Offc Action Outgoing

PRONTO

Pronto LLC

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85622265 - PRONTO - 20167-1


UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

    APPLICATION SERIAL NO.       85622265

 

    MARK: PRONTO  

 

 

        

*85622265*

    CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

          Stephen R. Lewis          

          ADAMS AND REESE LLP       

          One Shell Square

          701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500 

          NEW ORLEANS LA 70139     

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

 

 

    APPLICANT:           Pronto LLC   

 

 

 

    CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

          20167-1        

    CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

           trademarks@arlaw.com

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 9/6/2012

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Summary of issues

 

Ø  Section 2(d) Refusal-Likelihood of Confusion

Ø  Identification of Services

 

Applicant should note the following ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3842367; 3842366; 3572429; 3572046; 3226297; and 3094799.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

The applicant has applied to register “PRONTO” and design for “Financial services.” 

 

The registered marks are:

 

“PRONTO” and design for the relevant services listed as “Arranging of loans, namely, providing income tax refund advance loans;”

 

“PRONTO” for the relevant services listed as “Arranging of loans, namely, providing income tax refund advance loans;”

 

“PRONTO PAYMENT” for the services “bill payment services;”

 

“PRONTO CA$H CHECK CASHING” and design for “Financial services, namely, check cashing services, foreign currency exchange services, money order services, money transfer services, electronic funds transfer services, consumer loan services, namely, installment loans and temporary loans, bill payment services, utility bill payment services, telephone calling card services, and automated teller machine services;”

 

“PRONTO CA$H” for “Financial services, namely, check cashing, foreign currency exchange, money orders, money remittances, namely, electronic transfer of money, consumer loans, namely, installment loans, home equity loans, and temporary loans.”

 

“PRONTO COMMISSIONS” and design for “Financial services, namely, real estate commissions factoring services.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark “PRONTO” and design and the registered marks “PRONTO” and design; “PRONTO;” “PRONTO PAYMENT;” “PRONTO CA$H CHECK CASHING” and design; “PRONTO CA$H” and “PRONTO COMMISSIONS” and design share the identical wording “PRONTO.”  The identical wording “PRONTO” creates a similar overall commercial impression between the parties’ marks.

 

It is noted that the registered marks “PRONTO PAYMENT;” “PRONTO CA$H CHECK CASHING” and design; “PRONTO CA$H” and “PRONTO COMMISSIONS” and design contain the additional word elements “PAYMENT,” “CA$H CHECK CASHING,” “CA$H” and “COMMISSIONS.”  However, registrants were required to disclaim this wording apart from the mark as a whole because the word elements were found to be merely descriptive of registrants’ service activities.  Applicant should note that although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1060, 224 USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  For this reason, the aforementioned wording is less significant or less dominant when comparing the parties’ marks.  Accordingly, the additional wording does not obviate the similar overall commercial impression between the parties’ marks.

 

It is also noted that the applied-for mark and the registered marks “PRONTO” and design; “PRONTO CA$H CHECK CASHING” and design; and “PRONTO COMMISSIONS” and design contain additional design elements.  However, the word portions of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; therefore, the addition of a design element does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

 

For the above stated reasons, the applied-for mark “PRONTO” and design is found to be highly similar to the registered marks “PRONTO” and design; “PRONTO;” “PRONTO PAYMENT;” “PRONTO CA$H CHECK CASHING” and design; “PRONTO CA$H” and “PRONTO COMMISSIONS” and design in sound, appearance and meaning.  Accordingly, the marks create similar overall commercial impressions thereby satisfying the first prong of the likelihood of confusion test.

 

Comparison of Services

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, it is sufficient to show that because of the conditions surrounding their marketing, or because they are otherwise related in some manner, the goods and/or services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering the goods and/or services under confusingly similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source.  In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, applicant seeks registration for “Financial services.”  Registrants have protection for the relevant services listed as “Arranging of loans, namely, providing income tax refund advance loans; bill payment services; Financial services, namely, check cashing services, foreign currency exchange services, money order services, money transfer services, electronic funds transfer services, consumer loan services, namely, installment loans and temporary loans, bill payment services, utility bill payment services, telephone calling card services, and automated teller machine services; Financial services, namely, check cashing, foreign currency exchange, money orders, money remittances, namely, electronic transfer of money, consumer loans, namely, installment loans, home equity loans, and temporary loans and Financial services, namely, real estate commissions factoring services.”  The parties’ services are the type that would emanate from a single source because the services are the type sold to consumers seeking financial services.  Accordingly, the services would be sold to the same class of purchasers and encountered under circumstances leading one to mistakenly believe the services originate from the same source. 

 

Analyzing the applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness is based on the description of the goods and/or services set forth in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp. Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1337, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registrations has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the services and this wording is presumed to encompass all services of the type described, including those in registrants’ more narrow identification.  More specifically, applicant’s broadly identified service activities for “financial services” encompasses registrants’ service activities, which are all types of financial services.

 

Since the marks create similar overall commercial impressions and the services are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the applicant’s services.  Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 

 

APPLICANT HAS RIGHT TO RESPOND

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  

 

If the applicant chooses to respond to the Section 2(d) refusal, the applicant must also address the requirement set forth below.

 

Identification of services

 

The identification of services is indefinite and must be clarified.  See TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant must specify the nature of the services as well as their main purpose and their field of use or channels of trade. 

 

More specifically, applicant should further specify the type or nature of the financial services.  For instance, if the services are in the nature of money lending, investment fund transfer and transaction services, mortgage planning, credit repair and restoration or electronic remote check deposit services, applicant may indicate accordingly.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

 

Class 36:   Financial services, namely, {further specify the type or nature of the financial services, for example, money lending, investment fund transfer and transaction services, mortgage planning, credit repair and restoration or electronic remote check deposit services}.

 

An applicant may amend an identification of goods and services only to clarify or limit the goods and services; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods and/or services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07 et seq.

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services at http://tess2.gov.uspto.report/netahtml/tidm.html.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Response guidelines

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements. 

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02.  Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to live status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

/Ameen Imam/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 113

(571) 272-1942

ameen.imam@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.

 

 

 

 

 

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U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85622265 - PRONTO - 20167-1

To: Pronto LLC (trademarks@arlaw.com)
Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85622265 - PRONTO - 20167-1
Sent: 9/6/2012 12:13:48 PM
Sent As: ECOM113@USPTO.GOV
Attachments:

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 9/6/2012 FOR

SERIAL NO. 85622265

 

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

 

 

TO READ OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link or go to http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action.

 

PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

RESPONSE IS REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond; and (2) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 9/6/2012 (or sooner if specified in the office action).

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System Response Form.

 

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail

TDR@uspto.gov.  Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action. 

 

        WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.

 

 

 


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