UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/12/2013

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

• Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion
• Requirement for Acceptable Classification of Services

 

REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1650369 and 4203592, for LIMLIGHT and RIBALTA, respectively.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  In the seminal decision In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the court listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

In re U.S. Registration No. 1650369

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is LIMELIGHT and registrant’s mark is LIMELIGHT.  Thus, the word portion of the marks is identical in terms of appearance and sound.  In addition, the connotation and commercial impression of the marks do not differ when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.

 

A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters, or vice versa, because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

In re U.S. Registration No. 4203592

 

Here, the mark RIBALTA directly translates to “limelight”.  Therefore, the respective marks, LIMELIGHT and RIBALTA, are substantially similar in meaning and connotation.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a mark in a foreign language and a mark that is its English equivalent may be held to be confusingly similar.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi); see, e.g., In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1025 (TTAB 2006); In re Hub Distrib., Inc., 218 USPQ 284 (TTAB 1983).  Therefore, marks comprised of foreign words are translated into English to determine similarity in meaning and connotation with English word marks.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Equivalence in meaning and connotation can be sufficient to find such marks confusingly similar.  See In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1025.

 

The doctrine is applicable when it is likely that an ordinary American purchaser would “stop and translate” the foreign term into its English equivalent.  Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377, 73 USPQ2d at 1696; TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi)(A).  The ordinary American purchaser refers to “all American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to translate words into English.”  In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1024 (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §23:26 (4th ed. 2006), which states “[t]he test is whether, to those American buyers familiar with the foreign language, the word would denote its English equivalent.”).

 

Generally, the doctrine is applied when the English translation is a literal and exact translation of the foreign wording.  See In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1021 (holding MARCHE NOIR for jewelry likely to be confused with the cited mark BLACK MARKET MINERALS for retail jewelry and mineral store services where evidence showed that MARCHE NOIR is the exact French equivalent of the English idiom “Black Market,” and the addition of MINERALS did not serve to distinguish the marks); In re Ithaca Indus., Inc., 230 USPQ 702 (TTAB 1986) (holding applicant’s mark LUPO for men’s and boys’ underwear likely to be confused with the cited registration for WOLF and design for various clothing items, where LUPO is the Italian equivalent of the English word “wolf”); In re Hub Distrib., Inc., 218 USPQ at 284 (holding the Spanish wording EL SOL for clothing likely to be confused with its English language equivalent SUN for footwear where it was determined that EL SOL was the “direct foreign language equivalent” of the term SUN).

 

Common, modern languages include Spanish, French, Italian, German, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Serbian and Yiddish.  See, e.g., Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 129 USPQ 411 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (Hungarian); In re Tokutake Indus. Co., 87 USPQ2d 1697 (TTAB 2008) (Japanese); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik,” 80 USPQ2d 1305 (TTAB 2006) (Russian); In re Perez, 21 USPQ2d 1075 (TTAB 1991) (Spanish); In re Oriental Daily News, Ltd., 230 USPQ 637 (TTAB 1986) (Chinese); In re Ithaca Indus., Inc., 230 USPQ 702 (TTAB 1986) (Italian); In re Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 223 USPQ 45 (TTAB 1983) (German); In re Westbrae Natural Foods, Inc., 211 USPQ 642 (TTAB 1981) (Japanese); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775 (TTAB 1977) (French); In re Bagel Nosh, Inc., 193 USPQ 316 (TTAB 1976) (Yiddish); In re Hag Aktiengesellschaft, 155 USPQ 598 (TTAB 1967) (Serbian); In re New Yorker Cheese Co., 130 USPQ 120 (TTAB 1961) (Polish). 

 

In the instant case, ribalta is the Italian word for limelight; therefore, the wording in registrant’s mark is based on a common, modern language which an ordinary American purchaser would “stop and translate” to its English equivalent. 

 

Consequently, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are similar in sound, appearance, and meaning.

 

Relatedness of the Services

 

Applicant has applied for “Night club services; Dance club services; Discotheques; Restaurant services; Bar services; Provision of food and drink” in International Class 41. 

 

U.S. Registration No. 1650369 is for “discotheque services” in International Class 41 as well as “café and restaurant services” in International Class 42.

 

U.S. Registration No. 4203592 is for “restaurant services” in International Class 43.

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the services and this wording is presumed to encompass all services of the type described, including those in registrants’ more narrow identification.

 

Specifically, with respect to U.S. Registration No. 1650369, the respective parties share the identical services for discotheques and restaurant services.  Further, the wording “night club services”, “dance club services” and “provision of food and drink” are sufficiently broad to encompass that of registrant’s discotheques and restaurant services.

 

With respect to U.S. Registration No. 4203592, the respective parties share the identical wording “restaurant services” in the identifications.

 

The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the services listed therein, namely night club services, dance club services, discotheques, cafes, restaurant services, bar services, and/or the provision of food and drink, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Thus, upon encountering applicant’s and registrant’s mark, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods and/or services emanate from a common source.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant must respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

REQUIREMENT FOR ACCEPTABLE CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES

 

Applicant has classified the following services in International Class 41:  “Restaurant services; Bar services; Provision of food and drink.”  However, the proper classification for these items are as follows: 

 

Class 43:  Restaurant services; Bar services; Provision of food and drink.

 

Therefore, applicant must either (1) add International Class 43 to the application and reclassify these services in the proper international class, or (2) delete the wording “Restaurant services; Bar services; Provision of food and drink” from the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.86, 6.1; TMEP §§1403 et seq.  If applicant adds one or more international classes to the application, applicant must comply with the multiple-class requirements specified in this Office action.

 

An applicant may amend an identification of goods and services only to clarify or limit the goods and services; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods and/or services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07 et seq.

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

MULTIPLE – CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

 

The application identifies goods and/or services that are classified in at least two classes; however, the fees submitted are sufficient for only one class.  In a multiple-class application, a fee for each class is required.  37 C.F.R. §2.86(a)(2); TMEP §§810.01, 1403.01.

 

Therefore, applicant must either (1) restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fee(s) already paid, or (2) submit the fees for the additional class(es). 

 

The filing fees for adding classes to an application are as follows:

 

(1)  A $325 fee per class, when the fees are submitted with an electronic response filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp, via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).

 

(2)  A $375 fee per class, when the fees are submitted with a paper response.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(1)(i)-(ii); TMEP §§810, 1403.02(c).

 

For an application with more than one international class, called a “multiple-class application,” an applicant must meet all the requirements below for those international classes based on an intent to use the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b):

 

(1)       LIST GOODS AND/OR SERVICES BY INTERNATIONAL CLASS:  Applicant must list the goods and/or services by international class.

 

(2)       PROVIDE FEES FOR ALL INTERNATIONAL CLASSES:  Applicant must submit an application filing fee for each international class of goods and/or services not covered by the fee(s) already paid (confirm current fee information at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/tm_fee_info.jsp).

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.

 

 

 

/Jeanie H. Lee/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 105

(571) 272-6110

jeanie.lee@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 3/12/2013 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 85776443

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 3/12/2013 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.