UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 5/5/2016

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 4/29/16 in which applicant addressed the following issues:

 

1.      Refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) – Mark is Primarily Merely a Surname; Section 2(f) Claim Unsupported

 

2.      Requirement for an Acceptable Identification of Goods

 

With respect to Item 1, the examining attorney has carefully considered the applicant's arguments but has found them unpersuasive.  The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) is now made FINAL for the reasons set forth below.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).  In addition, the following requirement(s) is now made FINAL:  Requirement for an Acceptable Identification of Goods.  See37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

Registration was refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211.  The primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public determines whether a term is primarily merely a surname.  In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 832, 184 USPQ 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009); see TMEP §§1211, 1211.01.

 

The following five factors are used to determine whether a mark is primarily merelya surname:

 

(1)  Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)  Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)  Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)  Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)  Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

See In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009); In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995); TMEP §1211.01.

 

“There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie showing that a term is primarily merely a surname;” this question must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.  TMEP §1211.02(a); see In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009); In re Pohang Iron & Steel Co., 230 USPQ 79, 79 (TTAB 1986).  The entire record must be examined to determine the surname significance of a term.  TMEP §1211.02(a).  The following are examples of evidence that is generally considered to be relevant to such a determination:  telephone directory listings, excerpted listings and articles from computerized research databases, evidence in the application record that the term is used as a surname, the manner of use on specimens, dictionary definitions of the term and evidence from dictionaries showing no definition of the term.  Id.

 

With respect to the first factor, please see the previously attached evidence from www.411.com, establishing the surname significance of the surname OLIN.  This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing at least 100 times as a surname in a nationwide telephone directory of names. Attached herein is an excerpt from Lexis for a search of OLIN in the surname database with the result of “Total number found: 7552”. Clearly, the surname is not rare.

 

Applicant argues that the evidence from the surname databases may show duplicative surname use for the same individual and thus the term OLIN is not actually in sufficient use as to be perceived primarily merely as a surname.  The evidence from the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers, specifically shows the applied-for mark appearing 7552 times as a surname.  See TMEP §1211.02(b)(ii).

 

“There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie showing that a term is primarily merely a surname;” this question must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.  TMEP §1211.02(a); see In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009); In re Pohang Iron & Steel Co., 230 USPQ 79, 79 (TTAB 1986).  In this case, the overall search results show a sufficient number of uses as a surname such that the purchasing public would perceive this term primarily merely as a surname.  See In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 832, 184 USPQ 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d at 1537; TMEP §§1211, 1211.01.  Although there may appear to be some minor duplication, two different individuals with the same name may reside in a different residence and have a different phone number. 

 

Further, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have long recognized that the USPTO has limited resources for obtaining evidence when examining applications for registration; the practicalities of these limited resources are routinely taken into account when reviewing a trademark examining attorney’s action.  See In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1352, 67 USPQ2d 1629, 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F2d 764, 768, 226 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1784, 1786 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.

 

The issue of determining whether a surname is common or rare is not determined solely by comparing the number of listings of the surname in a computerized database with the total number of listings in that database, because even the most common surname would represent only a small fraction of such a database.  Rather, if a surname appears routinely in news reports, articles and other media as to be broadly exposed to the general public, then such surname is not rare and would be perceived by the public as primarily merely a surname.  In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1795 (TTAB 2004); see TMEP §1211.01(a)(v). The evidence attached demonstrates that OLIN routinely appears in news articles and that the public would associate the wording as being a surname. For example, the Wall Street Journal article attached discusses John Olin, the chief financial officer of Harley-Davidson motorcycles. The New York Times article attached discusses Laura Olin who ran social media strategy for the President Obama. The Wikipedia articles demonstrate that various politicians, actors, and actresses have the surname Olin. The evidence confirms that the surname OLIN is not rare and would be perceived by the public as primarily merely a surname.

 

With respect to the second factor, please see the previously attached evidence from applicant’s website, establishing that someone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname: “With the retirement of founder Franklin Olin from active management, his sons John and Spencer went on to guide the company through a remarkable period of expansion”.

 

With respect to the third factor, the evidence previously attached demonstrates that the term has no recognized meaning other than as a surname.  Evidence that a word has no meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the word would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.  See In re Petrin Corp., 231 USPQ 902, 903 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi).  The attached evidence from Collins American Dictionary and Macmillan American Dictionary shows that the word OLIN does not appear in the dictionary.  Thus, this word appears to have no meaning or significance other than as a surname. 

 

With respect to the fourth factor, the evidence of record from Surname Helper demonstrates that the term has the structure and pronunciation of other common surnames that begin with the same letters.  As such, the term would be recognized as a surname as well.

 

With respect to the fifth factor, the mark is in standard character and therefore this issue is moot.

 

Because the mark is primarily merely a surname, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4).

 

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS ARE UNPERSUASIVE AND UNSUPPORTED

 

Applicant argues that “the primary significance of the mark OLIN is not a surname, but the name and brand of a major American corporation” but does not provide any evidence to support this contention and does not address the fact that applicant’s own prior U.S. Registration No. 0848870 for the mark OLIN (see previously attached) confirms that surname aspect of the mark because that was only permitted to register upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act.

 

Even if, as applicant posits, “OLIN” turns out to be a relatively rare surname, a rare surname may be unregistrable under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) if its primary significance to purchasers is that of a surname.  E.g., In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Giger, 78 USPQ2d 1405, 1407-09 (TTAB 2006); see TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).  There is no minimum number of telephone directory listings needed to prove that a mark is primarily merely a surname.  See In re Petrin Corp., 231 USPQ 902, 903 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1211.02(b)(i).

 

Applicant argues that the term OLIN would not be perceived as a surname.  A mark’s primary surname significance is generally retained unless the non-surname significance displaces the primary surname significance of that mark.  See In re Petrin Corp., 231 USPQ 902, 904 (TTAB 1986) (holding PETRIN primarily merely a surname despite applicant’s argument that the mark represents an abbreviated contraction of “petroleum” and “insulation”); TMEP §1211.01(a)(ii); see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 18, 225 USPQ 652, 653-54 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding DARTY primarily merely a surname despite applicant’s argument that the mark is a play on the word “dart”).

 

In the present case, applicant’s argument (and no evidence whatsoever) is insufficient to show that the intended non-surname significance has displaced the primary surname significance of the mark.  Specifically, applicant’s mere statement that OLIN has some non-surname significance has not displaced the surname significance and has not been proven.

 

Applicant argues that it owns incontestable U.S. Registration No. 3,414,111 which covers OLIN in standard characters and thus this application should not face a surname refusal. Applicant conveniently ignores all of its own prior registrations and one application for the mark OLIN (see attached) which confirms that surname aspect of the mark because all of them were only permitted to register upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act or on the Supplemental Register.

 

• Serial No. 78946789 applied for with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 2235575 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 1437930 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 1318000 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 1065874 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 1070458 registered on the Supplemental Register
• U.S. Registration No.  0916922  registered on the Supplemental Register
• U.S. Registration No. 0848870 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 0769182 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 0659503 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)
• U.S. Registration No. 0563886 registered with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)

 

The past Office practice clearly shows that the mark OLIN is a surname and cannot be registered other than on the Principal register with a showing of acquired distinctiveness or on the Supplemental Register. Thus, the refusal is maintained and now made FINAL.

 

SECTION 2(f) ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS UNSUPPORTED

 

Applicant states that applicant was not attempting to show acquired distinctiveness but was attempting to prove that the primary significance of the mark OLIN is not a surname, but the name and brand of a major American corporation. Applicant’s statements regarding the dates of use, declaration, and sales figures indicates that applicant was attempting to show that the mark has acquired distinctiveness. As such, this Office Action now makes final the finding that the claim is unsupported.

 

An intent-to-use applicant who has used the same mark on related goods and/or services may file a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) before filing an allegation of use, if applicant can establish that, as a result of applicant’s use of the mark on other goods and/or services, the mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services in the intent-to-use application, and that this previously created distinctiveness will transfer to the goods and/or services in the intent-to-use application when use in commerce begins.  In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1347, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Nielsen Bus. Media, Inc., 93 USPQ2d 1545, 1547 (TTAB 2010); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1538 (TTAB 2009); TMEP §1212.09(a).

 

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has set forth the following two requirements for showing that a mark in an intent-to-use application has acquired distinctiveness:

 

(1)        Applicant must establish that the same mark has acquired distinctiveness as to the other goods and/or services, by submitting evidence such as ownership of a prior registration for the same mark for related goods and/or services, a prima facie showing of acquired distinctiveness based on five years’ use of the same mark with related goods and/or services, or actual evidence of acquired distinctiveness for the same mark with respect to the other goods and/or services.

 

(2)        Applicant must show sufficient relatedness of the goods and/or services in the intent-to-use application and those for which the mark has acquired distinctiveness to warrant the conclusion that the previously created distinctiveness will transfer to the goods and/or services in the application upon use.  The showing necessary to establish relatedness will be decided on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon the nature of the goods and/or services involved and the language used to identify them in the application.

 

See Kellogg Co. v. Gen. Mills Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1766, 1770-71 (TTAB 2007); In re Rogers, 53 USPQ2d 1741, 1744-45 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1212.09(a).

 

Although applicant owns prior registrations for the same mark, they are not for related goods. Specifically, U.S. Registration No. 0659503, 0848870, 1468218 and 3414111 are all for ammunition-related or metal-related goods, not chemical-related or resin-related goods. Applicant must show sufficient relatedness of the chemical and resin goods in the intent-to-use application and those for which the mark has acquired distinctiveness to warrant the conclusion that the previously created distinctiveness will transfer to the goods in the application upon use. 

 

 

Furthermore, although it appears that applicant has been in business for a lengthy time in the field of ammunition and metals, in this case, an allegation of five years’ use alone will be insufficient evidence of distinctiveness because the intent-to-use application has no dates of use whatsoever for the goods in this application. In other words, applicant’s statement that “Olin has been in the chemical business for more than 60 years, … and has been producing the some of the chemicals listed in the description of goods for more than 100 years” and “Olin has been manufacturing and selling many of the goods listed in the application for at least ten years” does not comport with the application which includes no date of use at all.

 

Applicant has provided evidence of high sales figures and significant advertising expenditures for “ammunition and chemicals” although it is unclear how much is attributed to chemicals alone and apparently none is attributed to the resins; however, such evidence is not dispositive of whether the proposed mark has acquired distinctiveness.  Such extensive sales and promotion may demonstrate the commercial success of applicant’s goods, but not that relevant consumers view the matter as a mark for such goods.  See In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 53 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Busch Entm’t Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1130, 1134 (TTAB 2000).

 

Similarly, applicant’s advertising expenditures are merely indicative of its efforts to develop distinctiveness; not evidence that the mark has acquired distinctiveness.  See In re Pennzoil Prods. Co., 20 USPQ2d 1753 (TTAB 1991).

 

In its response, as evidence, the applicant submitted a declaration of its Executive Vice President & President, Chemicals and Ammunition. The evidence is insufficient to show recognition of the applied-for wording as a mark by the public. The declaration by applicant’s own vice president/president is not persuasive because, as explained in TMEP Section 1212.06(c), the “statement is subject to bias”:

 

Affidavits or declarations that assert recognition of the mark as a source indicator are relevant in establishing acquired distinctiveness. However, the value of the affidavits or declarations depends on the statements made and the identity of the affiant or declarant. See In re Chem. Dynamics Inc., 839 F.2d 1569, 1571, 5 USPQ2d 1828, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding conclusionary declaration from applicant’s vice-president insufficient without the factual basis for the declarant’s belief that the design had become distinctive). Proof of distinctiveness also requires more than proof of the existence of a relatively small number of people who associate a mark with the applicant. See In re The Paint Prods. Co., 8 USPQ2d 1863, 1866 (TTAB 1988) (“Because these affidavits were sought and collected by applicant from ten customers who have dealt with applicant for many years, the evidence is not altogether persuasive on the issue of how the average customer for paints perceives the words ‘PAINT PRODUCTS CO.’ in conjunction with paints and coatings.”); see also Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1723 (TTAB 2010) (finding sixteen declarations of little persuasive value, as they were nearly identical in wording and only one of the declarants was described as an end consumer); In re Gray Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1558, 1560 (TTAB 1987) (finding affidavit of applicant’s counsel expressing his belief that the mark has acquired secondary meaning of “no probative value whatsoever” because, among other reasons, the statement is subject to bias); In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 2 USPQ2d 2032, 2035 (TTAB 1987) (finding declarations from customers which stated that designs used by applicant indicate to the declarant that the applicant is the source of the goods, but which did not refer to or identify the designs with any specificity, not persuasive).

 

Because a Section 2(f) claim is unsupported, the Section 2(e)(4) refusal is maintained and FINAL.

 

IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS

 

In general, commas should be used in an identification (1) to separate a series of related items identified within a particular category of goods or services, (2) before and after “namely,” and (3) between each item in a list of goods or services following “namely.”  TMEP §1402.01(a).  Semicolons generally should be used to separate a series of distinct categories of goods or services within an international class.  Id.  However, colons and periods should not be used in an identification of goods and/or services.  Id. 

 

The wording “chemical products, namely chemicals for industrial purposes” still does not include a comma after “namely”.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

 

“Chlorine; hydrochloric acid; potassium hydroxide; sodium hydroxide; sodium hypochlorite; hydrogen; sodium chloride; sulfuric acid; ethylene dichloride; vinyl chloride monomer; acetone; cumene; phenol; allyl chloride; epichlorohydrin; bisphenol A; unprocessed synthetic novolac resins; unprocessed epoxy resins, including unprocessed liquid epoxy resins and unprocessed advanced epoxy resins; unprocessed epoxy novolac resins; amine-based hardeners, namely, chemical additives for resins; polyphenolic-based hardeners, namely, chemical additives for resins; chlorinated hydrocarbons; chemical products, namely, chemicals for industrial purposes; unprocessed synthetic resins; chlorinated organic chemicals for use in industry; chlorinated inorganic chemicals for use in industry, and chemical preparations, namely, chlorinated solvents for industrial and commercial use” in International Class 001; and/or

 

 

“semi-processed synthetic novolac resins; semi-processed epoxy resins including semi-processed liquid epoxy resins and semi-processed advanced epoxy resins; semi-processed epoxy novolac resins; semi-processed synthetic resins” in International Class 017

 

 

SCOPE ADVISORY: Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

DESCRIPTION ADVISORY: Descriptions of goods and/or services found acceptable in earlier-filed applications and registrations do not always remain acceptable when adopted in later-filed applications.  See TMEP §§702.03(a)(iv), 1402.14.  Identifications of goods and/or services are examined in accordance with the Trademark Rules of Practice and the USPTO’s policies and procedures in effect on the date an application is filed (although an applicant may voluntarily choose to follow policies and procedures adopted after the application was filed).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.85(e)(1)-(e)(2); TMEP §§1401.12, 1402.14. 

 

The USPTO’s rules and policies with respect to identifications of goods and/or services are updated periodically to reflect changes in the marketplace and technology as well as changes to the international classification system.  See TMEP §1402.14.  For guidance on drafting acceptable identifications of goods and/or services, use the USPTO’s online U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual (ID Manual), which is continually updated in accordance with prevailing rules and policies.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

PROPER RESPONSE TO FINAL

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)        A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.

 

(2)        An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $50 per international class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone without incurring this additional fee. 

 

 

 

/Ms. Tasneem Hussain/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 118

tasneem.hussain@uspto.gov (preferred)

571.272.8273

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 5/5/2016 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86651083

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 5/5/2016 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.