To:DECISION Systems, Inc. (uspto@trademarks411.com)
Subject:U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86173315 - REASON - N/A
Sent:4/28/2014 3:11:42 PM
Sent As:ECOM107@USPTO.GOV
Attachments: Attachment - 1
Attachment - 2
Attachment - 3
Attachment - 4
Attachment - 5

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

    U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86173315

 

    MARK: REASON

 

 

        

*86173315*

    CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

          DECISION SYSTEMS, INC.

          PO BOX 792

          LONGVIEW, TX 75606-0792

          

          

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

 

 

    APPLICANT: DECISION Systems, Inc.

 

 

 

    CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

          N/A

    CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

          uspto@trademarks411.com

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/28/2014

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Section 2(d) Refusal– Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3728903.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  In the seminal decision In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the court listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services.  See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); TMEP §1207.01; see also In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, the applicant’s mark, REASON, is identical to the registrant’s mark, REASON, and will lead to consumer confusion. Specifically, the marks are similar in sound, meaning, and appearance.

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods and/or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks.  In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Indus., Inc., 210 USPQ 70, 78 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Comparison of the Goods and/or Services

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, it is sufficient to show that because of the conditions surrounding their marketing, or because they are otherwise related in some manner, the goods and/or services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering the goods and/or services under confusingly similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source.  In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The applicant’s services, namely “cloud computing featuring software for use in root cause analysis; platform as a service (PAAS) featuring computer software platforms for performing root cause analysis; software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for performing root cause analysis” are closely related to the registrant’s goods, namely “computer software for user-centered analysis of text data objects listed on a data table and associated dialog boxes containing additional object data by use of automated table permutation to support human reasoning about a plurality of interrelations among shifting parametric values and object names.”

 

According to the attached evidence, the field and function of applicant’s software (root cause analysis) is achieved somewhat broadly. Both applicant’s services and registrant’s goods appear to feature analysis of data using broadly defined wording. Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods and/or services as they are identified in the application and registration.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267-68, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.4, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

In this case, applicant’s goods and/or services are identified broadly.  Therefore, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in the registrant’s more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers.  See TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii); see, e.g., In re Americor Health Servs., 1 USPQ2d 1670, 1670-71 (TTAB 1986); In re Equitable Bancorporation, 229 USPQ 709, 710 (TTAB 1986).

 

Also, while the applicant features software services and the registrant features software goods, consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding BIGG’S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services likely to be confused with BIGGS for furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (holding design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids likely to be confused with design for skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (holding 21 CLUB for various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing likely to be confused with THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services and towels); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (holding CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store services and clothing likely to be confused with CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (holding STEELCARE INC. for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery likely to be confused with STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (holding similar marks for trucking services and on motor trucks and buses likely to cause confusion).

 

 

 

 

Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Assistance

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the reduced-fee TEAS Plus application must continue to submit certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(1).  For a complete list of these documents, see TMEP §819.02(b).  In addition, such applicants must accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process and must maintain a valid e-mail address.  37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2); TMEP §§819, 819.02(a).  TEAS Plus applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional fee of $50 per international class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(1)(iv); TMEP §819.04.  In appropriate situations and where all issues can be resolved by amendment, responding by telephone to authorize an examiner’s amendment will not incur this additional fee.

 

 

 

/James W. Stein/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 107

Phone: 571.272.3056

james.stein@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.