned to pick out one from the other.  See Miss World (U.K.) Ltd. V. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9^th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distrib., Inc., 748 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

While Applicant’s mark DOGSTAR and the cited prior mark both contain the weak term “DOG” because it is suggestive of pet food for dogs and the weak term “STAR” because it exists in a crowded field, the marks considered in their entireties are readily distinguishable from one another.  In fact, the Board has recognized that consumers will be able to distinguish among the various marks with common elements by looking to other elements.  In re Coca-Cola Co., 2007 WL 3320310 (TTAB 2007); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F2d 1403, 1406 (CCPA 1973).  As a result, it is highly unlikely that consumers will believe that all marks containing the words “DOG STAR” or “STAR” originate from the same source.  In this regard, inclusion of  additional terms, enable consumers to readily distinguish between the respective parties’ marks in view of the crowded field of marks for pet products incorporating the word “STAR”.  Clearly, the marks are very different in terms of their overall sound, meaning and appearance such that confusion is not likely.

F.         Differences in the Goods and Services

It is respectfully suggested that sufficient weight has not been given to the distinct differences in the services provided under Applicant’s mark and the goods provided under the cited registration.  Applicant’s services consist of operating state-of-the art kitchen facilities which exceed the regulatory requirements and track and trace capabilities expected of human food facilities.  By contrast, Registrant’s goods consist of specialty organic dog treats.  The cited Registrant does not provide any type of kitchen facilities.  As a result, there is no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and the cited mark.

G.        Channels of Trade

 

Applicant’s services and cited Registrant’s goods travel through totally different channels of trade to different end users.   The relevant consumers of Applicant’s services are large pet food companies who want state-of-the-art facilities to manufacture their pet food.  These consumers will directly contact Applicant to manufacture their products.  By contrast, the ordinary purchaser of pet treats is a pet owner who wants to purchase special organic treats for their pet.  Registrant’s pet treats are sold through specialty pet stores.  A printout from Registrant’s website showing the locations that sell these treats is submitted herewith.  As a result, Applicant’s services and the cited Registrant’s goods are marketed specifically to different end users through very different channels of trade.  Clearly, there are distinct goods and services being offered through different channels of trade by Applicant and the cited Registrant that eliminates any confusion. 

The fact that the Registrant’s goods may relate generally to other goods or services does not necessitate a finding of likelihood of confusion.  If the goods and services in question are not “marketed in such a way that they would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source, then, even if the marks are identical, confusion is not likely.”  T.M.E.P. § 1207.01(a)(i).  As there is no overlap between the identification of goods and services or the marketing channels for Applicant’s mark DOGSTAR directed to large pet food companies and the cited mark DOG STAR BARKERY directed to consumers who want to purchase special treats for their pets, there should be no likelihood of confusion as to source by the average consumer. 

In view of the fact that the respective goods and services do not move in the same channels of trade, and are not advertised in the same way to the same type of consumer, there is no likelihood of confusion.

H.        Sophisticated Consumers

Conditions under which the services are encountered in the marketplace, and under which purchasing decisions are made, must be considered as well when evaluating the likelihood that a mark sought to be registered in an application might be confused with a registered mark.  T.M.E.P  § 1207. If the decision is made by a sophisticated purchaser, it may be sufficient to negate a likelihood of confusion even between marks of great similarity.  Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. 97, 112 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  The goods and services offered under the present mark and the cited mark are not impulse purchases.  Moreover, the services provided by Applicant are expensive.  These goods and services require careful study and a thorough evaluation of the product and service providers.   The relevant consumers in the present case will only make a decision to have their pet food manufactured at Applicant’s facility after careful examination of the facility and its capabilities and to purchase organic treats for their pets after careful examination of the ingredients contained in the treats.  They are sophisticated consumers with specific needs.  These consumers tend to be careful, discriminating buyers who study the source, quality, and characteristics of Applicant’s services and the cited Registrant’s goods.  As a result, it is not likely or probable that such consumers would confuse Applicant’s services with the cited prior registrant’s goods. See Electronic Design and Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 718-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that goods purchased by persons highly knowledgeable about the goods substantially lessons likelihood of confusion); Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instr., Inc., U.S.P.Q. 786, 790 (1^st Cir. 1983) (“There is always less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful consideration.”). 

I.          There Can Be No Likelihood of Confusion

 Courts have consistently interpreted the likelihood of confusion standard as requiring much more than a “possibility” of confusion.  McGregor-Coniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2^nd Cir. 1979) (an “appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused”); International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196 (1^st Cir. 1996) (“the law has long demanded a showing that the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care”); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503 (2^nd Cir. 1997) (“likelihood of confusion means a probability of confusion; it is not sufficient if confusion is merely ‘possible’”); Elvis Presley Enter. Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5^th Cir. 1998) (“likelihood of confusion is synonymous with a probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility of confusion”).  In this case, the overall differences in the marks, goods and services, and channels of trade; the coexistence of the cited prior registration with other third party registrations and allowed applications, the weakness of the term STAR in connection with pet products, and sophisticated consumers eliminate the probability of confusion between Applicant’s mark and the cited prior mark.  See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23:3.

 II.        Conclusion

 In summary, it is respectfully requested that the Examining Attorney recognize and consider the overall differences between the marks, the coexistence of marks containing the word STAR, the sophisticated consumers, the differences in the goods and channels of trade, and the weakness of the word STAR in connection with pet products.  Taking all of these factors into consideration, there would be no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and the cited prior registration.

 In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, the Applicant respectfully requests publication of the present application.

EVIDENCE
Evidence in the nature of Wikipedia printout; website printouts for applicant and registrant; schedules A and B has been attached.
Original PDF file:
evi_18418012227-20160426155538657107_._DOGSTAR_definition.PDF
Converted PDF file(s) ( 2 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Original PDF file:
evi_18418012227-20160426155538657107_._DOG_STAR_BARKERY_website.PDF
Converted PDF file(s) ( 2 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Original PDF file:
evi_18418012227-20160426155538657107_._DOGSTAR_website.pdf
Converted PDF file(s) ( 2 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Original PDF file:
evi_18418012227-20160426155538657107_._DOGSTAR_schedule_A.pdf
Converted PDF file(s) ( 12 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Evidence-3
Evidence-4
Evidence-5
Evidence-6
Evidence-7
Evidence-8
Evidence-9
Evidence-10
Evidence-11
Evidence-12
Original PDF file:
evi_18418012227-20160426155538657107_._DOGSTAR_schedule_B.pdf
Converted PDF file(s) ( 20 pages)
Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Evidence-3
Evidence-4
Evidence-5
Evidence-6
Evidence-7
Evidence-8
Evidence-9
Evidence-10
Evidence-11
Evidence-12
Evidence-13
Evidence-14
Evidence-15
Evidence-16
Evidence-17
Evidence-18
Evidence-19
Evidence-20

CLASSIFICATION AND LISTING OF GOODS/SERVICES
Applicant hereby deletes the following class of goods/services from the application.
Class 044 for Operation of a pet food manufacturing facility

Applicant hereby adds the following class of goods/services to the application:
New: Class 035 (Original Class: 044 ) for business operation of pet food manufacturing facilities for others
Filing Basis: Section 1(b), Intent to Use: For a trademark or service mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods/services in the application. For a collective trademark, collective service mark, or collective membership mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by members on or in connection with the identified goods/services/collective membership organization. For a certification mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by authorized users in connection with the identified goods/services, and the applicant will not engage in the production or marketing of the goods/services to which the mark is applied, except to advertise or promote recognition of the certification program or of the goods/services that meet the certification standards of the applicant.

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS CHANGE
Applicant proposes to amend the following:
Current:
KIMBERLEY CUNNINGHAM
BENNETT JONES LLP
10020-100 STREET
3200 TELUS HOUSE
EDMONTON, AB
CA
T5J0N3

Proposed:
KIMBERLEY CUNNINGHAM of Cheryl Clarkin, Esq., having an address of
Adler Pollock & Sheehan Onc Citizens Plaza, 8th Floor Providence, Rhode Island 02903
United States
cclarkin@apslaw.com;ipdocketing@apslaw.com
401-274-7200
401-751-0604
The docket/reference number is 405502 7017 .



SIGNATURE(S)
Response Signature
Signature: /cac/     Date: 04/26/2016
Signatory's Name: Cheryl A. Clarkin
Signatory's Position: Attorney of record, MA bar member

Signatory's Phone Number: 401-274-7200

The signatory has confirmed that he/she is an attorney who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state, which includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions; and he/she is currently the owner's/holder's attorney or an associate thereof; and to the best of his/her knowledge, if prior to his/her appointment another U.S. attorney or a Canadian attorney/agent not currently associated with his/her company/firm previously represented the owner/holder in this matter: (1) the owner/holder has filed or is concurrently filing a signed revocation of or substitute power of attorney with the USPTO; (2) the USPTO has granted the request of the prior representative to withdraw; (3) the owner/holder has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her in this matter; or (4) the owner's/holder's appointed U.S. attorney or Canadian attorney/agent has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her as an associate attorney in this matter.

Mailing Address:    KIMBERLEY CUNNINGHAM
   Cheryl Clarkin, Esq.
   Adler Pollock & Sheehan
   Onc Citizens Plaza, 8th Floor
   Providence, Rhode Island 02903
        
Serial Number: 86774231
Internet Transmission Date: Tue Apr 26 16:07:06 EDT 2016
TEAS Stamp: USPTO/ROA-XXX.XXX.XX.XXX-201604261607061
58451-86774231-5505bd6fdab96d96276f86336
4dcde22fb8ee1d27d1e135a17333753a7c1c9a2c
-N/A-N/A-20160426155538657107