United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 79245712
Mark: ORCHID
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: BLACK HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
International Registration No. 1435017
On May 3, 2019, action on this application was suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87389247 and 87646904. Upon further review, the potential refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on U.S. Application Serial No. 87646904 has been withdrawn.
However, inasmuch as the mark associated with U.S. Application Serial No. 87389247 has since registered, registration is now refused as follows.
Refusal - Likelihood of Confusion
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5911534. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
A. Comparison of Goods
Applicant’s “wireless electronic transmitter and receiver system comprised of telecommunications transmitters and receivers, sold as a unit, for determining and tracking the geographic location of persons, animals, personal property, vehicles, machinery and other assets”, “tracking and location devices, namely, telecommunications transmitters, wireless transmitters and receivers, receivers of electronic signals, global positioning system [GPS] receivers and global system for mobile communications [GSM] receivers” and “electronic navigational and positioning apparatus and instruments” are identical and closely related to the registrant’s “mobile telephones”, “digital cameras”, “portable media players”, “portable computers”, “wireless headsets for mobile phones, smart phones and tablet computers”, “rechargeable batteries”, “battery chargers”, “tablet computers”, “television receivers”, “televisions”, “audio electronic components, namely, surround sound systems”, “digital set-top boxes”, “DVD players”, “monitors, namely, computer, television, video, and touchscreen monitors”, “computers”, “printers for computers” and “semiconductors” because they are electronic navigational and positioning apparatus and instruments, including mobile telephones, computers and digital cameras, electronic, telecommunication and wireless transmitters and receivers and devices featuring the same likely to travel through the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. For example, the goods are likely to be sold together in retail electronic and telecommunication supply stores and advertised together in electronic and telecommunication supply catalogs, directories and trade publications.
Furthermore, with respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-70, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade and are available to the same class of purchasers.
Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described including (1) mobile telephones, digital cameras, portable computers, tablet computers and computers all being electronic navigational and positioning apparatus and instruments, (2) mobile telephones, portable computers, tablet computers and computers for determining and tracking the geographic location of persons, animals, personal property, vehicles, machinery and other assets, (3) mobile telephones, digital cameras, portable computers, tablet computers and computers all featuring electronic, telecommunication and wireless transmitters and receivers and (4) wireless headsets for mobile phones, smart phones and tablet computers used for determining and tracking the geographic location of persons, animals, personal property, vehicles, machinery and other assets, which are identical and undeniably commercially-related to the applicant’s goods.
Similarly, the application uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described including (1) electronic navigational and positioning apparatus and instruments in the nature of mobile telephones, digital cameras, portable computers, tablet computers and computers and (2) tracking and location devices, namely, telecommunications transmitters, wireless transmitters and receivers, receivers of electronic signals, global positioning system [GPS] receivers and global system for mobile communications [GSM] receivers all for and/or embedded in mobile telephones, digital cameras, portable computers, tablet computers and computers, which are identical and closely related to the registrant’s goods.
Notwithstanding the overlapping goods of the parties, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of twenty-five third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely, telecommunications transmitters/receivers and computers, mobile phones, digital cameras and/or headsets for use therewith, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
B. Comparison of Marks
Applicant’s mark ORCHID is highly similar to the registered mark ORCHID GRAY in sound, appearance and commercial impression.
In particular, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.
In the present case, the word “ORCHID” in the registered mark is identical to the word “ORCHID” in the applied-for mark. This word also comprises the dominant portion of the registered mark as consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix or syllable in any trademark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Mattel Inc. v. Funline Merch. Co., 81 USPQ2d 1372, 1374-75 (TTAB 2006); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).
Moreover, the word “ORCHID” is the dominant portion of the registered mark as the word “GRAY” is descriptive in relation to the goods associated with the mark. In this regard, although marks are compared in their entireties, disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). As such, the respective marks create similar overall commercial impressions.
Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Furthermore, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, consumers will undoubtedly retain a similar recollection of the marks, namely, ORCHID and ORCHID GRAY electronic navigational and positioning apparatus and instruments, electronic, telecommunication and wireless transmitters and receivers and devices featuring the same.
What’s more, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Based on the foregoing remarks, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.
U.S-Licensed Attorney Required
Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney. An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory. 37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities. 37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
To appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form. The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any. Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).
Response Guidelines
For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements. For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02. Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.
When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).
Advisory Regarding E-mail Communications
If applicant’s attorney has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
Miscellaneous
If applicant’s attorney has questions about this application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/David Yontef/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 118
(571) 272-8274
david.yontef@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE