Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1444386

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.

 

In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.”  The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”

 

This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c).  See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – Likelihood of Confusion – With Respect to “Computer software” ONLY

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4913450.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

The examining attorney has determined that contemporaneous use of the marks VENN (for use on “Computer application software containing and for playing puzzles) and VENN, (for use on “Computer software”) would be likely to cause confusion for the following reasons.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01.  However, not all the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

A.  The Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).

The word portions of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; therefore, the addition of a design element does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

B.  The Goods

The applicant’s “Computer software” is closely related to, if not the same as, the registrant’s “Computer application software containing and for playing puzzles” for the following reasons.

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its software, which presumably encompasses all types of computer software, including the registrant’s more narrow “Computer application software containing and for playing puzzles.”  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

Furthermore, the compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

And, finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

C.  Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the applicant’s VENN is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 The stated refusal refers to the following goods and/or services and does not bar registration for the other goods and/or services:  “Computer software.”

Applicant may respond to the stated refusal by submitting evidence and arguments against the refusal.  In addition, applicant may respond by doing one of the following:

(1)  Deleting the goods and/or services to which the refusal pertains;

(2)  Filing a request to divide out the goods and/or services that have not been refused registration, so that the mark may proceed toward publication for registration for those goods or services to which the refusal does not pertain.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.87.  See generally TMEP §§1110 et seq. (regarding the requirements for filing a request to divide).  If applicant files a request to divide, then to avoid abandonment, applicant must also file a timely response to all outstanding issues in this Office action, including the refusal.  37 C.F.R. §2.87(e).; or

(3)  Amending the basis for the goods and/or services identified in the refusal, if appropriate.  TMEP §806.03(h).  (The basis cannot be changed for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a).  TMEP §1904.01(a).)

EARLIER-FILED APPLICATIONS

The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87193399, 87847784 and 88017777 precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

INFORMALITIES

If applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

Identification of Goods/Services

The identification of goods and services is indefinite and must be clarified because it fails to specify the applicant’s goods and services as indicated below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

The following substitute wording [IN CAPS] is suggested, if appropriate: 

1.      Class 9- COMPUTER SOFTWARE FOR {SPECIFY THE FUNCTION OF THE SOFTWARE, E.G., USE AS A SPREADSHEET, WORD PROCESSING, ETC. AND, IF SOFTWARE IS CONTENT- OR FIELD-SPECIFIC, THE CONTENT OR FIELD OF USE}; computer software applications, downloadable, FOR {SPECIFY ITEMS, E.G., MOBILE PHONES, PORTABLE MEDIA PLAYERS, HANDHELD COMPUTERS}, NAMELY, SOFTWARE FOR {SPECIFY THE FUNCTION OF THE PROGRAMS, E.G., USE IN DATABASE MANAGEMENT, USE IN ELECTRONIC STORAGE OF DATA, ETC.} in the field of communal housing

With respect to computer software and software applications in Class 9, purpose or function of the software must be specified.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.03(d).  If the software is content- or field-specific, applicant must also specify its content or field of use.  See TMEP §1402.03(d).  The USPTO requires such specificity in identifying computer software in order for a trademark examining attorney to examine the application properly and make appropriate decisions concerning possible conflicts between the applicant’s mark and other marks.  See In re N.A.D. Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000); TMEP §1402.03(d).

The international classification of goods in applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a) cannot be changed from the classification the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization assigned to the goods in the corresponding international registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).  Therefore, although software may be classified in international classes other than International Class 9 (i.e., International Classes 41 and 42), any modification to the identification must identify goods in International Class 9 only, the class specified in the application for such goods.  See TMEP §1904.02(c)(ii).

2.      Class 36-Financial management; financial consultancy; providing financial information via a web site; real estate management; apartment house management; management of residential complexes NAMELY MANAGEMENT OF BUILDINGS; providing operational services for residential complexes NAMELY {SPECIFY SERVICES}; real estate agency services; rental of real estate; rental of apartments; accommodation bureau services NAMELY {SPECIFY SERVICES}; rental of offices; rental of spaces for exhibitions and educational and cultural activities NAMELY {SPECIFY SERVICES}

 

3.      Class 41-EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, NAMELY, Organizing and conducting workshops, conferences and lectures IN THE FIELD OF {INDICATE SPECIFIC FIELD, E.G., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, ETC.} AND DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH; organizing exhibitions IN THE FIELD OF {SPECIFY FIELD, E.G., FILM, ARCHITECTURE, ETC.} for educational and cultural purposes; organizing and conducting personal educational sessions NAMELY EDUCATION SERVICES, NAMELY, PROVIDING TUTORING IN THE FIELD OF {INDICATE SUBJECT MATTER}

Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably narrowed.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §§1402.06, 1904.02(c)(iv).  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably narrowed.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).  Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods and/or services may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods and/or services transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

Significance

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must provide the following information:

(1)  Explain whether the wording in the mark “VENN” has any meaning or significance in the industry in which the goods and/or services are manufactured/provided, any meaning or significance as applied to applicant’s goods and/or services, or if such wording is a term of art within applicant’s industry. 

(2)  Explain whether this wording identifies a geographic place or has any meaning in a foreign language. 

(3)  Submit an English translation of all foreign wording in a mark and a transliteration (the phonetic spelling of the pronunciation, in Latin characters) of all non-Latin characters in a mark.  If the wording does not have meaning in a foreign language, applicant should so specify.   

The format for an English translation and transliteration:  “The English translation of “VENN” is “(provide translation)”. 

The format for when there is no English translation or meaning of the transliteration:  “The wording “VENN” has no meaning in a foreign language. 

(4)  Respond to the following question:

What is the meaning of “VENN?”

See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(9)-(a)(10), 2.61(b); TMEP §§809-809.03, 814. 

Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.

Entity

The application identifies applicant as a “private company,” which is not acceptable as an entity designation in the United States because there is no clear U.S. equivalent legal entity and the entity designation does not appear in Appendix D of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure.  See TMEP §803.03(i).  Applicant must indicate the U.S. equivalent of its legal entity or provide a description of the nature of the foreign entity.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(3), 2.61(b); TMEP §803.03(i).

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL:  Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01.  If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01.  Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.  The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).

 

In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal).  See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01. 

 

DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE:  The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served.  TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2).  Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp. 

 

 

 

 

/C. Dionne Clyburn/

C. Dionne Clyburn

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

571-272-9358

dionne.clyburn@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.