UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86148877
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: MASCHOFF BRENNAN LAYCOCK GILMORE ISRAELS 201 S MAIN ST STE 600 |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Shimano Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 10/3/2014
THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.
This letter is in response to the communication received on 7/17/2014 in which applicant 1) amended the identification and 2) argued against the refusal under Section 2(d).
The amended identification is accepted and this requirement is satisfied.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4103830. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant is applying for ECOVISION in standard characters for use with "[b]icycle components and accessories, namely, internal gear wheel hubs, bicycle wheel hubs which contains a dynamo inside, gear shift levers, suspensions."
The prior registration is for ECOVISION in special form for use with, in most relevant part, pneumatic tires; inner tubes for pneumatic tires; inner tubes for bicycles and cycles; adhesive rubber patches for repairing inner tubes; inner tube repair kits featuring rubber patches, rubber cement and adhesive tire sealant patches.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). In the present case, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are ECOVISION. Thus, the marks are identical in terms of sound. In addition, the connotation and commercial impression of the marks do not differ when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.
Further, with regard to appearance, applicant argues that the marks create a different commercial impression because the registrant's mark appears in special form. However, applicant's applied for mark is in standard characters. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Thus, the marks are legally identical in appearance because applicant's standard character mark may be presented in the identical manner of display as the prior registrant's mark. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar because they are virtually identical in sound, appearance, and connotation.
Comparison of the Goods
The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Applicant’s identified goods are related to the registrant’s identified goods because the identified goods, pneumatic tires, or inner tubes for bicycles and cycles commonly emanate from the same source as bicycle hubs under the same mark. See attached evidence from Soma, Bontrager, Eastern, Fatback, Origin 8, Ritchey, and Zipp showing pneumatic tires and/or inner tubes for bicycles and hubs offered under the same mark. Accordingly, the goods would be sold to the same class of purchasers and encountered under circumstances leading one to mistakenly believe the goods originate from the same source.
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative sample of ten third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely tires or inner tubes for bicycles and wheel hubs, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
In addition, the goods internal gear wheel hubs, inner tubes, and tires are commonly sold from bicycle specialty shops. See attached evidence from Harris cyclery, Soma, JensonUSA, Universal Cycles, Uptown Cycles.com, and Americas Bike Company offering for sale internal gear hubs, inner tubes and tires.
Finally, where evidence shows that the goods at issue have complementary uses, and thus are often used together or otherwise purchased by the same purchasers for the same or related purposes, such goods have generally been found to be sufficiently related such that confusion would be likely if they are marketed under the same or similar marks. See In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding bread and cheese to be related because they are often used in combination and noting that “[s]uch complementary use has long been recognized as a relevant consideration in determining a likelihood of confusion”); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus., 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597-98 (TTAB 2012) (holding yogurt products and ready-to-eat cereals to be related because they are complementary products given consumers’ longstanding behavior of mixing these types of breakfast foods and the fact that consumers are regularly exposed to yogurt and cereal combined as a food product). In this case, internal gear wheel hubs are components of a bicycle wheel. See attached evidence from rideyourbike.com, and Tour in Tune showing wheel hubs and tires as components of a usable bicycle wheel. A tire and inner tube are also used as a component of a usable bicycle wheel. Thus, internal geared wheel hubs, tires and inner tubes are used together to form a usable bicycle wheel and are related because they have a complementary use.
Applicant argues that the goods are unrelated because applicant's identified goods are specialized bicycle equipment. The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01. The attached evidence shows that wheel hubs and tires or inner tubes for bicycles commonly emanate from the same source. Thus, although applicant's gear hubs are specialized bicycle components, the goods travel in the same channels of trade and consumers would likely encounter the nearly identically marked gear hubs and tires or inner tubes for bicycles and likely believe the goods are related.
Finally, applicant argues that there is no likelihood of confusion because applicant is a market leader. The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the senior user is the source of the junior user’s goods, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” that is, the junior user is the source of the senior user’s goods. In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91, 6 USPQ2d 1187, 1190-91 (2d Cir. 1988). Thus, although applicant may be a market leader, a likelihood of confusion exists because users may likely believe the prior registrant is related to applicant.
Finally, applicant has submitted a list of alleged third party registrations for marks containing the wording ECOVISION to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection. However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record. In re Promo Ink, 78 USPQ2d 1301, 1304 (TTAB 2006); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03. To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal. In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1372-73 (TTAB 2006); In re Ruffin Gaming, 66 USPQ2d, 1924, 1925 n.3 (TTAB 2002); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.
Furthermore, even if applicant submitted proper evidence of these third party registrations. The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods. See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The goods and services listed in the third-party registrations submitted by applicant are different from those at issue and thus do not show that the relevant wording is commonly used in connection with the goods at issue.
Evidence of weakness or dilution consisting solely of third-party registrations, such as those submitted by applicant in this case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark, because such registrations do not establish that the registered marks identified therein are in actual use in the marketplace or that consumers are accustomed to seeing them. See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1204 (TTAB 2009); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009); Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ 989, 992 (TTAB 1982).
The examining attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The similarity between the marks and the relatedness of the goods creates a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source of the goods. Therefore, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Final Refusal – Response Guidelines
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) A response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals.
(2) An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with the appeal fee of $100 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
/Heather Biddulph/
Heather Biddulph
Law Office 104
email: heather.biddulph@uspto.gov
phone: 571-272-8190
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
