UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 5/17/2012

 

Upon further review, new bases for refusal are issued.  The Office regrets the failure to raise these issues previously.  Please also note, the issues previously raised and reiterated most recently in the action dated April 23, 2012 are incorporated herein by reference.  Thus, the previously-issued requirements for disclaimer of “RED” and for amendment of the mark description statement are maintained and continued.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark RED and design is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark RED (in typed form) in U.S. Registration No. 3939863.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

                                                                                                      

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source.  In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b).  For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression.  See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark is RED adjacent to a plus design.  The cited mark is RED in typed form.  While the marks are not identical, they share the term RED.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, both marks contain the similar term “RED”.

 

The addition of the design element in applicant’s mark does not significantly distinguish its mark from the cited mark for which no particular design elements, font style, color or stylization are claimed.  In fact, it has been held that when a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for the goods and/or services; therefore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir 1983); In re Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd., 98 USPQ2d 1261, 1267-68 (TTAB 2011).

 

Thus, the marks are so similar in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, that there is a likelihood of confusion.  Therefore, the similarity prong of the test to determine likelihood of confusion is satisfied.

 

COMPARISON OF GOODS

                                                                  

Here, the applicant’s goods are described as follows:  “Non-alcoholic beverages namely soft drinks, energy drinks, and syrups and concentrates for making the same.”  The cited mark is registered for use in connection with the following goods:  “energy drinks and soft drinks.”  Thus, the goods are essentially identical.  Both applicant and registrant are offering energy and soft drinks under very similar marks.  It has often been found that if the goods and/or services of the respective parties are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse goods and/or services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration.  The presumption also implies that the registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all classes of purchasers of the identified goods and/or services.  In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB 1991); McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1899 (TTAB 1989); RE/MAX of Am., Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960, 964-65 (TTAB 1980); see TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

In sum, the marks are very similar and the goods are the same.  While these facts are sufficient grounds for the refusal, it is also important to note that the following applies to all likelihood of confusion analyses:  the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

                              

Conclusion

 

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney.

 

 

/tfrazier/

Tamara G. Frazier

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116

Phone: (571) 272-8256

Email: tamara.frazier@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using TEAS, to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) at http://tarr.uspto.gov/.  Please keep a copy of the complete TARR screen.  If TARR shows no change for more than six months, call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageE.htm.