UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 79248708
MARK: DIBI
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: Beijing Kaicheng Hu; Intellectual Proper Room 903, Building 4, Bo Pu Gong She, |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Guangzhou Dibi Leather Co., Ltd.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1442253
STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION: TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.
In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.” The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”
This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application. See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c). See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.
WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL: Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner). 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01. If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response. 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01. Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01. Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02. The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing. 37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).
In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal). See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01.
DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE: The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served. TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2). Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
INTRODUCTION
PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION NOTED
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5617723. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant seeks to register the mark DIBI and design for “Handbags; pocket wallets; umbrellas; valises; walking sticks; bags for sports; school bags; backpacks; clothing for pets; animal skins.”
Registrant has registered the mark DIBI DIBI for, inter alia, “Apparel, namely, shirts.”
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Although not identical, the marks at issue are highly similar. The literal element of applicant’s mark is DIBI and the registered mark is DIBI DIBI. Applicant has essentially adopted the identical term that is repeated in registrant’s mark.
The addition of a design element to applicant’s mark does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Comparison of the Goods and/or Services
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Here, the goods are closely related.
The attached Internet evidence consists of web pages from www.michaelkors.com, www.gucci.com and www.betseyjohnson.com showing the same mark used on clothing and accessories such as wallets, backpacks, and bags. This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007).
Conclusion
Because the marks are highly similar and the goods are closely related, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of applicant’s goods. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDING
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.
TRANSLATION
“The English translation of “DIBI” is “[INDICATE English meaning]”.
TMEP §809.03.
Alternatively, if the wording has no meaning in a foreign language, applicant should provide the following statement:
“The wording “DIBI” has no meaning in a foreign language.”
Id.
MARK DESCRIPTION
The following description is suggested, if accurate:
“The mark consists of the wording DIBI below a highly stylized representation of the lowercase letters “DB” comprising two incomplete intersecting circles crossing below a vertical oblong with extending bands on both sides.”
TRADEMARK LAWYER SUGGESTED
For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help or an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®. The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.
Please note that foreign attorneys, other than duly authorized Canadian attorneys, are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c), (e); TMEP §602.03-.03(c).
The only attorneys who may practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are (1) attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths/territories; and (2) duly authorized Canadian agents/attorneys. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(a), (c); TMEP §602.
CLOSING
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.
/Tracy L. Fletcher/
Trademark Attorney, Law Office 115
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Direct Dial: (571) 272-9471
tracy.fletcher@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.