UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 10/11/2012

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 25 August 2012.

 

SECTION 2(d) – Refusal Made Final

On 9 August 2012, registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2781501 as to be likely, when used on the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reason(s) set forth below.  However, for the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

 

The examining attorney has determined that contemporaneous use of the marks LEGAL (and design) and LEGAL (stylized) both used on clothing would be likely to cause confusion for the following reasons.

 

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services.  See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); TMEP §1207.01; see also In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

A.  The Marks

The word portions of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression – LEGAL.  Therefore, the addition of a design element in the marks does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used when requesting the goods and/or services.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983)).  Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 

 

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in their entireties that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to result.  Edom Labs., Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d at 1438; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant has submitted printouts of third-party registrations for marks containing either the term “legal” or a variation thereof to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 

 

Evidence of weakness or dilution consisting solely of third-party registrations, such as those submitted by applicant in this case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark, because such registrations do not establish that the registered marks identified therein are in actual use in the marketplace or that consumers are accustomed to seeing them.  See AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1204 (TTAB 2009); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009); Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ 989, 992 (TTAB 1982).  Furthermore, none of the referenced registrations consist of the term “legal” alone.  Consequently, the referenced registered marks communicate an entirely different commercial impression from the one communicated by the cited registered mark and the applicant’s mark.

 

Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services.  In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 216 USPQ 793, 795 (TTAB 1982); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974).  This protection extends to marks registered on the Supplemental Register.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see, e.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 307-08, 198 USPQ 337, 340 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Hunke & Jochheim, 185 USPQ 188 (TTAB 1975).

 

The applicant is advised that the fallibility of the average purchaser's memory must be considered.  Given the substantial similarities in the appearance and meaning of the marks, the average purchaser is not likely to distinguish the marks based on such small differences.  The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side‑by‑side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP section 1207.01(b).  Furthermore, the Board has specifically addressed the issue of the fallibility of the average consumer's memory in The Barbers, Hairstyling for Men & Women, Inc. v. The Baraber Pole, Inc., 204 USPQ 403 (TTAB 1979), wherein it stated:

 

     [P]urchasers and prospective purchasers...generally do not have the

     opportunity to compare the respective marks on a side-by -side basis,

     and, thus, the test which we must apply in determining likelihood of

     confusion is not whether the marks are distinguishable upon a side-by-side

     comparison, but whether they so resemble one another as to be likely to

     cause confusion and this necessarily requires us to consider the fallibility 

     of the memory of the average purchaser, who normally retains but a general

     impression of trademarks over a period of time, and would not recollect

     minute details as to specific differences.

 

204 USPQ at 409.

 

And finally, where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

B.  The Goods

Both parties identify items of wearing apparel. 

 

And finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

C.  Conclusion

The refusal to register the applicant’s LEGAL (stylized) under Trademark Section 2(d) is accordingly maintained and is hereby made FINAL.

 

RESPONSE

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

TEAS PLUS APPLICANTS MUST SUBMIT DOCUMENTS ELECTRONICALLY OR SUBMIT FEE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the reduced-fee TEAS Plus application must continue to submit certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(1).  For a complete list of these documents, see TMEP §819.02(b).  In addition, such applicants must accept correspondence from the Office via e-mail throughout the examination process and must maintain a valid e-mail address.  37 C.F.R. §2.23(a)(2); TMEP §§819, 819.02(a).  TEAS Plus applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional fee of $50 per international class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(1)(iv); TMEP §819.04.  In appropriate situations and where all issues can be resolved by amendment, responding by telephone to authorize an examiner’s amendment will not incur this additional fee.

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

/Katherine Stoides/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 101

571-272-9230

katherine.stoides@uspto.gov (unofficial use only)

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 10/11/2012 FOR

SERIAL NO. 85675909

 

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

 

 

TO READ OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link or go to http://portal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action.

 

PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

RESPONSE IS REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond; and (2) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 10/11/2012 (or sooner if specified in the office action).

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System Response Form.

 

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail

TDR@uspto.gov.  Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action. 

 

        WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.