STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

Summary of Issues

· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

· Identification of Goods and Services

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3688850. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

Applicant’s applied-for mark is ABACUS for “downloadable mobile application software for use in accounting and employee expense reporting; providing software as a service (SaaS), namely, hosting software in the cloud for use by others in accounting and employee expense reporting.”

Registrant’s mark is ABAKOOS for “Providing online non-downloadable software for tracking time, budgeting, preparing, disseminating and processing invoices and payments, bookkeeping, processing and recording financial transaction data, preparing and managing work orders, sharing documents via a global computer network, and for sending and receiving electronic messages; providing on-line non-downloadable software for expense tracking.”

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Centraz Indus. Inc. v. Spartan Chem. Co., 77 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

Based on the foregoing, the applicant’s applied-for and registrant’s marks are sufficiently similar to find a likelihood of confusion.

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-70, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services “travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Further, the software functions identified in the application use broad wording to describe the goods and/or services and this wording (“software for use in accounting and employee expense reporting”) is presumed to encompass all software functions of goods and/or services of the type described, including those in registrant’s more narrow identification (“software for tracking time, budgeting, preparing, disseminating and processing invoices and payments, bookkeeping, processing and recording financial transaction data, preparing and managing work orders, sharing documents via a global computer network, and for sending and receiving electronic messages”; “software for expense tracking”). See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)).

Based on the analysis above, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

Because applicant’s and registrant’s marks are similar and the goods and/or services are related, there is a likelihood of confusion and applicant’s applied-for mark must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

Identification of Goods and Services

The application identifies downloadable software and SaaS for “use in accounting and employee expense reporting” in the identification of goods and services is indefinite and must be clarified in order to clearly indicate the particular function of the software. That is to say, the particular function is required, i.e., accounting, not merely an indication that the software is used by accountants. See TMEP §1402.01.

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:

Class 9: “Downloadable mobile application software for accounting and employee expense reporting”;

Class 42: “Providing software as a service (SaaS), namely, hosting software in the cloud for use by others for accounting and employee expense reporting”.

An applicant may only amend an identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to add to or broaden the scope of the goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual at http://tess2.uspto.gov/netahtml/tidm.html. See TMEP §1402.04.

Assistance

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

Zachary R. Sparer

/Zachary R. Sparer/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

571-272-9168

zachary.sparer@uspto.gov

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.