UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86497300
MARK: CRESTLINE
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld 1333 New Hampshire Ave NW Ste 400 |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Crestline Investors, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/6/2015
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on October 14, 2015.
For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration Nos. 2776671 and 3196143. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
SECTION 2(d) – FINAL REFUSAL
Similarity of the Marks
U.S. Registration No. 2776671
The only difference between the literal aspect of the applied-for mark, namely, CRESTLINE, and the registered mark, namely, CRESTLINE MORTGAGE, is the omission by the applicant of the generic term “mortgage.”
The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark, however, may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as the registered mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from the registered mark.
In addition, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word in any trademark or service mark, which in the present case is the identical term CRESTLINE See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark, such as the term CRESTLINE in the registered mark, may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter, such as the term “mortgage,” that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
U.S. Registration No. 3196143
The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark, however, may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as the registered mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from the registered mark.
Moreover, the omission of a house mark, such as the applicant’s omission of the Barcelo name from the otherwise confusingly similar CRESTLINE mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1366-67 (TTAB 2007) (finding CLUB PALMS MVP and MVP confusingly similar); In re Christian Dior, S.A., 225 USPQ 533, 534 (TTAB 1985) (finding LE CACHET DE DIOR and CACHET confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). It is likely that the services sold under these marks would be attributed to the same source. See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007). Accordingly, in the present case, the marks are confusingly similar.
For a composite mark containing both words and a design, such as is the case with the applied-for mark, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services. Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)). Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Relatedness of the Services
With respect to the services in both U.S. Registration No. 2776671 and U.S. Registration No. 3196143, applicant’s arguments that applicant’s own services are not related thereto are not persuasive and are not supported by any evidence; on the contrary, the examining attorney provides additional and overwhelming evidence that the services of the applicant are highly related to the services of each registrant.
With respect to applicant’s services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all services of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
In this case, the identification set forth in the application has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the services and this wording is presumed to encompass all services of the type described.
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of the applicant and registrants in this case. This evidence shows that the services listed therein are indeed of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007). The Internet has become integral to daily life in the United States, with Census Bureau data showing approximately three-quarters of American households used the Internet in 2013 to engage in personal communications, to obtain news, information, and entertainment, and to do banking and shopping. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1639, 1642 (TTAB 2015) (taking judicial notice of the following two official government publications: (1) Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Am. Cmty. Survey Reports ACS-28, Computer & Internet Use in the United States: 2013 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf, and (2) The Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. & Econ. & Statistics Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation: America’s Emerging Online Experience (2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring_the_digital_nation_-_americas_emerging_online_experience.pdf). Thus, the widespread use of the Internet in the United States suggests that Internet evidence may be probative of public perception in trademark examination.
Finally, applicant’s “sophisticated consumer” argument is not persuasive. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).
(1) A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.
(2) An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
/David Elton/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 106
Phone: (571) 272- 9317
david.elton@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.