Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

 

International Registration No. 1580825

 

Notice of Provisional Full Refusal

 

Deadline for responding.  The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned (see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks-application-process/abandoned-applications for information on abandonment).  To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.”  The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.” 

 

Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

Discussion of provisional full refusal.  This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a).  See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c). 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Trademark Act Section 2(d)—Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Trademark Act Section2(e)(1)—Merely Descriptive Refusal
• Identification of Goods
• Citizenship Required
• Email Address Required
• U.S. Counsel Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4912000.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark KIWI is for “Personal oral vaporizers for smokers and electronic cigarettes, and flavourings and solutions therefor; oral vaporizers for smokers; holders for electronic cigarettes; smokeless cigarette vaporizer pipes; cigarette filters; mouthpieces for cigarettes; electronic cigarette cases; electronic cigarette boxes; electronic cigarette cleaners; electronic cigarette cartomizers; cartridges for electronic cigarettes; cartridges sold filled with chemical flavorings in liquid form for electronic cigarettes; smoking sets for electronic cigarettes; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of vegetable glycerin; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of propylene glycol; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of flavorings in liquid form used to refill electronic cigarette cartridges; smokers' articles” in Class 34.

 

Registrant’s mark   KIWI GARDEN KIWI GARDEN KIWI GARDEN AL FAKHER SPECIAL EDITION AL FAKHER SPECIAL EDITION is for “Molasses tobacco, flavored tobacco, hookah parts, namely, hookah foil, hoses, bowls, and accessories, namely, hookah stems, hookah hose tips, and hookah tongs; hookahs; smokers' articles, namely, hookah charcoal, electronic cigarettes” in Class 34.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, the applied-for mark is KIWI and KIWI GARDEN KIWI GARDEN KIWI GARDEN AL FAKHER SPECIAL EDITION AL FAKHER SPECIAL EDITION. The registered mark features the entirety of the applied-for mark. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Further, although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Moreover, the design featured in the registered mark does not obviate the confusion because when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

Therefore, the marks are similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods/Services

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration(s) are identical in part, namely, electronic cigarettes.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.  

 

 

Additionally, the application use(s) broad wording to describe flavorings and smokers’ articles, which presumably encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow flavored tobacco and molasses tobacco, flavored tobacco, hookah parts, namely, hookah foil, hoses, bowls, and accessories, namely, hookah stems, hookah hose tips, and hookah tongs; hookahs; smokers' articles, namely, hookah charcoal, electronic cigarettes goods.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Further, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

In sum, given the similarity of the marks overall and the related nature of the goods, consumers encountering the marks are likely to mistake the underlying sources of the goods.

 

Thus, the applied-for mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks cited herein.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature, characteristic, purpose, or function of applicant’s goods and services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

Here, the applied-for mark is “KIWI” for “Personal oral vaporizers for smokers and electronic cigarettes, and flavourings and solutions therefor; oral vaporizers for smokers; holders for electronic cigarettes; smokeless cigarette vaporizer pipes; cigarette filters; mouthpieces for cigarettes; electronic cigarette cases; electronic cigarette boxes; electronic cigarette cleaners; electronic cigarette cartomizers; cartridges for electronic cigarettes; cartridges sold filled with chemical flavorings in liquid form for electronic cigarettes; smoking sets for electronic cigarettes; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of vegetable glycerin; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of propylene glycol; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of flavorings in liquid form used to refill electronic cigarette cartridges; smokers' articles”.

The attached evidence shows that the wording “KIWI” refers to a “kiwifruit”. See the attached dictionary definitions from AHDictionary.com.

A term that describes an ingredient of the goods is merely descriptive.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 114 USPQ2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding NOPALEA merely descriptive of dietary and nutritional supplements containing nopal juice); In re Keebler Co., 479 F.2d 1405, 178 USPQ 155 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding RICH ‘N CHIPS merely descriptive of chocolate chip cookies); In re Andes Candies Inc., 478 F.2d 1264, 178 USPQ 156 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding CREME DE MENTHE merely descriptive of candy); In re Entenmann’s, Inc., 15 USPQ2d 1750 (TTAB 1990) (holding OATNUT merely descriptive of bread containing oats and hazelnuts); Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 5 USPQ 2d 1580 (TTAB 1987) (holding HONEY WHEAT merely descriptive of bread containing honey and wheat).

Here, the wording KIWI merely describes an ingredient of applicant’s flavorings and electric cigarette liquids because they are kiwi flavored. Therefore, the applied-for mark merely describes an ingredient and flavoring of applicant’s goods.

Further, the attached Internet evidence shows kiwi is common flavoring for electronic cigarettes. Websites and webpages are generally a competent source for determining how the public perceives the mark in connection with applicant’s goods and/or services.  See In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367-68, 123 USPQ2d 1707, 1709-10 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 160, 229 USPQ 818, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); TMEP §1209.01(b).

Thus, the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods.

SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER

Applicant cannot overcome the refusal by amending the application to the Supplemental Register.  A mark in an application under Trademark Act Section 66(a) is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register.  37 C.F.R. §§2.47(c), 2.75(c); TMEP §816.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1141h(a)(4).

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “flavourings”, “mouthpiece”, “cartomizers”, “cartridges”, “smoking sets”, and “smokers' articles” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because it fails to specify the nature of the goods.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate, with proposed amendments in bold and comments in bold italics: 

 

International Class 34:            Personal oral vaporizers for smokers and electronic cigarettes, and flavourings, other than essential oils, for use in electronic cigarettes; oral vaporizers for smokers; holders for electronic cigarettes; smokeless cigarette vaporizer pipes; cigarette filters; smokers' mouthpieces for cigarettes; electronic cigarette cases; electronic cigarette boxes; electronic cigarette cleaners; electronic cigarette cartomizers, namely, combination electronic cigarette refill cartridges sold empty and atomizers, sold as a component of electronic cigarettes; refill cartridges for electronic cigarettes sold empty; cartridges sold filled with chemical flavorings in liquid form for electronic cigarettes; smoking kits for electronic cigarettes comprised of {specify contents of the kits, e.g., oral vaporizers for smoking purposes}; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of vegetable glycerin; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of propylene glycol; electronic cigarette liquid (e-liquid) comprised of flavorings in liquid form, other than essential oils, used to refill electronic cigarette cartridges; smokers' articles, namely, {specify types of articles, e.g., cigars, cigarettes, snuff, etc.}

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).  Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and/or services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and/or services transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

CITIZENSHIP REQUIRED

 

Applicant must specify its national citizenship.  37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(3)(i); TMEP §803.04.

 

EMAIL ADDRESS REQUIRED 

 

Applicant must provide applicant’s email address, which is a requirement for a complete application.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(2); TMEP §803.05(b).  This email address cannot be identical to the primary correspondence email address of a U.S.-licensed attorney retained to represent applicant in this application.  See TMEP §803.05(b). 

 

U.S. COUNSEL REQUIRED

 

Applicant is required to be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal because applicant’s domicile is located outside of the United States and applicant does not appear to be represented by a qualified U.S. attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a); TMEP §601.01(a).  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories must be represented by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a); TMEP §§601, 601.01(a).  In this case, applicant’s domicile is identified in the application as Croatia.  For more information, see the U.S. Counsel webpage at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademark/laws-regulations/trademark-rule-requires-foreign-applicants-and-registrants-have-us and Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney webpage at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks-getting-started/why-hire-private-trademark-attorney.  

 

To appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney in this application, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form at http://teas.gov.uspto.report/wna/ccr/car.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form at http://teas.gov.uspto.report/office/roa/ indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii); TMEP §604.01.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Michelle Ribaudo/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 126

(571) 270-3962

michelle.ribaudo@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.