UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 85733678
MARK: TAPESTRY
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: 1560 BROADWAY STE 1200 |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Tapestry Pty Ltd
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 1/24/2013
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4076394. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). In the seminal decision In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the court listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01. However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation, and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, the applicant’s mark, TAPESTRY (in standard character form) is similar or identical in sound, connotation and commercial impression to the wording of the registrant’s mark, TPSTRY (in special form). When spoken, the registrant’s mark is identical in sound to the applicant’s mark. The omission of vowels and silent letters has become commonplace with the advent of electronic texting. See attached article discussing the foreshortening of words by omission that has become popular. This practice results in a phonetic reading of words with omissions such as the registrant’s TPSTRY. Both marks are for use in an environment where this phenomenon is popular, e.g., the marks are intended for use in an electronic environment. The marks are phonetic equivalents or highly similar in sound when spoken. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
The registrant’s mark has a design element. For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services. In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)). Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
COMPARISON OF THE GOODS AND SERVICES
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, it is sufficient to show that because of the conditions surrounding their marketing, or because they are otherwise related in some manner, the goods and/or services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering the goods and/or services under confusingly similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source. In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The applicant’s mark is intended for use with “Software for providing communications assistance to older generations to stay in touch with their families and friends; software for facilitating the delivery of communications from aged care providers to seniors and the family and friends of seniors.” The registrant’s mark is used in connection with “Computer services, namely, hosting an interactive web site that allows families to record and display family profiles, relationships, interests, audio and video content.”
It is common for those hosting interactive websites to also provide software for the site under the same mark. Attached are copies of printouts from the USPTO X-Search database, which show third-party registrations of marks used in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of applicant and registrant in this case. These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely the provision of software and hosting websites, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source. In re Infinity Broad. Corp.,60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
The purpose of the applicant’s software is generally software for social media created for aging citizens to use with families and for care providers of those citizens to communicate with families. The registrant’s hosting is for an interactive website that provides highly similar content for use by families to share information of the same or similar kind that is relevant to family members. Consumers, upon encountering or hearing of the TAPESTRY software and phonetically identical TPSTRY web hosting services that feature highly similar kinds of content, are likely to believe that the goods and services emanate from a common source. The provision of software as a good or as a service is of negligible distinction to consumers who acquire software in either format, but which, in this case, is all intended for use with social media that is used on the Internet.
Overall, the similarities among the marks and the goods and services are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion. The examining attorney must resolve any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion in favor of the prior registrant. In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir., 1988).
Note: The acronym “TMEP” used in official USPTO letters and notices refers to the USPTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (7th ed. Oct. 2010), a manual written by USPTO staff that explains the laws and procedures governing the trademark application, registration, and post registration processes. The TMEP can be viewed online at the Trademarks’ Home Page at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/index.jsp by clicking on “Manuals, Guides, Official Gazette” on the left side of the screen.
There is no required format or form for responding to an Office action. The Office recommends applicants use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to respond to Office actions online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html. If applicant responds on paper via regular mail, the response should include the title “Response to Office Action” and the following information: (1) the name and law office number of the examining attorney, (2) the serial number and filing date of the application, (3) the date of issuance of this Office action, (4) applicant’s name, address, telephone number and e-mail address (if applicable), and (5) the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.194(b)(1); TMEP §302.03(a).
In the response, applicant should explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in the Office action. If a refusal has issued, applicant may wish to argue against the refusal, i.e., submit arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and why the mark should register. To respond to requirements, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.
Instructions for signing responses are provided below.
If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.
/Linda A. Powell/
Linda A. Powell
Examining Attorney
L.O. 106 United States Patent and Trademark Office
571-272-9327
linda.powelll@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
