UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 7/13/2012

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3060029.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis.  See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1584 (TTAB 2007); see also In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b).  The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Here, the applicant’s mark, IT’S GAME-ON FOR BUSINESS, is similar to the registrant’s mark, GAME ON!, because both marks contain the similar phrase GAME ON. 

 

Although the applicant’s mark also contains additional wording, the mere addition of a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (GASPAR’S ALE and JOSE GASPAR GOLD); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (THE LILLY and LILLI ANN); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266 (TTAB 2009) (TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (MACHO and MACHO COMBOS); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE and CREST CAREER IMAGES); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (ACCUTUNE and RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

 

Both the applicant’s mark and the registrant’s mark feature the similar phrase GAME ON, thereby creating the same overall commercial impression.  Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Similarity of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Rather, it is sufficient to show that because of the conditions surrounding their marketing, or because they are otherwise related in some manner, the goods and/or services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering the goods and/or services under confusingly similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source.  In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, the applicant’s services are closely related to the registrant’s goods because the goods and services listed feature software used in connection with gaming applications.  Please see the identification of goods and services listed in the instant application and cited registration.  As evidenced by the identification of goods, the applicant’s software is used in applying gaming mechanics and the registrant’s software is used to enhance and boost the performance of computer gaming.  Thus, both the applicant’s and registrant’s software are used in connection with gaming functions.

 

Where evidence shows that the goods at issue have complementary uses, and thus are often used together or otherwise purchased by the same purchasers for the same or related purposes, such goods have generally been found to be sufficiently related such that confusion would be likely if they are marketed under the same or similar marks.  See In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding bread and cheese to be related because they are often used in combination and noting that “[s]uch complementary use has long been recognized as a relevant consideration in determining a likelihood of confusion”); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1272 (TTAB 2009) (finding medical MRI diagnostic apparatus and medical ultrasound devices to be related, based in part on the fact that such goods have complementary purposes because they may be used by the same medical personnel on the same patients to treat the same disease); In re Hester Indus., Inc., 231 USPQ 881, 882-83 (TTAB 1986) (finding bread and frozen chicken parts to be complementary goods, and thus related, because such goods are appropriate for use together in sandwiches and may otherwise be sold to the same purchasers for use in a single meal); In re Vienna Sausage Mfg. Co., 230 USPQ 799, 799-800 (TTAB 1986) (finding sausage and cheese to be complementary goods, and thus related, because they may be used together in recipes, sandwiches, and hors d’oeuvres); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. La Loren, Inc., 224 USPQ 509, 511 (TTAB 1984) (finding bath sponges and personal products, such as bath oil, soap, and body lotion, to be closely related because they are complementary goods that are likely to be purchased and used together by the same purchasers). 

 

The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration.  The presumption also implies that the registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all classes of purchasers of the identified goods and/or services.  In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB 1991); McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1899 (TTAB 1989); RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964-65 (TTAB 1980); see TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Accordingly, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

Refusal of Registration on Supplemental Register – Eligible for Principle Register

 

Applicant has sought registration of the applied-for mark on the Supplemental Register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1091.  However, applicant’s mark appears to be eligible for registration on the Principal Register because it comprises or includes inherently distinctive matter.  See TMEP §815.01.

 

Thus, as applicant’s mark is eligible for registration on the Principal Register, it may not be registered on the Supplemental Register.  See In re U.S. Catheter & Instrument Corp., 158 USPQ 53, 54 (TTAB 1968); Daggett & Ramsdell, Inc. v. I. Posner, Inc., 115 USPQ 96, 96 (Comm’r Pats. 1957); TMEP §815.01.  Accordingly, applicant must amend the application to seek registration on the Principal Register. 

 

Pending a proper response, registration on the Supplemental Register is refused because the mark is eligible for registration on the Principal Register.  TMEP §815.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1091(a).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant must respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

Specimen

 

The specimen is not acceptable because it does not show the applied-for mark used in connection with any of the services specified in the application.  An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each class of goods and/or services.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

In this case, the specimen consists of a screenshot from the applicant’s website.  Although the specimen displays the proposed mark, it fails to show use of the mark in connection with the applied-for ASP software services.  Rather, the specimen shows use of the mark in connection with a blog.  Please note that blogs are on-line journals classified in Class 041.  However, the applicant did not apply for blog services but rather for application service provider services featuring software.  Thus, the specimen is unacceptable because it fails to show use of the mark in connection with the services specified in the application.

 

A service mark specimen consisting of advertising or promotional materials generally must show a direct association between the mark and the services for which registration is sought.  See In re Universal Oil Prods. Co., 476 F.2d 653, 655, 177 USPQ 456, 457 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re HSB Solomon Assocs., 102 USPQ2d 1269, 1274 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1301.04(b).  While the exact nature of the services does not need to be specified in the specimen, there must be something which creates in the mind of the purchaser an association between the mark and the service.  In re Adair, 45 USPQ2d 1211, 1215 (TTAB 1997) (quoting In re Johnson Controls Inc., 33 USPQ2d 1318, 1320 (TTAB 1994)); see In re Osmotica Holdings, Corp., 95 USPQ2d 1666, 1668 (TTAB 2010).

 

Please note that the applicant may not amend the identification of services to specify blog services in the instant application because such an amendment would be beyond the scope of the wording used to describe the services at the time of filing the application. An applicant may amend an identification of goods and services only to clarify or limit the goods and services; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods and/or services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07 et seq.

 

Therefore, applicant must submit the following:

 

(1)  A substitute specimen showing the mark in use in commerce for each class of goods and/or services specified in the application; and

 

(2)  The following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute specimen was in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.”  37 C.F.R. §2.59(a); TMEP §904.05; see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).  If submitting a substitute specimen requires an amendment to the dates of use, applicant must also verify the amended dates.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(c); TMEP §904.05.

 

Examples of specimens for services are signs, photographs, brochures, website printouts or advertisements that show the mark used in the actual sale or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §§1301.04 et seq.

 

If applicant cannot satisfy the above requirements, applicant may amend the application from a use in commerce basis under Section 1(a) to an intent to use basis under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  See TMEP §806.03(c).  However, if applicant amends the basis to Section 1(b), registration will not be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen.  See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c), (d); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP §1103. 

 

To amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “Applicant has had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods and/or services listed in the application as of the filing date of the application.”  37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(2); TMEP §806.01(b); see 15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.35(b)(1), 2.193(e)(1).

 

Pending receipt of a proper response, registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce as a trademark and/or service mark for the identified goods and/or services.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).

 

Pro Se Response Guidelines

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements. 

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02.  Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to live status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

Pro Se Applicant may wish to seek Trademark Counsel

 

Because of the legal technicalities involved in this application, applicant may wish to hire an attorney specializing in trademark or intellectual property law.  For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/findlegalhelp/home.cfm or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO cannot aid in the selection of an attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11. 

 

 

 

/Natalie Polzer/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

Phone:  (571) 272-4103

natalie.polzer@uspto.gov (not for formal responses)

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR TRADEMARK APPLICATION

Your trademark application (Serial No. 85603111) has been reviewed.   The examining attorney assigned by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has written a letter (an “Office Action”) on 7/13/2012 to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

1. Read the Office letter by clicking on this link OR go to http://tmportal.gov.uspto.report/external/portal/tow and enter your serial number to access the Office letter.       

 

 PLEASE NOTE: The Office letter may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

2. Respond within 6 months, calculated from 7/13/2012 (or sooner if specified in the Office letter), using the Trademark Electronic Application System Response to Office Action form. If you have difficulty using the USPTO website, contact TDR@uspto.gov. 

 

3. Contact the examining attorney who reviewed your application with any questions about the content of the office letter:

 

/Natalie Polzer/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

Phone:  (571) 272-4103

natalie.polzer@uspto.gov (not for formal responses)

WARNING

Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses.  Instead, please use the Trademark Electronic Application System Response to Office Action form.