To: | Landmark Associates LLC (landmarkassociatesllc@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86137335 - RINCON - N/A - Request for Reconsideration Denied - Return to TTAB |
Sent: | 11/12/2015 3:21:58 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM106@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86137335
MARK: RINCON
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/index.jsp
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APPLICANT: Landmark Associates LLC
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/12/2015
The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant’s request for reconsideration and is denying the request for the reasons stated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a). The following requirement(s) and/or refusal(s) made final in the Office action dated April 24, 2015 are maintained and continue to be final: 2(d) likelihood of confusion with another mark. See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).
In the present case, applicant’s request has not resolved all the outstanding issue(s), nor does it raise a new issue or provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issue(s) in the final Office action. In addition, applicant’s analysis and arguments are not persuasive nor do they shed new light on the issues. Accordingly, the request is denied.
Specifically, applicant argues again that the channels of trade would be different for the goods, as applicant’s goods are highly specialized and target knowledgeable customers. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).
Further, applicant’s goods include computers. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has held that computer hardware products are related to computer software products, such that their marketing under the same or similar marks may be likely to cause source confusion. See In re TIE/Commc’ns, Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1457, 1458 (TTAB 1987) (holding DATA STAR likely to cause confusion when used in connection with both registrant’s “computer programs recorded on magnetic media” and applicant’s “voice/data communications terminals and parts thereof”); In re Epic Sys. Corp., 228 USPQ 213, 214-15 (TTAB 1985) (holding EPIC for computer software for use in health care facilities likely to be confused with EPIC DATA for “electronic data collection terminals and electronic data collection units”); In re Teradata Corp., 223 USPQ 361, 362 (TTAB 1984) (holding Y NET for computer hardware likely to be confused with XYNET for computer software); Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Microsystems, 220 USPQ 67, 69, 71-72 (TTAB 1983) (holding ALPHA MICRO for digital computer equipment and programs likely to be confused with ALPHA MICROWAVE for microwave components and subassemblies).
Moreover, applicant asserts that the third party registrations were not sufficient in number to show relatedness of the goods. Accordingly, see the attached additional registrations. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely goods and services for operating software, as well as, business related software, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
In addition, applicant asserts “mere registrations do not demonstrate that these registrants ever offered these types of software of the same mark.” In response, a trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). The presumption also implies that the registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all classes of purchasers of the identified goods and/or services. In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB 1991); McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1899 (TTAB 1989); RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964-65 (TTAB 1980); see TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution. See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
Most importantly, where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, the relationship between the relevant goods and/or services need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1077 (TTAB 2015); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202 (TTAB 2009); TMEP §1207.01(a).
If applicant has already filed a timely notice of appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Board will be notified to resume the appeal. See TMEP §715.04(a).
If no appeal has been filed and time remains in the six-month response period to the final Office action, applicant has the remainder of the response period to (1) comply with and/or overcome any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s), and/or (2) file a notice of appeal to the Board. TMEP §715.03(a)(ii)(B); see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(3). The filing of a request for reconsideration does not stay or extend the time for filing an appeal. 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); see TMEP §§715.03, 715.03(a)(ii)(B), (c).
/Bernice Middleton/
Bernice Middleton
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 106
Bernice.Middleton@uspto.gov
(571) 270.1514