UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1176100

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.

 

In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.”  The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”

 

This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c).  See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

Refusal to Register-Likelihood of Confusion

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3756681.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services.  In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 (TTAB 2015) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see TMEP §1207.01.  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

Similarity of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applicant’s mark is MAXIMUM.  The registrant’s mark is MAXIMO; the English translation of MAXIMO is MAXIMUM.  Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a mark in a foreign language and a mark that is its English equivalent may be held to be confusingly similar.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi); see, e.g., In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1127-28 (TTAB 2015); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1025 (TTAB 2006).  Therefore, marks comprised of foreign words are translated into English to determine similarity in meaning and connotation with English word marks.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Equivalence in meaning and connotation can be sufficient to find such marks confusingly similar.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d at 1127-28; In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1025.

 

The doctrine is applicable when it is likely that an ordinary American purchaser would “stop and translate” the foreign term into its English equivalent.  Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1377, 73 USPQ2d at 1696; TMEP §1207.01(b)(vi)(A).  The ordinary American purchaser refers to “all American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to translate words into English.”  In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1352, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1024 (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §23:26 (4th ed. 2006), which states “[t]he test is whether, to those American buyers familiar with the foreign language, the word would denote its English equivalent.”).

 

Generally, the doctrine is applied when the English translation is a literal and exact translation of the foreign wording.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d at 1127-28 (holding MARAZUL for imitation crab meat and frozen and fresh processed fish and seafood likely to be confused with BLUE SEA for non-live and frozen fish, where “mar azul” is the Spanish equivalent of the English word “blue sea”); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d at 1021 (holding MARCHE NOIR for jewelry likely to be confused with the cited mark BLACK MARKET MINERALS for retail jewelry and mineral store services where evidence showed that MARCHE NOIR is the exact French equivalent of the English idiom “Black Market,” and the addition of MINERALS did not serve to distinguish the marks); In re Ithaca Indus., Inc., 230 USPQ 702 (TTAB 1986) (holding LUPO for men’s and boys’ underwear likely to be confused with the cited registration for WOLF and design for various clothing items, where LUPO is the Italian equivalent of the English word “wolf”).

 

In this case, the English translation of the foreign term MAXIMO is identical to the applicant’s mark.  Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar because they have the same meaning and commercial impression.

 

Similarity of the Goods

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods as stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods ces are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods (wines) and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in the applicant’s more narrow identification (sparkling wines).

 

In view of the similarity of the marks and the goods, confusion is likely to occur.

 

 

 

 

 

 

WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL:  Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01.  If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths or U.S. territories.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01.  Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.  The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).

 

In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal).  See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01. 

 

DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE:  The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served.  TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2).  Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp. 

 

 

 

 

/Patty Evanko/

Patty Evanko

Examining Attorney

Law Office 119

571-272-9404

patty.evanko@uspto.gov (informal questions only)

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.