Offc Action Outgoing

Deadline for responding. The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned. To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.” The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”

Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

Discussion of provisional full refusal. This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a). See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c).

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

Likelihood of Confusion

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 2382929. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).

In the present case, applicant’s mark is REDLINE (stylized) and registrant’s mark is REDLINE. The literal elements of the marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

In this case, applicant’s good are “[b]uilding materials (not of metal), especially for bridging gaps in structural and civil engineering; building materials (non-metallic), namely expansion joints and shaped pieces mainly of asphalt, pitch and bitumen; roof-covering materials (not of metal); building materials (non-metallic), namely containers of stone, artificial stone, stoneware or cement, included in this class.”

Registrant’s goods are “rubberized construction materials for waterproofing expansion joints in the nature of a continuous rubber roll with polyester fleece embedded on both edges.”

In this case, both applicant offers expansion joints and registrant offers materials for waterproofing expansion joints. Consequently, they are complimentary goods. Further, all of the good are building materials.

Given the nearly identical nature of the marks and the closely related nature of the goods, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods. Consequently, registration is refused under Section 2(d).

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

Description of the Mark

Applicant must submit a description of the mark, because one was not included in the application. 37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02. Applications for marks not in standard characters must include an accurate and concise description of the entire mark that identifies all the literal and design elements. See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808.01, 808.02, 808.03(b). In this case, the drawing of the mark is not in standard characters.

The following description is suggested, if accurate: The mark consists of the wording REDLINE appearing in white on a red background.

Identification of Goods

The identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because all goods are not identified with the requisite clarity and specificity. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. All goods should be identified with specificity by common commercial name.

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

Building materials not of metal for bridging gaps in buildings, bridges, superstructures, and roads, namely,{specify any and all goods individually with specificity, e.g. expansion joints}; non-metallic building materials, namely, expansion joints made of asphalt, pitch and bitumen for {indicate use, e.g. for bridging gaps in buildings, bridges, superstructures, and roads}; roof-covering materials not of metal; non-metallic building materials, namely, Containment systems for large scale liquid spills or releases, namely, berms made of cement or artificial stone.

To the extent the suggested identification is incomplete or inaccurate, the applicant is further advised that the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual is available for assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services. See TMEP §1402.04. It is noted that non-metal “containers” for commercial or industrial purposes are generally classified in class 20 and not in class 19. The examining attorney has suggested goods within class 19 that would be considered in the nature of containers and are within the scope of the goods identified.

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted. See TMEP §1402.07(e). Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and/or services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau. 37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b). Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and/or services transferred from one existing class to another. 37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal. An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory. 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form. The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any. Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.

/alrademacher/

April L. Rademacher

Examining Attorney

USPTO

Law Office 108

571-270-3353

april.rademacher@uspto.gov

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon. A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period. TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.

Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon. If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant. If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

Offc Action Outgoing

REDLINE

Schoop + Co. AG

Offc Action Outgoing

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