UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86295091
MARK: OPPO
|
|
CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
|
|
|
CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
|
OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/7/2015
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This letter responds to applicant’s communication filed on February 9, 2015, in which applicant argued against the previously issued 2d refusal based on US Registration No. 4508756; and submitted an amended identification of goods, entity clarification, amended description of the mark, significance of the mark and claim of prior registrations. Please note, the amended identification of goods, entity clarification, description of the mark, significance of the mark statement and claim of prior registrations are accepted and entered into the record. However, the examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments against the previously issued 2(d) refusal and finds them unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below. Therefore, the 2(d) refusal is hereby made FINAL.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – FINAL ACTION
Registration of the applied-for mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4508756. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is “OPPO” with design for “shoes and boots; hats and caps; socks, and stockings; shoe inserts for primarily non-orthopedic purposes; gloves as clothing accessories; cold-proof gloves; sleeping eye masks; puttees, namely, leg wrappings; underclothing, undergarments, sports clothes, namely, tight fitted clothing, namely, shorts, tights, athletic support tops, tops, girdles, compression shirts, compression shorts, compression pants, athletic sleeves, leggings, wrist bands” in Class 025.
The registrant’s mark is “OPPO SUITS” with design for “Clothing, namely suits, blazers, trousers, pants, waistcoats, shirts, T-shirts, ties, bow ties, socks and underwear; footwear, namely shoes and sneakers; headgear, namely hats and caps” in Class 025.
In its response, applicant argues that “the marks include very distinct design elements” as the registrant’s mark includes the word “SUITS” with a tie substituting the “I”; whereas, applicant’s mark includes a distinct figure design. Applicant further argues that the commercial impression is different since registrant’s mark includes a word play on “opposites” and refers to its goods (i.e., suits) are the ‘opposite’ of an ordinary suit.
However, for a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services. Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)). Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). As such, the design elements of the marks do not overcome the similarity in the literal elements. Indeed the only difference in the literal elements is that the registrant includes “suits” which is descriptive and less dominant than the wording “OPPO” – identical to the literal element of applicant’s mark. Further, it is likely that consumers would view the applicant’s mark as a shortened version of registrant’s mark.
Additionally, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751. Indeed, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).
Thus, the marks are so similar in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, that there is a likelihood of confusion. Therefore, the similarity prong of the test to determine likelihood of confusion is satisfied.
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant argues that the registrant’s “suits are only sold as entire suits and are not available as separates … [t]his is clearly something very different than Applicant’s athletic clothing that are not sold as complete suits.” However, with respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification. As such, the registrant’s shirts, shoes, hats, etc. Thus, the goods are identical in part, and otherwise closely related. Please see attached evidence which illustrates how designers such as Ralph Lauren and Tommy Hilfiger provide suits and other athletic clothing.
Lastly, applicant states that it has a consent agreement in New Zealand & Australia in which applicant required registrant to include specific exclusion of “sportswear, athletic wear exercise clothing and orthotic footwear”. However, such an agreement is not relevant in this case since it does not address the U.S. application and registration at issue. Indeed, the consent agreement appears to support the fact that there is a likelihood of confusion in the absence of the parties consenting to take steps to ensure otherwise.
Any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion is resolved in favor of the prior registrant. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).
Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, the previously issued 2(d) refusal is made FINAL.
Proper Response to Final Action
(1) A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.
(2) An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
Tamara Frazier
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 116
(571) 272-8256
tamara.frazier@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.