Offc Action Outgoing

MVMT

Bozich, Jeremiah

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86420323 - MVMT - N/A

To: Siwiak, Joseph (info@mvmtapparel.com)
Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86420323 - MVMT - N/A
Sent: 1/22/2015 10:29:47 AM
Sent As: ECOM104@USPTO.GOV
Attachments: Attachment - 1
Attachment - 2
Attachment - 3
Attachment - 4
Attachment - 5
Attachment - 6
Attachment - 7

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO.  86420323

 

MARK: MVMT

 

 

        

*86420323*

CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

       SIWIAK, JOSEPH

       139 WINSLOW CT

       GREENSBURG, PA 15601-7407

       

       

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

VIEW YOUR APPLICATION FILE

 

APPLICANT: Siwiak, Joseph

 

 

 

CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

       N/A

CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

       info@mvmtapparel.com

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 1/22/2015

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

  • Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion
  • Identification of Goods

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3502441 and 4355139.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Registration No. 3502441 – MVMNT

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant seeks to register its mark “MVMT” in standard characters, while registrant’s mark is “MVMNT,” also in standard characters.

 

When comparing marks that consist of a series of two or more letters, confusion may be likely even if the letters are not identical or in the same order.  It is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged letters than to remember words or figures; that is, confusion is more likely between arbitrarily arranged letters than between other types of marks.  See, e.g., Weiss Assoc. v. HRL Assoc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding confusion between TMS and TMM); Dere v. Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc., 420 F.2d 1068, 164 USPQ 347 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding confusion between ISI and I.A.I.); cf. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214 (TTAB 2001) (finding confusion between registrant’s KING FM and KING-TV and applicant’s KYNG).

 

This principle was set forth in Crystal Corp. v. Manhattan Chem. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 506, 506, 25 USPQ 5, 6 (C.C.P.A. 1935), wherein the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals applied the following reasoning in holding Z.B.T. likely to be confused with T.Z.L.B. for talcum powder:  “We think it is well known that it is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged letters than it is to remember figures, syllables, words or phrases.  The difficulty of remembering such lettered marks makes confusion between such marks, when similar, more likely.”

 

Even lettered marks having only two letters in common, used on identical or closely related goods, have been held likely to cause confusion.  See, e.g., Feed Serv. Corp. v. FS Servs., Inc., 432 F.2d 478, 167 USPQ 407 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding confusion between FSC and FS); Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. J.H. Bonck Co., 390 F.2d 754, 156 USPQ 401 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (finding confusion between TTM and T.M.T.); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Brutting E.B. Sport-Int’l GmbH, 230 USPQ 530 (TTAB 1986) (finding confusion between EB and EBS); see also TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

In this instance, the only difference between applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark is the addition of the letter “N” in registrant’s mark, which makes the appearance of the marks highly similar.

 

Further, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar.

 

Similarity of the Goods

 

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In the present case, applicant seeks to register its mark for “A-shirts; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Athletic shorts; Athletic uniforms; Belts; Bottoms; Children's and infant's apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded elbow compression sleeves being part of an athletic garment; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded pants; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded shirts; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded shorts; Gloves for apparel; Headbands for clothing; Hooded sweat shirts; Hoods; Jackets; Jerseys; Polo shirts; Sports shirts with short sleeves; Sweat shirts; T-shirts, Tank tops, leggings, Sports Bras, Yoga Shorts, Bikinis, Athletic Shorts, Socks, Stringer tank tops, Beanies, Scarves, Underwear” in International Class 025.  Registrant offers “T-shirts; Shirts; Sports jerseys; Jeans; Shorts; Sweaters; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Dress shirts; Slacks; Baseball caps; Suits; Socks; Underwear; Leather jackets; Jackets; Belts,” also in International Class 025.

 

Neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the clothing items, and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s clothing are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).  Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods (e.g., “Shirts”) and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification.

 

Finally, decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods.  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).

 

Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Applicant should note that maintenance documents are due to be filed for the above-cited registration.  If maintenance documents are not timely filed, the registration will be cancelled under Section 8 or 71, and/or expire under Section 9 and will no longer present a bar to registration under Section 2(d).  See 15 U.S.C. §§1058, 1059, 1141k; 37 C.F.R. §§2.160(a), 2.182, 7.36(b). 

 

Registration No. 4355139 – FREE MVMT

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

As previously stated, marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression, and similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.

 

In the present case, applicant seeks to register its mark “MVMT” in standard characters, while registrant’s mark is “FREE MVMT” also in standard characters.

 

Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., 110 USPQ2D 1651, 1660-61 (TTAB 2014) (finding PRECISION and PRECISION DISTRIBUTION CONTROL confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part in that both contain the term “MVMT.”

 

Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are confusingly similar.

 

Similarity of the Goods

 

As previously stated, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” 

 

In the present case, applicant seeks to register its mark for the above-identified clothing items in International Class 025, while registrant offers “Shirts; Sweatshirts; Undergarments,” also in International Class 025.

 

Neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the clothing items, and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s clothing are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods (e.g., “Shirts; Undergarments”) and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification.

 

As stated above, decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods. 

 

Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded elbow compression sleeves being part of an athletic garment” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because applicant must specify the types of garments on which the compression sleeves are used.  See TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant must amend the identification to specify the common commercial name of the goods.  If there is no common commercial name, applicant must describe the product and its intended uses.  See id.

 

Additionally, the wording “stringer” in the identification of goods is a registered mark not owned by applicant.  See enclosed copy of U.S. Registration No. 4565828.  An applicant may not use a registered mark owned by another party in the identification.  A registered mark indicates origin in one party and cannot be used to define goods or services that originate in a party other than the registrant.  TMEP §1402.09; see Camloc Fastener Corp. v. Grant, 119 USPQ 264, 264 n.1 (TTAB 1958).  Therefore, applicant must amend the identification of goods to delete the wording “stringer” and substitute the common commercial or generic name of the goods.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate (changes in bold):

 

A-shirts; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Athletic shorts; Athletic uniforms; Belts; Bottoms; Children's and infant's apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments; Clothing for athletic use in the nature of padded elbow compression sleeves being part of an athletic garment, namely, {indicate type of garment, e.g., jerseys, uniforms, etc.}; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded pants; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded shirts; Clothing for athletic use, namely, padded shorts; Gloves for apparel; Headbands for clothing; Hooded sweat shirts; Hoods; Jackets; Jerseys; Polo shirts; Sports shirts with short sleeves; Sweat shirts; T-shirts; Tank tops; Leggings; Sports Bras; Yoga Shorts; Bikinis; Socks; Y-back tank tops; Beanies; Scarves; Underwear

 

See TMEP §1402.01.

 

An applicant may only amend an identification to clarify or limit the goods, but not to add to or broaden the scope of the goods.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07. 

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02.  Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

APPLICANT MAY WISH TO SEEK TRADEMARK COUNSEL

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice.  Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/findlegalhelp/home.cfm, an attorney referral service of a state or local bar association, or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11.

 

 

 

/Tamara Hudson/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

(571) 272-2575

tamara.hudson@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

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U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86420323 - MVMT - N/A

To: Siwiak, Joseph (info@mvmtapparel.com)
Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86420323 - MVMT - N/A
Sent: 1/22/2015 10:29:48 AM
Sent As: ECOM104@USPTO.GOV
Attachments:

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 1/22/2015 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86420323

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 1/22/2015, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. 

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Tamara Hudson/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

(571) 272-2575

tamara.hudson@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.

 

 


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