Offc Action Outgoing

MAXIMUM

Ferrari F.lli Lunelli S.p.A.

Offc Action Outgoing

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

    U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO.           79136349

 

    MARK: MAXIMUM

 

 

        

*79136349*

    CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

          PERANI & PARTNERS S.P.A.

          Piazza San Babila, 5

          I-20122 MILANO (MI)

          ITALY

          

 

CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:

http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp

 

 

 

    APPLICANT: Ferrari F.lli Lunelli S.p.A.

 

 

 

    CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:  

          N/A

    CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: 

          

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

 

INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1176100

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTIFICATION:  TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL NOTIFICATION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE “DATE ON WHICH THE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO WIPO (MAILING DATE)” LOCATED ON THE WIPO COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTIFICATION.

 

In addition to the Mailing Date appearing on the WIPO cover letter, a holder (hereafter “applicant”) may confirm this Mailing Date using the USPTO’s Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  To do so, enter the U.S. application serial number for this application and then select “Documents.”  The Mailing Date used to calculate the response deadline for this provisional full refusal is the “Create/Mail Date” of the “IB-1rst Refusal Note.”

 

This is a PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL of the request for extension of protection of the mark in the above-referenced U.S. application.  See 15 U.S.C. §1141h(c).  See below in this notification (hereafter “Office action”) for details regarding the provisional full refusal.

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

  • Section 2(d) Refusal- Likelihood of Confusion

 

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3373780.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registration.

 

Applicant’s mark is MAXIMUM for alcoholic beverages (except beers).

 

Registrant’s mark is MAXIMUM DEL NORTE for wines.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

The respective marks are similar.  Both marks contain the wording “MAXIMUM.”  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Applicant has merely deleted the wording  “DEL NORTE”  from its mark the mere deletion of wording from a registered mark may not be sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  Applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression because it contains the same common wording as registrant’s mark, and there is no other wording to distinguish it from registrant’s mark.

 

The average purchaser’s recollection of the wording  “MAXIMUM”  in the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source.  When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in their entireties that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Edom Labs., Inc. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Thus the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Similarity of the Goods

 

Applicant’s goods are alcoholic beverages (except beers).  Registrant’s goods are wines.   The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-70, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). 

 

In this case, the identification set forth in the application and registration has no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described, including those in registrant’s more narrow identification.  Accordingly, applicant’s alcoholic beverages (except beers) could encompass registrant’s wines.

 

In total, all of the marks are similar and create the same commercial impression and the goods are commercially related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers.  Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods originate from a common source.  Therefore, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02.  Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  There is a $100 fee for such petitions.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. 

 

 

 

 

WHO IS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THIS PROVISIONAL FULL REFUSAL:  Any response to this provisional refusal must be personally signed by an individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §712.01.  If applicant hires a qualified U.S. attorney to respond on his or her behalf, then the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(2)(i), 11.18(a); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  Qualified U.S. attorneys include those in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions of the United States.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 2.62(b), 11.1, 11.14(a); TMEP §§602, 712.01.  Additionally, for all responses, the proper signatory must personally sign the document or personally enter his or her electronic signature on the electronic filing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(a); TMEP §§611.01(b), 611.02.  The name of the signatory must also be printed or typed immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(d); TMEP §611.01(b).

 

In general, foreign attorneys are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal).  See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(c), (e); TMEP §§602.03-.03(b), 608.01. 

 

DESIGNATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE:  The USPTO encourages applicants who do not reside in the United States to designate a domestic representative upon whom any notice or process may be served.  TMEP §610; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(e), 1141h(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.24(a)(1)-(2).  Such designations may be filed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp. 

 

 

/Shavell McPherson-Rayburn/

Shavell McPherson-Rayburn

Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

571-272-6121

Shavell.mcpherson-rayburn@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

Offc Action Outgoing [image/jpeg]

Offc Action Outgoing [image/jpeg]

Offc Action Outgoing [image/jpeg]


uspto.report is an independent third-party trademark research tool that is not affiliated, endorsed, or sponsored by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) or any other governmental organization. The information provided by uspto.report is based on publicly available data at the time of writing and is intended for informational purposes only.

While we strive to provide accurate and up-to-date information, we do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information displayed on this site. The use of this site is at your own risk. Any reliance you place on such information is therefore strictly at your own risk.

All official trademark data, including owner information, should be verified by visiting the official USPTO website at www.uspto.gov. This site is not intended to replace professional legal advice and should not be used as a substitute for consulting with a legal professional who is knowledgeable about trademark law.

© 2024 USPTO.report | Privacy Policy | Resources | RSS Feed of Trademarks | Trademark Filings Twitter Feed