UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 79225054
MARK: MARLIN
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Private Joint Stock Company; "ALEF-VINAL ETC.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1384882
STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION: TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.
In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.” The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”
This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application. See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c). See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.
INTRODUCTION
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Potential Section 2(d) Refusal – prior filed application
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Although the applicant is not required to respond to the issue of the prior pending application, the applicant must respond to the below refusal/requirement within six months of the mailing date of this Office action to avoid abandonment
Section 2(d) Refusals – likelihood of confusion
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos 3825480, 4489168, 4860349, and 4924434. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Here the applicant’s mark is:
MARLIN for Rice alcohol; alcoholic beverages, except beer; alcoholic essences; alcoholic extracts; anise liqueur; anisette liqueur; aperitifs; arak arrack; alcoholic beverages containing fruit; distilled beverages; bitters; brandy; cider; cocktails; curacao; digesters liqueurs and spirits; distilled beverages; fruit extracts, alcoholic; gin; hydromel mead; kirsch; liqueurs; mead hydromel; peppermint liqueurs; perry; piquette; rice alcohol; rum; sake; spirits beverages; vodka; whisky; wine
The registrants’ marks are:
Reg. No. |
MARK |
OWNER |
RELEVANT GOODS AND/OR SERVICES |
CLASS |
3825480 |
THE GRAND MARLIN |
THE GRAND MARLIN RESTUARANT GROUP |
Prepared alcoholic cocktails |
33 |
4489168 |
WHITE MARLIN |
SAZERAC BRANDS |
Tequila |
33 |
4860349 |
THE GIGGLING MARLIN (+des) |
GIGGLING MARLIN |
Tequila |
33 |
4924434 |
BLUE MARLIN |
Southern Latitude Distilling |
Distilled Spirits; Rum; Vodka |
33 |
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
In this case the following factors are most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the applicant's standard character mark MARLIN is confusingly similar to the registrants' marks THE GRAND MARLIN, WHITE MARLIN, THE GIGGLING MARLIN, and BLUE MARLIN.
Registration 4860349 also contains a design. However, this addition is insufficient to obviate the similarities between the marks. Specifically, the design is not so distinctive that consumers are likely to call for the goods by referencing it, nor does the design otherwise alter the commercial impression that the mark conveys. For a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the goods and/or services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods and/or services. Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Thus, the wording THE GIGGLING MARLIN remains the dominant element of the mark.
Further, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant's goods and services sold under the “MARLIN” mark constitute a new or additional product line from the same source as the goods and services sold under the “THE GRAND MARLIN,” “WHITE MARLIN,” “THE GIGGLING MARLIN,” and “BLUE MARLIN” marks with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s mark is merely a variation of the registrant’s mark. See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).
For these reasons, when consumers encounter the respective marks they are likely to be confused or mistaken as to whether the marks originate from the same source. Therefore the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
Here, the applicant's various alcoholic beverages are closely related to the registrants’ “Prepared alcoholic cocktails, tequila, and distilled spirits, rum, and vodka.” In fact, applicant’s goods are identical to those of registrants with respect to rum, vodka, and distilled spirits. Applicant’s “alcoholic beverages except beer” and “cocktails” also encompasses registrants’ “tequila” and “prepared alcoholic cocktails.” See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000). Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Even if not identical or encompassing, the goods are highly related. The attached Internet evidence, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
The undersigned attorney also has attached evidence from the Office's database of marks consisting of nine third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of the applicant and registrants. See U.S. Registration Nos 5320566, 5330792, 5137375, 5137371, 5149731, 5073006, 5116260, 5106589, and 5018928. This evidence further shows that the goods identified therein are of a kind that may emanate from the same source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
Collectively, this evidence demonstrates that the parties' goods are similar in nature and/or regularly travel in the same trade channels under the same mark. For these reasons, consumers are likely to mistakenly conclude that the goods emanate from the same source. Therefore, the goods are closely related.
Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are closely related, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Response to Refusals
Although the applicant's mark has been refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and offering argument against the refusals and in support of registration.
REQUIREMENT
If the applicant responds to the refusal, then the applicant also must respond to the below requirement.
Amended identification of goods required
Portions of the wording in the identification of goods must be clarified because they contain indefinite language. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. For example, applicant must clarify the alcoholic nature of the bitters, and the nature of the cider.
Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate (additions in bold, deletions crossed-out, explanations in italics):
Rice alcohol; alcoholic beverages, except beer; alcoholic essences; alcoholic extracts; anise as liqueur; anisette as liqueur; aperitifs; arak arrack; alcoholic beverages containing fruit; distilled beverages, namely, distilled spirits; alcoholic bitters;
brandy; dry cider; prepared alcoholic cocktails; curacao; digesters alcoholic beverages, namely,
digestifs, liqueurs and spirits; distilled beverages; fruit extracts, alcoholic; gin; hydromel as mead; kirsch; liqueurs; mead being hydromel;
peppermint liqueurs; perry; piquette; rice alcohol; rum; sake; spirits as beverages; vodka; whisky; wine
Scope Advisory—limited ability to amend identifications
Assistance with amending identifications
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal, and should consider those options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements. For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the date on which the USPTO sends this Office action to the International Bureau, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§711, 718.01, 718.02.
When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).
WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL: Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner). 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01. If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response. 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01. Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01. Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02. The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing. 37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).
In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal). See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01.
DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE: The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served. TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2). Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
Turner, Jessica (Lauren)
/J Lauren Turner/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 123
(571) 272-9890
Jessica.Turner1@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.