Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

International Registration No. 1490305

 

 

Notice of Provisional Full Refusal

 

Deadline for responding.  The USPTO must receive applicant’s response within six months of the “date on which the notification was sent to WIPO (mailing date)” located on the WIPO cover letter, or the U.S. application will be abandoned.  To confirm the mailing date, go to the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database, select “US Serial, Registration, or Reference No.,” enter the U.S. application serial number in the blank text box, and click on “Documents.”  The mailing date used to calculate the response deadline is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.” 

 

Respond to this Office action using the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

 

Discussion of provisional full refusal.  This is a provisional full refusal of the request for extension of protection to the United States of the international registration, known in the United States as a U.S. application based on Trademark Act Section 66(a).  See 15 U.S.C. §§1141f(a), 1141h(c). 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Identification of Goods
• U.S. Counsel Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4442799.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Here, applicant seeks registration of VITALFORCE in connection with “Massage apparatus, physical rehabilitation apparatus for medical use.”

 

The mark in the cited registration is VITAL FORCE, which is registered in connection with “Crystals used for therapeutic balance and wellness.”

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

In this case, the compared marks are identical except for a slight difference in appearance between applicant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, VITALFORCE; and registrant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, VITAL FORCE.  As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). 

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark makes a highly similar overall commercial impression to the mark in the cited registration.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screen shots from Nature’s Treasure’s, Crystal Age, and Rock On Mineral & Design establishes that crystals for wellness are often used as massage apparatus.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Thus, upon encountering applicant’s and registrant’s marks, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods emanate from a common source.  Accordingly, applicant’s mark must be refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

Applicant must correct the punctuation in the identification to clarify the individual items in the list of goods and/or services.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01(a).  Proper punctuation in identifications is necessary to delineate explicitly each product or service within a list and to avoid ambiguity.  Commas, semicolons, and apostrophes are the only punctuation that should be used in an identification of goods and/or services.  TMEP §1402.01(a).  An applicant should not use colons, periods, exclamation points, and question marks in an identification.  Id.  In addition, applicants should not use symbols in the identification such as asterisks (*), at symbols (@), or carets.  Id.

 

In general, commas should be used in an identification (1) to separate a series of related items identified within a particular category of goods or services, (2) before and after “namely,” and (3) between each item in a list of goods or services following “namely” (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion, bar soap, shampoo).  Id.  Semicolons generally should be used to separate a series of distinct categories of goods or services within an international class (e.g., personal care products, namely, body lotion; deodorizers for pets; glass cleaners).  Id. 

 

In addition, the wording “physical rehabilitation apparatus for medical use” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified to indicate the specific nature or type of apparatus.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant must amend this wording to specify the common commercial or generic name of the goods.  See TMEP §1402.01.  If the goods have no common commercial or generic name, applicant must describe the product, its main purpose, and its intended uses.  See id.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate (changes in bold): 

 

Class 10: Massage apparatus; physical rehabilitation apparatus for medical use, namely, {indicate specific apparatus e.g., force and motion testing apparatus for physical rehabilitation}

 

An applicant may only amend an identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to add to or broaden the scope of the goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §1904.02(c)(iv).  In an application filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau).  37 C.F.R. §2.85(f); TMEP §§1402.07(a), 1904.02(c).  If an applicant amends an identification to a class other than that assigned by the International Bureau, the amendment will not be accepted because it will exceed the scope and those goods and/or services will no longer have a basis for registration under U.S. law.  TMEP §§1402.01(c), 1904.02(c).

 

In addition, in a Section 66(a) application, an applicant may not change the classification of goods and/or services from that assigned by the International Bureau in the corresponding international registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1402.01(c).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, an applicant may not transfer goods and/or services from one existing international class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1402.01(c). 

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

U.S. COUNSEL REQUIRED

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO to respond to or appeal the provisional refusal.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019).  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

Michael Eisnach

/Michael Eisnach/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

(571) 272-2592

michael.eisnach@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.