UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 12/6/2012

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on October 15, 2012.

 

Applicant’s amendments are accepted and made of record.

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 4177152 as to be likely, when used on the identified goods and services to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

 

The examining attorney considered the applicant’s arguments carefully but finds them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  In the seminal decision In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the court listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in their entireties that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Edom Labs., Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applied-for mark is KEYSTONE.  The registered mark is QEYSTONE.

 

The applied-for mark and the registered mark are similar because they both feature the similar worded terms KEYSTONE and QEYSTONE.

 

Also, the marks presented here are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  Slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion.  In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

 

Turning to the goods and services, they need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, it is sufficient to show that because of the conditions surrounding their marketing, or because they are otherwise related in some manner, the goods and/or services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering the goods and/or services under confusingly similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source.  In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The fact  that the goods of the parties may differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Here, applicant provides "computer software used by investment professionals for the managing and accounting of investments and asset portfolios comprised of securities such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, alternative investment products." and "computer services, namely, customizing, designing and programming systems for investment advisory firms and other investment professionals" under its KEYSTONE mark.

 

The registrant provides cloud computing services that feature software for use in project and portfolio management, dashboarding, quality improvement, process improvement, statistics, data analysis and business intelligence under its QEYSTONE mark.

 

The applicant’s goods and services and the registrant’s services are closely related because they both specifically feature software for use in portfolio management.

 

It is important to note that where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Such is the case when comparing the KEYSTONE and QEYSTONE marks above.

 

Applicant also argues that the owner of the cited registration has abandoned its trademark and/or service mark due to nonuse.  However, a trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).

 

Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution.  See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  Such evidence and arguments may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.

 

Also, when analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application and registrations  use of  broad wording to describe the goods and/or services is presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in applicant’s possibly more narrow identification.

 

Finally, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has held that computer hardware products are related to computer software products, such that their marketing under the same or similar marks may be likely to cause source confusion.  See In re Emulex Corp., 6 USPQ2d 1312 (TTAB 1987) (holding JAVELIN for computer peripheral software storage unit likely to be confused with JAVELIN for “prerecorded computer programs in machine readable form”); In re TIE/Commc’ns, Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1457 (TTAB 1987) (holding DATA STAR likely to cause confusion when used in connection with both registrant’s “computer programs recorded on magnetic media” and applicant’s “voice/data communications terminals and parts thereof”); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (holding CONCURRENT PC-DOS likely to be confused with CONCURRENT TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION for “printed electronic circuit boards”); In re Epic Sys. Corp., 228 USPQ 213 (TTAB 1985) (holding EPIC for computer software for use in health care facilities likely to be confused with EPIC DATA for “electronic data collection terminals and electronic data collection units”); In re Teradata Corp., 223 USPQ 361 (TTAB 1984) (holding Y NET for computer hardware likely to be confused with XYNET for computer software); In re Compagnie Internationale Pour L’Informatique-Cii Honeywell Bull, 223 USPQ 363 (TTAB 1984) (holding QUESTAR for computer hardware likely to be confused with QUESTAN for computer programs); In re Graphics Tech. Corp., 222 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1984) (holding AGILE for computer programs likely to be confused with AGILE for computer data terminals); Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Microsystems, 220 USPQ 67 (TTAB 1983) (holding ALPHA MICRO for digital computer equipment and programs likely to be confused with ALPHA MICROWAVE for microwave components and sub assemblies); see also Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming TTAB decision on summary judgment that found computer modems and computer programs highly related); cf. In re Quadram Corp., 228 USPQ 863 (TTAB 1985).

 

Clearly, the marks are similar and the goods and services are related.  As such, this applicant could be perceived as the source of the registrant’s goods and/or services.  This registrant could likewise be perceived as the source of the applicant’s goods and/or services.  Therefore, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) is maintained and made FINAL.

 

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class. 

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

 

 

 

/John D. Dalier/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

(571) 272-9150

John.Dalier@USPTO.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR TRADEMARK APPLICATION

Your trademark application (Serial No. 85634508) has been reviewed.   The examining attorney assigned by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has written a letter (an “Office Action”) on 12/6/2012 to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

1. Read the Office letter by clicking on this link OR go to http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter your serial number to access the Office letter.       

 

 PLEASE NOTE: The Office letter may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

2. Respond within 6 months, calculated from 12/6/2012 (or sooner if specified in the Office letter), using the Trademark Electronic Application System Response to Office Action form. If you have difficulty using the USPTO website, contact TDR@uspto.gov. 

 

3. Contact the examining attorney who reviewed your application with any questions about the content of the office letter:

 

/John D. Dalier/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

(571) 272-9150

John.Dalier@USPTO.gov

WARNING

Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, please use the Trademark Electronic Application System Response to Office Action form.