UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/11/2015

 

On November 12, 2013, action on this application was suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial Nos. 85784145 and 85758289.  The referenced prior-pending applications have since registered.  Therefore, registration is refused as follows.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

• Likelihood of Confusion Refusal as to Specific Services
• Surname Refusal - Continued 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

The stated refusal refers to the following goods and/or services and does not bar registration for the other goods and/or services:  “Web site design.”

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4676759 and 4714578.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is SMITH and registrant’s marks are SMITH and SMITH and design.  Thus, the marks are identical in whole or as to the wording in terms of appearance and sound.  In addition, the connotation and commercial impression of the marks do not differ when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.

 

For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services.  Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)).  Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Therefore, the wording of registrant’s mark that also features a design is the dominant feature of the mark and is identical to the applicant’s mark in its entirety.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

COMPARISON OF THE SERVICES

 

Applicant’s services are in relevant part: “Web site design.”

 

Registrant’s services are in relevant part computer services, specifically (emphasis added): “Computer services, namely, cloud hosting provider services, computer system design services; creating virtual communities for users to organize groups and events, participate in discussions, and engage in social, business and community networking; hosting electronic facilities, namely, websites and digital content for others for organizing and conducting meetings, events and interactive discussions via communication networks; application service provider (ASP) services, namely, hosting computer software applications of others; application service provider (ASP) featuring software to enable or facilitate the uploading, downloading, streaming, posting, displaying, blogging, linking, sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information over communication networks; providing temporary use of non-downloadable software applications for social networking, creating a virtual community, and transmission of audio, video, photographic images, text, graphics and data; computer services in the nature of developing, creating, designing and providing customized web pages featuring user-defined or specified information, personal profiles, audio, video, photographic images, text, graphics and data; providing a web site featuring technology that enables online users to create personal profiles featuring social networking information and to transfer and share such information among multiple websites; computer services, namely, hosting an online website community for users to share information engage in communication between themselves and engage in social networking; application service provider (ASP) featuring software for use in uploading, posting, displaying, tagging, and electronically transmitting data, information, audio and video images; providing an online network service that enables users to transfer personal identity data to and share personal identify data with and among multiple websites; providing a web site that gives computer users the ability to photo-share and video-share; and providing information, consultancy and advisory services relating to the aforesaid.”

 

As the case law shows, applicant’s and registrant’s services are commercially related.

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Here, however, the services overlap.

 

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registrations has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the services and this wording is presumed to encompass all services of the type described, including those in registrant’s more narrow identification.

 

In total, the marks create the same commercial impression and the case law shows that the services are commercially related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers.  Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the services originate from a common source.  Therefore, there is a likelihood of confusion and registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

 

Applicant may respond to the stated refusal by submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal.  In addition, applicant may respond by doing one of the following:

 

(1)        Deleting the goods and/or services to which the refusal pertains;

 

(2)        Filing a request to divide out the goods and/or services that have not been refused registration, so that the mark may proceed toward publication for opposition for those goods or services to which the refusal does not pertain.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.87.  See generally TMEP §§1110 et seq. (regarding the requirements for filing a request to divide).  If applicant files a request to divide, then to avoid abandonment, applicant must also file a timely response to all outstanding issues in this Office action, including the refusal.  37 C.F.R. §2.87(e).; or

 

(3)        Amending the basis for the goods and/or services identified in the refusal, if appropriate.  TMEP §806.03(h).  (The basis cannot be changed for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a).  TMEP §1904.01(a).)

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

The refusal of registration because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname is continued.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211.  The primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public determines whether a term is primarily merely a surname.  In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 832, 184 USPQ 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009); see TMEP §§1211, 1211.01.

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reason(s) set forth below.

 

Applicant argues that the wording SMITH has non-surname significance in relation to the services.  The existence of other non-surname meanings of a mark does not preclude the mark from being held primarily merely a surname.  Mitchell Miller, P.C. v. Miller, 105 USPQ2d 1615, 1620-21 (TTAB 2013); see In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d 629, 631, 186 USPQ2d 238, 239 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Hamilton Pharms. Ltd., 27 USPQ2d 1939, 1942 (TTAB 1993).  The issue is not whether a mark that has surname significance might also have a non-surname significance, but whether, in the context of an applicant’s goods or services, the non-surname significance is the mark’s primary significance to the purchasing public.  Mitchell Miller, P.C. v. Miller, 105 USPQ2d at 1621; see In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d at 631, 186 USPQ2d at 239; In re Hamilton Pharms. Ltd., 27 USPQ2d at 1942.  The dictionary definitions for SMITH provided by applicant indicate a definition of metal workers or used in connection with someone who makes something, such as a locksmith or a wordsmith.  Applicant’s services are advertising services.  Applicant’s mark is the word SMITH alone.  Applicant’s services are not related to any of the alternative dictionary definitions of the word nor is it used in connection with other wording that would inform applicants that they are making a specified good.  Therefore, the alternate non-surname meanings of applicant’s mark do not have significance in relation to applicant’s services.

 

Applicant also argues that no one connected with the applicant has the surname SMITH.  While a term that is the surname of an individual applicant or that of an officer, owner, or principal of applicant’s business is probative evidence of the term’s surname significance the non-existance of this evidence does not demonstrate that the term is not primarily merely a surname.  TMEP §1211.02(b). 

 

There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie showing that a term is primarily merely a surname.  This question must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.  TMEP §1211.02(a); see, e.g., In re Monotype Corp. PLC, 14 USPQ2d 1070 (TTAB 1989); In re Pohang Iron & Steel Co., 230 USPQ 79 (TTAB 1986).  The entire record is examined to determine the surname significance of a term.  The following are examples of evidence that is generally considered to be relevant:  telephone directory listings, excerpted articles from computerized research databases, evidence in the record that the term is a surname, the manner of use on specimens, dictionary definitions of the term and evidence from dictionaries showing no definition of the term.  TMEP §1211.02(a).  In addition to the previously attached evidence from Lexis, attached is evidence from the United States Census and the data spreadsheet from the highlighted link as well as evidence from Wikipedia.  This evidence establishes that SMITH is the most common surname in the United States.

 

A mark deemed primarily merely a surname may be registered on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f) by satisfying one of the following:

 

            (1)  Submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.”  37 C.F.R. §2.41(b); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).; or

 

            (2)  Submit actual evidence of acquired distinctiveness.  37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); TMEP §1212.06.  Such evidence may include the following:  examples of advertising and promotional materials that specifically promote the applied-for mark as a trademark and/or service mark in the United States; dollar figures for advertising devoted to such promotion; dealer and consumer statements of recognition of the applied-for mark as a trademark and/or service mark; and any other evidence that establishes recognition of the applied-for mark as a source-identifier for the goods and/or services.  See In re Ideal Indus., Inc., 508 F.2d 1336, 184 USPQ 487 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Instant Transactions Corp. of Am., 201 USPQ 957 (TTAB 1979); TMEP §§1212.06 et seq.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(f), 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); see 37 C.F.R. §2.41; TMEP §§1211, 1212.

 

If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above, applicant can amend the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  Trademark Act Section 23, 15 U.S.C. §1091; see 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a).

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $50 per international class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone without incurring this additional fee. 

 

 

 

/Jonathan R. Falk/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 111

(571)272-5301

jonathan.falk@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 6/11/2015 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 85856518

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 6/11/2015 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.