UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/1/2016

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on March 16, 2016.

 

In a previous Office action dated September 16, 2015, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with two registered marks.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements:  amend the identification of goods, disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.

 

On March 16, 2016, the applicant responded, argued against the refusal, provided the disclaimer, and amended the identification. Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. The applicant’s arguments were reviewed and found unpersuasive. In addition, the identification continues to contain indefinite items. Accordingly, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal and requirement in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal
• Identification of Goods

 

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 2672384 and 4546784.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  The registrations were provided in the previous Office Action.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

The applicant’s mark is DRILL MASTER in standard characters. The registrants’ marks are MASTER in standard characters (Registration No. 4546784) and MASTER in typed letters, a precursor to in standard characters (Registration No. 2672384). The registrations are owned by separate registrants.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1813 (TTAB 2014); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049, (TTAB 2014); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, applicant’s mark DRILL MASTER and registrants’ marks MASTER are highly similar in sound, appearance and overall commercial connotation. The marks contain the identical dominant term MASTER. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

The applied-for mark is merely the registered marks with the addition of the generic term DRILL. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

The addition of the generic term DRILL does not obviate the similarity because it is merely generic for the goods. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). As a result, consumers will look to other wording in the mark for the commercial impression: MASTER, which is identical to the registered marks. As a result, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS

 

The applicant’s goods, as amended, are identified as “Power tools, namely, cordless drills and corded drills, orbital palm sanders; cordless hammer drivers, corded hammer drivers, circular saws, routers, cut-off saws, tile saws, reciprocating saws, jig saws, drill guides; bits for power drills, drill bit sharpeners; electric planers; drill powered pump for use with air powered drills; router speed control dial for power tools, namely, routers; router bit set consisting of spiral mortising router bits; machine tools, namely, circular tile cutters.”

 

 

            RELATEDNESS OF GOODS WITH REGISTRATION NO. 2672384

 

 

The registrant’s goods (Registration No. 2672384) include core drills, impact drills, and hammer drills.

 

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in registrant’s more narrow identification. The applicant’s goods include “Power tools, namely, cordless drills and corded drills,” which encompasses all corded and cordless drills, including the registrant’s more narrow type of power drills (core drills, impact drills, and hammer drills). As a result, the applicant’s goods encompass the registrant’s goods, and therefore the goods are related.

 

 

 

            RELATEDNESS OF GOODS WITH REGISTRATION NO. 4546784

 

The registrant’s goods (Registration No. 4546784) are identified as “Hand held power heat tools, namely, butane powered soldering irons, electric soldering irons, battery powered soldering irons, butane powered blow torches, flame producing gas-powered blow torches; tips for gas-powered soldering irons.”

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The Internet evidence attached to the previous Office Action consisted of website screenshots from www.dewalt.com and www.toolpartspro.com (Dewalt makes drills and soldering irons), www.boschtools.com (makes drills and soldering irons), www.milwaukeetool.com and www.toolorbit.com (Milwaukee makes drills and heat guns used for soldering). Heat guns are used for soldering, as shown by the internet evidence from www.amazon.com (sells soldering heat guns). This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, and the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods are related.  See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007).  The Internet has become integral to daily life in the United States, with Census Bureau data showing approximately three-quarters of American households used the Internet in 2013 to engage in personal communications, to obtain news, information, and entertainment, and to do banking and shopping.  See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1639, 1642 (TTAB 2015) (taking judicial notice of the following two official government publications:  (1) Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Am. Cmty. Survey Reports ACS-28, Computer & Internet Use in the United States:  2013 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf, and (2) The Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. & Econ. & Statistics Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation:  America’s Emerging Online Experience (2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring_the_digital_nation_-_americas_emerging_online_experience.pdf).  Thus, the widespread use of the Internet in the United States suggests that Internet evidence may be probative of public perception in trademark examination.

 

            APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS

 

Applicant has submitted printed or electronic copies of eight third-party registrations for marks containing the wording MASTER to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  These registrations appear to be for goods that are predominantly different or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application.  For example, Registration Nos. 4858406 COIL MASTER, 4816830, MASTER’S EDGE, 4340050, PARTS MASTER, 3953724, ROYAL MASTER, 4002045, TORQUE MASTER, are for Class 8 hand tools that are not related to the applicant’s or registrants’ goods.

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ 989, 992 (TTAB 1982).  These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; see Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ at 992.  Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording MASTER is weak or diluted. 

 

Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods, as in the present case, is of limited probative value in determining the strength of a mark.  See Kay Chems., Inc. v. Kelite Chems. Corp., 464 F.2d 1040, 1042, 175 USPQ 99, 101 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording MASTER is weak or diluted. 

 

In addition, several of the third party registrations have a different commercial impression due to the placement of the wording and the additional wording in the mark, and therefore does not show weakness. This is demonstrated by Registration Nos. 4816830, MASTER’S EDGE, 4902217, MASTERCUT, and 3953724, ROYAL MASTER.  As a result, this argument is without merit.

 

Applicant argues that its canceled registration (No. 1280530) demonstrates that its current application may coexist with the cited registered marks. The examining attorney disagrees. A cancelled or expired registration is “only evidence that the registration issued and does not afford an applicant any legal presumptions under [Section] 7(b),” including the presumption that the registration is valid, owned by the registrant, and the registrant has the exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods specified in the certificate.  In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d 1185, 1197 (TTAB 2013) (citing Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Krier, 478 F.2d 1246, 1248, 178 USPQ 46, 47 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (statutory benefits of registration disappear when the registration is cancelled); In re Brown-Forman Corp., 81 USPQ2d 1284, 1286 n.3 (TTAB 2006); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 USPQ2d 1047, 1047 n.2 (TTAB 2002)); see TBMP §704.03(b)(1)(A); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  Nor does a cancelled or expired registration provide constructive notice under Section 22, in which registration serves as constructive notice to the public of a registrant’s ownership of a mark.  See Action Temp. Servs. Inc. v. Labor Force Inc., 870 F.2d 1563, 1566, 10 USPQ2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[A] canceled registration does not provide constructive notice of anything.”). Thus, this canceled registration has little, if any, probative value with respect to the registrability of applicant’s current mark.  As a result, this argument is not persuasive.

 

In summary, the applicant’s and registrants’ marks create the same commercial impression and the respective goods are highly related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that these goods originate from a common source. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “drill bit sharpeners” in the identification of goods is indefinite and overbroad, and must be clarified because it may include goods in multiple international classes. Applicant must specify whether they are electric (properly classified in Class 7) or manually operated (properly classified in Class 8).  See TMEP §1402.01. 

 

The wording “machine tools, namely, circular tile cutters” in the identification of goods is indefinite and overbroad, and must be clarified because it may include goods in multiple international classes. Applicant must specify whether they are electric or power tools (properly classified in Class 7) or hand tools (properly classified in Class 8).  See TMEP §1402.01. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate (examining attorney’s suggestions in bold font):

 

Class 7:           Power tools, namely, cordless drills and corded drills, orbital palm sanders; cordless hammer drivers, corded hammer drivers, circular saws, routers, cut-off saws, tile saws, reciprocating saws, jig saws, drill guides; Bits for power drills, Electric drill bit sharpeners; electric planers; drill powered pump for use with air powered drills; router speed control dial for power tools, namely, routers; router bit set consisting of spiral mortising router bits; Electric machine tools, namely, circular tile cutters

 

Class 8:           Manually operated drill but sharpeners; Hand tools, namely, circular tile cutters

 

 

See TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.

 

An applicant may only amend an identification to clarify or limit the goods, but not to add to or broaden the scope of the goods.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07. 

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

 

The application identifies goods in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on use in commerce under Section 1(a):

 

(1)       List the goods by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.

 

(2)       Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/tm_fee_info.jsp).  The application identifies goods that are classified in at least two classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only one class.  Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

(3)       Submit verified dates of first use of the mark anywhere and in commerce for each international class.

 

(4)       Submit a specimen for each international class.  The current specimen is acceptable for class 7 only; and applicant needs a specimen for class 8.

 

            Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, and photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, or displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods. 

 

(5)       Submit a verified statement that “The specimen was in use in commerce on or in connection with the goods listed in the application at least as early as the filing date of the application.” 

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1112; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(1), 2.86(a); TMEP §§904, 1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

For an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(a) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/multiclass.jsp.

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $50 per international class of goods.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone without incurring this additional fee. 

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

/Jillian R. Cantor/

Trademark Examining Attorney

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 117

jillian.cantor@uspto.gov

(571) 272-6564

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 4/1/2016 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86652143

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 4/1/2016 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.