To:Incline Health, Inc. (mbuserlaw@gmail.com)
Subject:U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85919993 - EVLUTION - N/A
Sent:6/7/2017 5:42:09 PM
Sent As:ECOM113@USPTO.GOV
Attachments:

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO.  85919993

 

MARK: EVLUTION

 

 

        

*85919993*

CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

       MATTHEW W. BUSER, ESQ.

       MWB PL

       350 NE 24TH STREET, SUITE 104

       MIAMI FL 33137-5185

       

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

VIEW YOUR APPLICATION FILE

 

APPLICANT: Incline Health, Inc.

 

 

 

CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

       N/A

CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

       mbuserlaw@gmail.com

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/7/2017

 

The instant application had been suspended pending further prosecution of App. Ser. Nos. 85273411 and 85463561, the former of which has abandoned—and the latter of which has registered, necessitating the following refusal:

 

            Likelihood-of-confusion refusal.

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5191430.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the referenced registration (in Appendix below).

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see TMEP §1207.01.  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

            a.        Comparison of goods/services.

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

Decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods.  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).

In the instant case, the applicant’s goods/services (“Men's and women's clothing and athletic apparel, namely, shirts and T-shirts”) are similar in kind and/or closely related to the registrant’s goods/services (“T-shirts”) because both are articles of clothing—shirts in particular—that are likely to travel through the same channels of trade to the same classes of purchasers. 

Neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

            b.        Comparison of marks.

Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

In the instant case, the applicant’s mark EVLUTION is self-evidently similar to the registered mark EVOLUTION TEE; thus the respective parties’ marks share a common appearance, sound, connotation, and overall commercial impression.  The only differences in the marks do not alter the commercial impression of the marks because the applicant’s word is redolent of the registrant’s EVOLUTION (and no other word) despite the former’s lack of the first O, and the registrant’s extra word TEE is generic disclaimed wording that has no source-indicating value.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely in the instant case, registration is refused under Trademark Act §2(d).  Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. 

 

            Responding to this Office Action.

To expedite prosecution of the application, applicant is encouraged to file its response to this Office action online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), which is available at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/index.jsp.  If applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/e_filing_tips.jsp and e-mail technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.

Unless the applicant (1) filed its application with TEAS-Plus status and (2) wishes to avoid incurring a $50-per-class fee (in which case, see immediately preceding paragraph regarding TEAS), there is no required format or form for responding to an Office Action.  However, the Office recommends that applicants use TEAS to respond to Office Actions.

If the applicant responds on paper via regular mail, the response should include the title “Response to Office Action” and the following information:  (1) the name and law office number of the examining attorney, (2) the serial number and filing date of the application, (3) the date of issuance of this Office Action, (4) the applicant’s name, address, telephone number, and e-mail address (if applicable), and (5) the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.194(b)(1); TMEP §302.03(a).

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02.  Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

The response must be signed by the individual applicant or by a person with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer, the equivalent of an officer for unincorporated organizations or limited liability companies, a general partner).  See TMEP §§611.03(b), 611.06 et seq., 712.01.  In the case of joint applicants, all should sign.  TMEP §611.06(a).  The proper signatory must personally sign or manually enter his/her electronic signature.  TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.

 

/J. Brendan Regan/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 113

571/272-9212

brendan.regan@uspto.gov

 

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX TO OFFICE ACTION

 

 

 

Mark
        EVOLUTION TEE
Goods and Services
        IC 025. US 022 039. G & S: T-shirts. FIRST USE: 20150603. FIRST USE IN COMMERCE: 20150603
Standard Characters Claimed
        STANDARD CHARACTERS CLAIMED
Mark Drawing Code
        (4) STANDARD CHARACTER MARK
Serial Number
        85463561
Filing Date
        November 3, 2011
Current Filing Basis
        1A
Original Filing Basis
        1B
Publication for Opposition Date
        February 25, 2014
Registration Number
        5191430
Registration Date
        April 25, 2017
Owner Name and Address
        (REGISTRANT) MAJESTIC APPAREL, LLC LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DELAWARE 2711 CENTERVILLE ROAD SUITE 400 WILMINGTON DELAWARE 19808
Assignment Recorded
        ASSIGNMENT RECORDED
Disclaimer Statement
        NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "TEE" APART FROM THE MARK AS SHOWN
Type of Mark
        TRADEMARK
Register
        PRINCIPAL
Live Dead Indicator
        LIVE
Attorney of Record
        Christopher M. Turk