UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 11/5/2012

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

This letter response to the applicant’s communication filed September 26, 2012.  In the foregoing communication, the applicant argued against the refusal to register applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act on the grounds that the mark is likely to be confused with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3695633.

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 3695633.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused and made final because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3695633.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  In the seminal decision In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the court listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Here, the applicant applied to register the mark FLICKR for distributing advertising for others via an online electronic communications network in International Class 35.

 

The registered mark is BUZZFLIKR for advertising services, public relations and marketing services, namely, promoting and marketing the goods and services of others through all public communication means in International Class 35. 

 

Similarity Of The Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the instant case, the marks are highly similar.  The only distinguishing characteristic of the applicant’s mark from the registered mark is that the term “BUZZ” has been deleted from the registrant’s mark.

 

The mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

Moreover, when comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in their entireties that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to result.  Edom Labs., Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d at 1438; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

While the applicant contends that the dominant portion of the registrant’s mark is “BUZZ” it cannot ignore the term FLIKR, which is phonetically identical and highly similar to the applicant’s mark “FLICKR.”   The applicant’s mark, as stated previously herein, does not have any other feature or wording to distinguish it from the registrant’s mark.

 

Finally, as discussed subsequently herein, the services are presumed to be identical in part.  Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods and/or services of the respective parties that is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202 (TTAB 2009); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009).

 

 

Accordingly, since the marks are so similar in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression, confusion as to source is likely.

 

Relationship Between the Services

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d at 1268, 62 USPQ2d at 1005.  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration(s) has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and/or services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the registration use(s) broad wording to describe the goods and/or services and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification.

 

The registrant specifically indicates that its services include “advertising …. the goods and services of others through all public communications means.”  The applicant’s services are distributing advertising for others via an online electronic communications network.  It is presumed therefore, that the registrant’s advertising services includes  distributing advertising for others via an online electronic communications network.  The registrant identifies the fact that its services promote and market the goods and services of others.  Simply stated, the registrant is attempting to attract public attention to the goods and services of others.   This service is the definition of advertising.  See attached online dictionary definition of advertising.

The applicant may not, sua sponte, limit the scope of the registrant’s broadly identified advertising services.  The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration.  The presumption also implies that the registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all classes of purchasers of the identified goods and/or services.  In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB 1991); McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1899 (TTAB 1989); RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964-65 (TTAB 1980); see TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

 

Accordingly, since there is no overriding factor to distinguish applicant’s mark from the mark already registered, registration must be refused and made final because the average purchaser would be likely to conclude that applicant’s services and those cited in U.S. Registration No. 3695633 emanate from a common source of origin.

 

 

Applicant’s Response

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

 

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

 

 

/Andrea Koyner Nadelman/

Andrea Koyner Nadelman

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

571-272-9370

andrea.nadelman@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.uspto.gov/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.