Offc Action Outgoing

LAUNCH

Launch Tech Co., Ltd.

Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO.  79199292

 

MARK: LAUNCH

 

 

        

*79199292*

CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

       Guangdong Scihead H; Trademark Agent Co.

       Unit 1508,

       Huaxu Commercial & Trade Building,

       510070 Guangdong

       CHINA

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

 

 

APPLICANT: Launch Tech Co., Ltd.

 

 

 

CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

       N/A

CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

       

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

 

INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1325964

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.

 

In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.”  The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”

 

This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c).  See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

  • SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
  • MARK DESCRIPTION REQUIRES AMENDMENT
  • IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4566378 and 5019692.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark is “LAUNCH” in stylized form for “electrostatic coating machines” and “air compressors for inflating tires.”

 

Reg. No. 4566378 is for “LAUNCH AMAZING” in standard character form for “electric compressors.”

 

Reg. No. 5019692 is for “LAUNCH” in stylized form for “coating machines for applying chemical coatings to commercial products and packaging.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see TMEP §1207.01.  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Turning to the first prong of the test, a comparison must be made between the applied-for mark “LAUNCH” in stylized form and Reg. No. 4566378 for “LAUNCH AMAZING” in standard character form and Reg. No. 5019692 for “LAUNCH” in stylized form.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d at 1960 (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

For a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to indicate the origin of the goods because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the goods.  Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Similarly, the stylization of the applied-for mark and Reg. No. 5019692 does not distinguish the marks for purposes of a likelihood of confusion. The identical wording “LAUNCH” is the dominant portion of the marks.

 

Additionally, a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Therefore, the stylization of the applied-for mark does not distinguish the mark from Reg. No. 4566378, which is in standard character form.

 

In the present case, the wording, “LAUNCH”, in the applied-for mark and Reg. No. 5019692 is identical and is also the first word of Reg. No. 4566378 “LAUNCH AMAZING”. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, ___ USPQ2d ___, ___, Ser. No. 86140341, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 470, at *30-31 (Sept. 27, 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

 

The use of the word “LAUNCH” in the applied-for and registered marks creates a similar overall commercial impression. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Moreover, the applied-for mark “LAUNCH” is entirely incorporated in Reg. No. 4566378 “LAUNCH AMAZING”. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, ___ USPQ2d ___, ___, Ser. No. 86140341, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 470, at *29-30 (Sept. 27, 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar in their entireties when giving each feature of the marks their appropriate weight.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Applicant’s mark is for “electrostatic coating machines” and “air compressors for inflating tires.”

 

Reg. No. 4566378 is for “electric compressors.”

 

Reg. No. 5019692 is for “coating machines for applying chemical coatings to commercial products and packaging.”

 

Notably, both applicant and registrant for Reg. No. 4566378 offer compressors and applicant and registrant for Reg. No. 5019692 offer coating machines.

 

The attached Internet evidence consists of third-party retailers.  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces/provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

 

Accordingly, with the contemporaneous use of sufficiently similar marks, consumers are likely to conclude that the goods are related and originate from a single source. As such, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

 

 

MARK DESCRIPTION REQUIRES AMENDMENT

 

The drawing in the Section 66(a) application shows the mark in what appears to be standard characters (i.e., text only with no particular font style, size, or color being claimed).  However, no explicit claim to standard characters has been made in the application.  A mark registered in standard characters would provide protection of a text mark in any lettering style, size, and color.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §807.03(a).  Because the application does not include a standard character claim, the USPTO will treat the mark drawing in the Section 66(a) application as a special form drawing, and any registration issuing from this application will be limited to the particular appearance and text style shown in the drawing.  See TMEP §§807.03(h), 807.04 et seq.

 

A mark in the international registration and corresponding U.S. application may meet the USPTO’s requirements for a standard character drawing even though no claim to standard characters was included in the application.  TMEP §807.03(h).  The absence of a standard character claim could be due to the differences in requirements for such claims in different countries. 

 

Thus, if applicant seeks to register the mark in standard characters in the United States, applicant must submit the following two statements:

 

(1) “Under the laws of the country of the basic application and/or registration, the basic application and/or registration includes, and thus the international registration includes, the legal equivalent of a standard character claim. 

 

(2) “The mark consists of standard characters without claim to any particular font style, size, or color.” 

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §807.03(a), (h).  

 

If applicant does not provide these two statements, the USPTO will consider the mark drawing to be in special form.  See TMEP §807.03(h).

 

Therefore, because the mark is considered to be in special form, applicant must provide a mark description. Applications for marks not in standard characters must include an accurate and concise description of the entire mark that identifies literal elements as well as any design elements.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808.01, 808.02, 808.03(b). 

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a description of the applied-for mark.  The following is suggested:

 

The mark consists of the wording “LAUNCH” in stylized form.

 

 

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “tyre removing and installing machines” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because applicant must specify the nature of the goods. For example, applicant must indicate whether the machines are powered tire changer machines for land vehicles.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.

 

The wording “transmission fluid changing machines” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because applicant must specify the nature of the goods, specifically, whether the machines are powered machines for land vehicles. See id.

 

In the identification of goods, applicant must use the common commercial or generic names for the goods, be as complete and specific as possible, and avoid the use of indefinite words and phrases.  TMEP §1402.03(a); see 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6).  If applicant uses indefinite words such as “accessories,” “apparatus,” “components,” “devices,” “equipment,” “materials,” “parts,” “systems,” or “products,” such wording must be followed by “namely,” and a list of each specific product identified by its common commercial or generic name.  See TMEP §§1401.05(d), 1402.03(a). Therefore, applicant must specify the nature of the “lifting apparatus” in the identification of goods.

 

In an application filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), an applicant may not change the classification of goods from that assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau) in the corresponding international registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Therefore, any modification to this wording must identify goods in International Class 007, the classification assigned by the International Bureau for these goods.

 

The following substitute wording is suggested, if accurate: 

 

International Class 007: Spray guns for paint; paint-spraying machines; electrostatic coating machines; car washing installation; fuel system cleaning machine; fuel nozzle cleaning machines; tyre removing and installing machines, powered tire changer machines for land vehicles; air compressors for inflating tires; disc brakes for machines; refrigerant recovery pumps; powered transmission fluid changing machines for land vehicles; hoist; lifting apparatus, namely, car lifts

 

Applicant’s goods may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably narrowed.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §§1402.06, 1904.02(c)(iv).  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods or add goods not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably narrowed.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods will further limit scope, and once goods are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).  Additionally, for applications filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments is limited by the international class assigned by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (International Bureau); and the classification of goods may not be changed from that assigned by the International Bureau.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §§1401.03(d), 1904.02(b).  Further, in a multiple-class Section 66(a) application, classes may not be added or goods transferred from one existing class to another.  37 C.F.R. §2.85(d); TMEP §1401.03(d).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.  All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.  Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice.  Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help, an attorney referral service of a state or local bar association, or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11.

 

In addition, foreign attorneys, other than authorized Canadian attorneys, are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal).  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c), (e); TMEP §602.03-.03(c). 

 

The only attorneys who may practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are as follows:

 

(1)       Attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories; and

 

(2)       Canadian agents/attorneys who represent applicants located in Canada and (a) are registered with the USPTO and in good standing as patent agents or (b) have been granted reciprocal recognition by the USPTO.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), (e), 11.1, 11.14(a), (c); TMEP §602.

 

 

 

WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL:  Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01.  If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01.  Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.  The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).

 

In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal).  See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01. 

 

DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE:  The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served.  TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2).  Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp. 

 

 

 

 

/Tricia L. Brown/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 270-7892

tricia.brown@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

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